new view of the nature of myth as a social phenomenon, namely, that the kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and that the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied. As Lévi-Strauss put it: “What makes a steel ax superior to a stone ax is not that the first one is better made than the second. They are equally well made, but steel is quite different from stone” (Lévi-Strauss 1963 Vol. 1, 230). Or, as Leszek Kołakowski said, the difference between scientific knowledge and narrative (mythical) knowledge is that the former uses one universal language, while the latter usually uses different ones (Kołakowski 1990). By analogy, if we follow the logic of Lévi-Strauss “the same logical process operates in myth as in science, and … man thinks equally well in both. The improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man’s mind, but in discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers” (Lévi-Strauss 1963 Vol. 1, 230). The Russian philosopher Aleksei Losev stated something similar when he defined myth as “poetic estrangement given as a thing.” Losev wrote: “Science, morality and art are intelligent constructs while mythology realizes in fact these or other constructs” (Losev 1991, 163). Therefore it is important to differentiate our understanding of the usage of the term “myth” from another possible variant wherein it is implied in wider social concepts, namely, belief systems.
For instance, John Talmon (1981) used the term in this way:
The French Revolution bequeathed a colossal myth, which continues to have an incalculable effect as an inspiration and example all over the world: the vision of a people’s revolutionary war, in which patriotism and ideological revolutionary ardor became fused. The defense of native land then became identified with the struggle for a political-social ideal; against a counter-revolutionary league of selfish traitors and foreign reactionary powers. “Patrie” became synonymous in France with ‘La Revolution’, revolutionary “Liberté,” “La République une et indivisible.” Such slogans as “la patrie en danger,” “levée en masse,” and symbols like the tricolor, the “Marseillaise” and the red cap, came to evoke an almost religious response. In the cases of the Bolshevik, Chinese, Cuban, Vietnamese and other revolutions, the memory and legends of similar struggles have proved to be far more potent and more cohesive influences than social-economic doctrines and innovating aspirations. (Talmon 1981, 5)
In this case, we should speak not about “colossal myth” (too many components and different aspects are included), but about the complexities of a belief system, i.e., a perception of the world order.
The crucial difference between the usage of these two terms, “belief system” and “myth,” can be found in the scale of the phenomena. These two terms reflect different levels of self-perception by social agents. A belief system tends to be based on the whole of a human being’s self-identity, whereas a myth is instead a particular component of this self-identity. For example, Smith (1984) describes ethnic myths and their components as a particular part of ethnic identity.
The term “belief system” is consistent with both social identity theory as well as with “reflection theory,”, since the former is a part of the same framework of the cognitive tradition in psychology, and the latter defines consciousness as a means of relation between the individual and the world (and this relation is defined by the socially developed system of knowledge fixed in language and all its meanings). This system of knowledge is adopted by the individual from early unconscious childhood and is in fact the first belief system to be built upon. Later on, this initial belief system develops and is accomplished with other belief systems, creating altogether a complex of beliefs or, in other words, an individual worldview, i.e., a cognitive scheme of the world.
In this way a myth as a particular kind of social belief can be a part of a belief system not only as a particular component, but also in the form of a transformation group of myths, as mentioned above. The dynamic between belief systems as a whole and their components remains debatable; however, it is important to stress the inherent differences which exist between them.
As pointed out earlier in this Chapter, national identity usually consists of national myth in the form of an ethnic myth or a complex of ethnic myths, because nations certainly built upon a preexisting “ethnic mosaic” in Europe and, mostly, outside. As Smith observes: “Myths of national identity typically refer to territory or ancestry (or both) as the basis of political community” (Smith 1991, viii). According to the author, the main features and characteristics of these myths vary. For instance, myths of ethnic descent can include, in different combinations, myths: 1) of origins, both temporal and spatial, telling us when we were born and from where we came; 2) of migrations and/or liberation (charting our wanderings and our road to freedom); 3) of descent proper, with a special emphasis upon the nature of our ancestors; 4) of the heroic age, which is an idealized past, a golden age when the community was great and glorious, when our national genius flourished and men were heroes; 5) of communal decline and, perhaps, conquest and exile; 6) of rebirth, a reawakening of the community which involves a summons to political action.
Myths usually exaggerate and dramatize historical events in order to make necessary conclusions more obvious. The Ukrainian philosopher N. Hamitov stated that national mythology is “the way to solve the tragic contradictions of the nation, which are not to be solved in an ‘ordinary’ life” (Mala 1996, 100) and one can only add that the “tragic” character of its perception could be well conditioned by the mythology itself. The function of myths in national (social) consciousness therefore is in mobilizing social opinion and social action. “The myths not only inspire, and even require, certain kinds of regenerative collective action; they answer the all-important questions of identity and purpose which religious tradition no longer seems able to resolve. In the shape of ancient heroes, they give us our standards of collective morality ... By ‘replacing’ us as links in an unbroken chain of generations, the myths of descent disclose our national destinies” (Smith 1984b, 115-123).
At the same time, Gellner argued: “nationalist ideology suffers from pervasive false consciousness. Its myth inverts reality...” (Gellner 1983, 125). In response to this, one can say that a myth of national identity represents reality in another dimension by another language. In fact, a myth successfully performs a real mobilizing function within the national community. If so, it might mean that either reality is already inverted (that is, unreasonable) or that myth is a special form of this reality.
We can apply this consideration not only to nationalist myth but also to all kinds of myths. For instance, Smith writes: “we might well see the emergence of a new European identity and community forging its own myths and symbols, and unifying itself around common values and memories out of the many cognate traditions to hand” (Smith 1988, 25). The basic assumptions for a belief system of European identity are much more amorphous and bleak than for a nationalist one;10 however, its belief system is rather successful. This means that where the nature of myth and its successful functioning are concerned, it is not necessary to follow rational knowledge.
“Under normal circumstances, most human beings can live happily with multiple identifications and enjoy moving between them as the situation requires” (Smith 1991b, 59) But, sometimes, one or another of these identities can come into confrontation with external reality, or enter into conflict with another individual identity. In this case it is a myth that very often can make confrontation less painful for the individual. Myth can become a kind of irrational medicine in order to encompass, or at least to simplify, contradictions within national consciousness. This mechanism is also applicable to social identities where conflicting knowledge can be encompassed through forgetting:
All profound changes in consciousness, by their nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias ... As with modern persons, so it is with nations. Awareness of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of “forgetting” the experience of this continuity—product of the ruptures of the late eighteenth century—engenders the need for a narrative of “identity.” (Anderson 1991: 204-205)
On the other hand, the virtue of a social consciousness is that it can assist in maintaining collective myths much longer than would be