patriotism as an alternative to nationalism, he does not develop the idea of American civic patriotism as a “civic religion.” However, it is revealing that he defines (American) patriotism in terms of religion. In fact, one might consider religion a myth or belief system. In arguing that nationalism does not have to be ethnic, many scholars equate the civic belief system of the United States with civic nationalism. Therefore, we can conclude that nationalism as a belief system can and usually does include a set of myths as an essential part of its doctrine. At the same time, the structural and functional difference between nationalism and myth should be stressed. Insofar as a myth is included in nationalism as an ideological doctrine, it can be adequately included in national identity. In national identity, however, not only nationalists` myths but also other kinds of myths concerning the nature of nationhood and national belonging can be represented, even a cosmopolitan one. However, a belief about a cosmopolitan unity, as opposed to a national one, would have to develop in the evolution of the individual worldview within his/her national identity until a break with national belonging takes place.
The possibility of creating a cosmopolitan, non-national or even global democracy poses a serious challenge to the existing world order of nation-states. If Held is right in arguing that the universal political unification of the world into a system of nation-states was a result of European expansion in order to further its commerce and trade, it suggests that if the European Union replaces the nation-state principle with a supra-national principle, this will eventually became a world-wide movement. In other words, the development of the EU could be a test case for the future of the nation-state precisely because its development is driven by the logic of post-industrial economic development, just as the creation of the nation-state was driven by the logic of industrialization and modernization. Those who discount this possibility argue that, in fact, the national principle of state building may not be displaced by the successful integration of Europe. The European Union might become a super-power-type nation-state similar to the United States. A “United States of Europe” might become another civic nation similar to the American one, but based on a single European culture. Liah Greenfeld argues that potentially even a “United States of the World” would not necessarily depart from the principle of nationalism if sovereignty were vested in the population of the world and its various segments were regarded as equals (Greenfeld 1992).
Although the potential transformation of the EU into a single political unit is not likely to happen in the near future, it is possible to predict that such a federal Europe of countries, but not nation-states, would encounter the problem of developing a common identity capable of mass mobilization to the extent that national identity is capable of this within nation-states. However, as Anthony Giddens asks, would not a globalized democracy, featuring representative assemblies, meet with the same problems of apathy or hostility encountered at the national level? According to Giddens, “cosmopolitan democracy is not only about the movement of governance towards a world level, but about diffusion downwards to local regions” (Giddens 1998, 146). Again, the main reason states might devolve power upwards to institutions of global governance is not idealism but, according to Giddens, because it is in their interest to have the global economy managed more effectively. The latter is equally one of the guiding principles of the emerging EU alternative in the East of Europe—The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
The economic necessity for states to form supra-national or cosmopolitan democratic governance does not, however, provide the answer to the question as to whether national identities will disappear completely, merge into a cosmopolitan identity, or become merely regional components of a supra-national identity. In fact, humans enjoy a multiplicity of identities and new ones do not have to replace the old ones. This, however, does not necessarily hold in the case of nationalism as a political principle, according to which a separate national state is essential for the development of a national culture. In fact, the end of the Cold War manifested newly emerging ethno-national revivals and social identities that rapidly challenged national borders on the continent. US president Donald Trump reflected similar rising sentiments in his electoral base when he used his address to the UN general assembly (2019) to deliver a nationalist manifesto, denouncing “globalism” and illegal immigration and promoting patriotism as a cure for the world’s ills:
“The free world must embrace its national foundations. It must not attempt to erase them, or replace them,” Trump said. “The true good of the nation, can only be pursued by those who love it, by citizens who are rooted in its history, who are nourished by its culture, committed to its values, attached to its people.”
(Quoted from the Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces-globalism)
Trump went on to underline the role of patriots, a self-selecting group of citizens uniquely able to interpret national interest in the globalized world: “Patriots see a nation and its destiny in ways no one else can. Liberty is only preserved, sovereignty is only secured, democracy is only sustained, greatness is only realized by the will and devotion of patriots,” the president said. It is these groups of patriots that were a matter of preoccupation for scholars of national revivals at least since the 1960s.
1.2. Nationalist Revival, National Identity and Security
The emergence of nationalist revivals2 in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism stimulated debate in a number of social science disciplines. Identity, generally, and national identity in particular, became central to scholarly debates on the nature of nations and nationalism. In the 1990s scholars began to explore identity politics and the role of inter-national relations as opposed to inter-state ones, in order to explain the disintegration of the multi-national Soviet state, and inter-ethnic violence in the post-communist world.
Increased attention given to the problem of national identity and nationalist revival in recent years appears to have resulted, according to some scholars, in an “over-production of theories,”’, i.e., in the introduction of new theoretical concepts, but ones insufficiently based on empirical and comparative research. The objective of this work, therefore is, first, to compare existing theories of nations and nationalism in the Western and Eastern (Soviet) European traditions in order to develop a synthetic perspective on nationalism and nationalist revival; and, second, to provide empirical grounding for this synthesis.
As previously discussed, nationalism as an ideology and a political movement is often a major cause of inter-group violent conflict. James Kellas (1991) has argued that the principal task of any theory of nationalism is to find out what kind of force makes people go for “the highest sacrifice” and die for their nation (1991, 170). Yet, nationalism is also a largely unavoidable element of nation building in modern European societies. It is therefore crucial to find out the conditions under which individuals form nationalist groups according to one or another nationalist project.
Modernist theories of nationalism do not explain why individuals decide or happen to choose ideological movements that are new to them and not rooted in their existing cultures. The only systematic research in this direction was done by the Czech scholar, Miroslav Hroch. Hroch enquired into why and under what circumstances individuals move from a simple awareness of national belonging to an active national identity or patriotism. Although Hroch’s Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe was written in 1968, this question remains unanswered, although new comparative research was published involving case studies from around the world (See Maxwell 2012).
Hroch (1985) identifies three main phases of national revival: Phase A—the period of scholarly interest; Phase B—the period of patriotic agitation; and Phase C—the rise of a mass national movement. As Hroch (1998) points out:
We know of a number of cases in which the national movement remained in Phase B for a long time, sometimes down to the present: here we may point to Wales, Brittany, Belarus or the Eastern Ukraine. How can these differences be explained? … The question of the ‘success’ of the national movement cannot be posed in the abstract, but concretely within the individual phases of the national movement. … The first level of the problem [Why did some of the patriots from Phase A decide to begin national agitation? In