Sanitized Sex. Robert Kramm

most American servicemen made no significant attempt to cover up their criminal activities. Occasionally, some servicemen even bluntly showed off their intentions. A certain “G.I. Jopha,” for instance, stopped a Japanese truck driver somewhere in the Tokyo-Yokohama area on September 19, took his vehicle, and left an “obligation letter” that said:

      One car (Buick) Model ‘1930’.

      To be used by the U.S.Gov. for purpose of transporting high ranking officers on official business. After all who won the war, you or me? This certified that this car is to be used to pick up any girls who fuck, and further more who cares what the hell is it to you.

      G. I. Jopha (signed)

      17-fort soldiers of the winning army, U.S.A.

      on this date 19. Sept. 1945.¹⁶¹

      Such statements vividly demonstrate the general attitude of superiority of U.S. servicemen in occupied Japan. Especially in the first few weeks, before the whole bureaucratic apparatus of the occupation regime was established and the presence of the victorious military was still totally new to the occupied, the occupation army’s servicemen appeared to be under no strict regimentation. Apparently, this translated for some servicemen into wholehearted engagement in all the various criminal activities occupied Japan seemed to have to offer.¹⁶² The dimension of sex in the above-cited reports is particularly apparent, and the references to a night out with “geisha girls” and the truck “to be used to pick up any girls who fuck” substantiate the impression that American servicemen sought sexual adventures and exploited opportunities for them in occupied Japan.

      As many of the reports indicate, most sexual assaults were committed along similar patterns. Tanaka Yuki has argued that many servicemen pretended to patrol Japanese neighborhoods to search the area for accessible women. “In many of these cases,” Tanaka highlights, “small groups of G.I.s would intrude into a Japanese civilian house while the family members were asleep to rape the women. Typically, while a few of the soldiers were inside the premises, others were on watch outside the house.”¹⁶³ In addition, rape or attempted rape often followed the distribution of food or other goods. On many occasions, servicemen offered chocolate, cigarettes, or money in exchange for sexual services. Upon rejection, however, perpetrators often forced women into sexual intercourse by beating and/or threatening them at gunpoint.¹⁶⁴ Tanaka’s interpretation thus echoes the evaluation given by the Home Ministry’s Peace Preservation Section in September 1945. The ministry’s analysis and suggestions were explicated in their memorandum about two rape cases in Yokosuka and Tateyama, which both occurred on September 2, 1945. In the first case in Yokosuka, two sailors of the U.S. Navy acted as if they were inspecting the neighborhood. According to the memo, the sailors were purposely ranging the area on midday when most men were at work and the women alone at home. After entering a house, they are supposed to have communicated through unmistakable gestures that they were seeking sexual intercourse and even offered payment. After the women rejected the proposal, the sailors drew their pistols and forced the women to have sex. In Tateyama, located in Chiba Prefecture, another group of two soldiers from the U.S. Eighth Army acted quite similarly. In this case, the memo concluded, it was apparent that the soldiers had knowingly broken the law, because they tried to rape the women “in secret” (hisoka ni) and always posted one man outside as a lookout (mihari ni tatsu).¹⁶⁵

      The occupiers’ responses to the many and continuing reports of the occupied were rather sobering and probably disappointing for Japan’s authorities as well as for the victims of sexual assaults. Usually, SCAP’s reaction was simply to demand more detailed evidence for the crimes reported and to respond that the scarce information Japan’s authorities provided on the suspects was insufficient for further investigation. Quite often, occupation authorities stated that victims and witnesses should give more comprehensive testimonies and more accurate descriptions of the suspected perpetrators, who should be easy to identify due to their uniform and military insignia.¹⁶⁶ As Sarah Kovner has argued on the basis of statistics compiled in 1950 by the Far East Command (FEC), throughout the occupation period a discrepancy existed between cases of rape reported and cases investigated and put to trial. Apparently, 422 servicemen were arrested on rape charges between 1947 and 1949, but only 104 were court-martialed, and only 53 were actually convicted.¹⁶⁷ SCAP also responded to newspaper articles that addressed sexual assaults and other crimes against Japanese civilians committed by occupation personnel. On September 19, 1945, SCAP released an often-criticized press code, which prohibited among other things criticizing SCAP as well as its policies and personnel. Under the press code’s censorship guidelines, reports on harassments, assaults, and other crimes committed by American soldiers and sailors were deemed direct critiques of the occupation and the occupiers, and their publication was therefore prohibited.¹⁶⁸ Both strategies, then, first, that of suspending or even declining to conduct investigations due to an alleged lack of information, and second, that of releasing the press code to censor news reports on servicemen’s crimes, were significant attempts by the occupation regime to officially silence sexual violence in early occupied Japan.

       Preventive Measures: Police and Civilian Efforts and Agency

      The Japanese police were in an ambivalent position in postsurrender Japan. As an integral institution of Japan’s defeated imperial state, the police had lost much of their sovereignty as the former legitimate agent of the state’s monopoly on physical force. The Japanese police had no right to intervene in or even investigate crimes committed by members of the occupation regime. In particular, crimes committed within the premises of the occupation army’s bases, such as black marketeering with U.S. army supplies, but also assaults on Japanese civilians working for the occupiers as translators, typists, caretakers, and cooks, were totally unascertainable by Japanese police officers. In the early days and weeks of the occupation period, much of the police work concerning the occupiers was thus limited to paperwork such as gathering information, securing evidence, and filing reports. Nevertheless, the police were still obligated to enforce Japanese law and maintain order among Japanese citizens. The Home Ministry directly ordered all police units to endure defeat by memorizing Emperor Hirohito’s call for a “grand peace for all the generations to come” (bansei ni taihei o hirakamu) in his radio broadcast of August 15. They were further ordered to maintain “pride” (kinji) in their work as representatives of the Japanese people and to embody additional values such as “open-heartedness” (kyoshin), “kindly, cordial manner” (konsetsu), and “speedy management” (jinsoku shori).¹⁶⁹ Hence, during the first encounter of the early occupation period, a tense and uneven space in which to maneuver emerged for the Japanese police, who had to engage with Japanese civilians on the one hand, and with servicemen of the occupation army on the other.