equality (all humans without exception are equally considered), and generality (humans should count for everyone).38 Moral cosmopolitanism is an offspring of natural law cosmopolitanism (see Chapter 2), goes back to Greek and Roman Antiquity, and was reactivated, for instance, by Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813) in the Age of Enlightenment. Martha Nussbaum’s concept of world citizenship is meant metaphorically and denotes membership in a worldwide moral community. As moral cosmopolitanism implies normative individualism, it clashes with multicultural or postmodern normative relativism.
Political cosmopolitanism usually argues for some sort of global legal world order. Habermas advocates a thin version of world government with layered sovereignty, David Held has developed a theory revolving around cosmopolitan democracy and cosmopolitan democratic law, others favour a strengthening of existing international political institutions, or the evolution of a global civil society.39 Habermas is close to Kant, whereas Anacharsis Cloots (1755–94) envisioned a world government where states have been absorbed (see Chapters 4 and 5).
Cultural cosmopolitanism acknowledges the diversity of cultures across the globe, and claims that ‘we should recognize different cultures in their particularity’.40 This implies the appreciation of cultural diversity and multicultural hybridization while rejecting (strong) nationalism, but also strong moral relativism. Cultural cosmopolitans work on the scope and limits of the ‘rights to culture’, cultural self-determination, and the rights of minority cultures. Georg Forster (1754–94) is a good example of an eighteenth-century cultural cosmopolitan, and in contrast to the superficial Fougeret de Monbron, he realized that it is difficult to free oneself from prejudice completely and admitted that he himself did not always succeed, while he was in fact rather successful in the enterprise (by challenging Eurocentric racist assumptions, for instance).41
In the eighteenth century, economic or commercial cosmopolitanism held ‘that the economic market should become a single global sphere of free trade’.42 Major representatives were Adam Smith and other intellectuals of the Scottish Enlightenment (see Chapter 3), but also the German Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch (1746–1812). In recent years, economic exchange unrestricted by state intervention has been attacked as neoliberalism, and economic cosmopolitanism has been reformulated by some philosophers in a way that includes elements of moral and political cosmopolitanism.43 Epistemological cosmopolitanism is a way of thinking (‘global thinking’, according to Ulrich Beck), a cognitive orientation with the key feature of impartiality. It is a disposition which entails openness towards others, and an appreciation of diversity.44
This taxonomy of cosmopolitanisms can be further refined. I will briefly mention romantic cosmopolitanism, patriotic cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitisme littéraire towards the end of the eighteenth century in a later chapter. Cloots could be described as a representative of revolutionary or republican cosmopolitanism (see the end of Chapter 5). Francisco de Vitoria or John Locke (Chapter 2), William Penn and John Bellers (Chapter 3) are Christian cosmopolitans (just like today’s German theologian Hans Küng). We even find a ‘Christianized Ciceronian tradition of cosmopolis’ in sixteenth-century neo-Stoicism.45 Thomas Paine or Kant might deserve the label early liberal cosmopolitans (or cosmopolitan liberals). Some equate legal or judicial cosmopolitanism with political cosmopolitanism, whereas others distinguish between them.46 The various forms of cosmopolitanisms are quite different from each other, might clash, but could also overlap. At any rate, they can still be subsumed under the heading of ‘cosmopolitanisms’. As Charles Jones puts it: ‘Cosmopolitanism is actually a range of views – moral, political, and cultural – affirming the importance and value of the community of all human beings.’47
We should not only distinguish among forms of cosmopolitanism. There is another dimension: all forms can come in thin (moderate, weak) or thick (strong, extreme) versions. Strong moral cosmopolitanism, for instance, claims that loyalties, affiliations and preferences at the local level can only be justified ‘by reference to the interests of all human beings considered as equals’. Thin moral cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, claims that the moral ideal of world citizenship is not the ultimate source of legitimization. This type of cosmopolitanism simply insists ‘that one’s local attachments and affiliations must always be balanced and constrained by considerations of the interests of other people’.48 Here, local duties are not derived from duties to humanity as a whole. In the 1990s, Nussbaum started off as a strong moral cosmopolitan, now she seems to have moved towards a moderate version, endorsing openminded patriotism.49 Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism is another form of weak moral cosmopolitanism. We will see that most authors in the following chapters favoured this thin or moderate version.
Cosmopolitans, especially adherents of moral cosmopolitanism, usually defend a form of moral or normative universalism. This leads us to the familiar debates with moral relativists, and attempts to mediate between these positions, or develop an alternative approach. I do not want to go into this any further. Suffice it to say that this problem will be with us in all the following chapters.50
The state of the art and the aims of the book
The current interest in cosmopolitanism has led to publications which usually follow conventional academic disciplinary boundaries. The writers mentioned in a previous section are mostly philosophers, such as Martha Nussbaum, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Seyla Benhabib, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas or Jürgen Habermas.51 Cultural histories, which are often highly specialized and cover the eighteenth century or later periods, are widespread. A fine example is the volume edited by Peter Uwe Hohendahl on patriotism and cosmopolitanism in Hamburg between 1700 and 1933.52
Historical or cultural studies with a broader perspective are surprisingly rare. However, recently two excellent studies have been published. Margaret C. Jacob looks into early science and alchemy, into Masonic lodges, stock markets, international commerce and the radicalization of the late eighteenth century to show how everyday cosmopolitan practices led to new forms of engagement with strangers or unbelievers. Michael Scrivener illustrates how intellectuals in the eighteenth century tried to expand the public sphere, wrote against slavery, race and empire, or advocated Jewish emancipation.53
Literary studies usually define cosmopolitanism in a broad sense, pick several authors and put them in context. Amanda Anderson, for instance, focuses on Charles Dickens and Oscar Wilde, among others, and defines cosmopolitanism as a practice which encompasses above all ‘the capacious inclusion of multiple forms of affiliation’ and the capacity of detachment, which in turn involves ‘an attempt to transcend partiality, interests, and context: it is an aspiration toward universality and objectivity’ (interestingly, this definition takes her close to epistemological cosmopolitanism).54
Especially important for the present study are works in the fields of conceptual history and philosophical or intellectual history. An outstanding example is Andrea Albrecht’s dissertation on the cosmopolitan discourses in German-speaking countries around 1800. Derek Heater has offered a string of books on cosmopolitan themes, revolving around the theme of world citizenship.55 Simone Zurbuchen’s focus is on the Swiss Enlightenment and the familiar tension between patriotisms and cosmopolitanisms, whereas Francis Cheneval’s seminal study discusses the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism in early European thought up to Kant.56
This book tries to show how contemporary debates on cosmopolitanism could benefit from a deeper historical understanding. In an essay entitled ‘Emancipatory cosmopolitanism’, Jan Nederveen Pieterse states: ‘The relationship between cosmopolitanism and history is less often discussed. But cosmopolitanism that does not acknowledge its lineages and does not examine its positionality is unreflexive, unexamined cosmopolitanism.’ He claims that normative