Peacebuilding in Israeli-Palestinian Relations. Saliba Sarsar

political scientist, wrote of what it means to be living in close proximity to Palestinians.

      We are simultaneously enemies and neighbors. One inevitable consequence of war is the depersonification of the enemy. If you do not depersonify your adversary, you cannot shoot him. One cannot depersonify one’s neighbor …. So, we are torn between our affinity to our respective communities and our kinship as human beings participating in the same life cycle. (p. 15)

      Many Israelis abhor what Palestinians have to undergo under the grip of the Israeli occupation. Amos Elon (1997) discussed the plight of “refuseniks”—those reservists or recruits who prefer to go to prison rather than serve in the Occupied Territories (pp. 169–170). Israeli psychologist Dan Bar-On (1997) stated that psychologists were accused of misusing their professional role when they claimed that soldiers were suffering emotionally by participating in suppressing the First Intifada (p. 95). Yoram Binur (1989), an Israeli lieutenant in the Israeli Defense Forces, even disguised himself as a Palestinian to understand the daily Palestinian experience. He wrote,

      I am tired of having to witness the disastrous results of the occupation every day, as well as frightened of the possibility that many people, on both sides, may be doomed to suffer bloodshed and destruction. As an Israeli Jew, I believe that it is too high a price to pay for the messianic and imperialistic aspirations of a small but militant minority among us, all legitimate claims to an independent and secure Jewish state notwithstanding. (p. 215)

      Following the Oslo Accords of 1993 and successive peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian leadership, there was hope that agreeable terms could be reached around such issues like the status of Jerusalem and sovereignty in the West Bank. However, the talks broke down and after Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, the Al-Aqsa or Second Intifada took shape. As leaders at the top attempted to quell the violence, the situation on the ground was brutal. Many Palestinians were killed, beaten, or imprisoned. Many of those injured were children. The conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip only worsened. Israeli operations like Defensive Shield humiliated Palestinians and led to the occupation of important administrative cities like Ramallah. At the same time, the Second Intifada saw escalation from stone throwing and unarmed protests to the use of suicide bombings and rocket firings by militant Palestinian groups such as Hamas, terrifying Israeli citizens. The bombings ←32 | 33→were often in public restaurants and parks as well as scheduled on Jewish religious holidays like Passover.

      Palestinian villagers located east of the “seam zone” or the space between the Green Line and the security or separation wall, have often protested the wall. They have demonstrated and even tied themselves to trees. The protesters were often joined by Israelis and members of the International Solidarity Movement. In 2003, a four-month “peace camp” took place in the Masha village that highlighted efforts to protest the wall. Other local villages imitated the efforts of the Masha village. These protests formed bonds between Palestinians and Israelis and generated increased levels of awareness to many Israelis about how the wall poses problems for Palestinians. Due to the resistance gaining international popularity, some villages actually regained their lands.

      Israeli unemployment peaked at over 13% and unemployment in the West Bank rose to nearly 50% by 2003. Tourism in Israel dropped significantly and the country’s economy contracted over the course of the Second Intifada. All said, at the end of the conflict in 2005, the relationship between Israel and Palestine was arguably the worst it had ever been. Israeli public opinion seemed to take a shift from conflict resolution to conflict management, and the Palestinians were left battered and questioning whether the “shaking off” had been worth the trouble. The Palestinians found themselves without a state or any credible plan to create a state. Even the concession of the Gaza Strip pull out and “end of occupation” was not all it seemed. With Israel still in control of land access, waterways, and airspace in the Gaza Strip, a humanitarian crisis emerged from the overcrowded region that still lingers today, leaving it as a hotbed for Hamas operations and recruitment.

      The years following the Second Intifada were marked by political shakeups and deteriorating conditions on the ground. Politically, the Palestinians appeared to take steps backward. Given the Hamas electoral victory in 2006 and the ousting of Fatah in the Gaza Strip (at the toll of 100 fellow Palestinians), the Palestinians were left even further divided along ideological lines. This made the prospects for peace and a unified state bleak.