and stressful.
This means that in order to deal effectively with Japanese, particularly those who have not been partially desensitized by long exposure to foreigners, it is very important to treat them with special decorum. The Japanese recognize that most foreigners do not know their etiquette and generally speaking go to what for them is extreme lengths in tolerating Western behavior that they find unpleasant. But they find that the negative effect of putting up with Western behavior is cumulative and that they need some kind of purging mechanism.
There are many areas of business where it is desirable and justifiable to insist that the Japanese change their ways and accept the foreign approach. But one cannot assault their emotions without there being some kind of negative reaction. Learning how to stroke and not provoke a Japanese businessman is part of the process of working with them.
Obviously some of the more conspicuous and damaging things to avoid are appearances of racial or cultural superiority, failure to pay proper respect to Japanese customs and beliefs, and failure to express appreciation or gratitude when it is due. As the Japanese become more self-confident, there may come a time when derogatory remarks about eating raw fish or other traditional Japanese dishes will no longer be regarded as highly insulting and adversely affect business relationships.
Given the power that the traditional culture has on the behavior of the Japanese, it is interesting to note that the culture chains that bind them break easily and quickly once they are outside of the confines of the culture. Within as little as two years outside of Japan, the average Japanese is internationalized to the point that he or she never again fits into the traditional cultural mold, and when these expatriates go home, they face varying kinds and degrees of discrimination because of their un-Japanese attitudes and behavior.
THE RESENTMENT FACTOR
JAPAN’S ASTOUNDING economic success between the early 1950s and 1970s was viewed by many Japanese as sweet revenge against foreigners who had derided their traditional culture and regarded them as inherently inferior. However, the sudden wealth of Japanese companies and individuals was to add a new twist to the resentment they felt toward the West.
By 1980 there were strong signs that the Japanese business community was feeling beleaguered by the mass of foreigners trying to sell them something or obtain financing for one kind of project or another. What had begun as a trickle in the 1960s had developed into a torrent by the late 1970s. Everybody from presidents, prime ministers, and state governors down to shady hucksters was trying to sell something to the suddenly rich Japanese.
Some of these visitors to Japan came in with a lot of political clout, resulting in promises by the government that did not sit well with the private business sector, exacerbating the feeling that the world was trying to take unfair advantage of Japan.
This phenomenon continued until the early 1990s when Japan’s financial house of cards collapsed, its seemingly unstoppable growth rate slowed to a crawl, and the supreme confidence of the Japanese in the superiority of their corporate structure and management practices took a stunning blow. The emotional high they had been reveling in suddenly deflated like a pricked balloon.
However, this dash of cold water on the global aspirations and confidence of the Japanese— combined with the economic revival of the U.S. and the emergence of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea as major competitors—was to have a significantly beneficial effect on their overall mind-set and in their business relations with the rest of the world.
Businessmen, economists, scholars, and a broad range of people across the entire social spectrum began to question the traditional beliefs and practices that had contributed to the economic miracle that had remade Japan and to urge fundamental reforms that would bring Japan closer to the rest of the world in its social and economic systems.
This urging, combined with the continuously evolving world situation, had a major impact on the public as well as the business mind-set of the Japanese, making it a lot easier to do business in Japan. But this does not mean that their attitudes and behavior have changed to the point that they are no longer Japanese in the traditional sense.
The traditional values and traits that have controlled and defined the Japanese for well over a thousand years remain the foundation of the attitudes and behavior of most adult Japanese in their public lives. Understanding and dealing effectively with Japanese businessmen and government officials continue to require in-depth knowledge of a wide range of these enduring cultural factors.
THE ROLE OF GROUPTHINK
GEORGE ORWELL must have had some familiarity with Confucianism or Japanese culture when he wrote 1984. One of the Japanese cultural factors that remind me of Orwell’s book is called shudan ishiki (shuu-dahn ee-she-kee), an old term which means something like “groupthink.”
Shudan ishiki remains an important ingredient in the Japanese way of managing, especially in larger companies and despite its now obvious shortcomings. There is a slow but gradual movement in corporate Japan to allow individual thinking and initiative, but it is still in its early stages of development and generally is not pervasive enough to significantly change the way one has to deal with companies.
The groupthink concept that continues to prevail in most Japanese companies makes it imperative that virtually all decisions be made by consensus—a factor that dramatically increases the time it takes to reach decisions. The larger the group involved, the longer it can take for consensus to be achieved.
The obvious advantage of shudan ishiki is that once consensus is reached within a section or department, the wholehearted support and effort of the group helps to ensure that the task has a much better chance of being accomplished efficiently and quickly.
However, there is a downside to the groupthink mentality. It is still common for companies, and especially for government agencies, to look at and treat employees as material assets rather than as individuals. Among other things, larger companies and government offices typically switch white-collar workers from one section or department to another every two or three years.
The purpose of this rotation system is to provide employees with experience in all of the key sections and departments so they will have a good overview of the entire operation as they move up in rank and responsibility. On the surface, the system has merit, but in any particular section or department it means that a significant percentage of the members are newcomers with little or no knowledge of the work to be done.
The thinking behind this training method, obviously, is that experienced individuals in each of the sections and departments will train and supervise the newcomers and “carry” them until they learn the ropes.
Foreigners dealing with a Japanese company should be cautious about getting stuck with a section member who is new in the group, is not totally familiar with its work, and may have no clout at all.
The custom of transferring personnel from one job to another without regard for the skills involved—and for putting the newest and greenest personnel out in front to handle walk-in visitors or callers—adds to the amount of time and sometimes the confusion involved in contacting and dealing with firms—and is another reason why it is important to have the name of a responsible person in a company before calling or visiting. By immediately giving the name of the individual you wish to contact, you may be able to avoid getting caught up in the mushy outer wall of the Japanese company.
The effects of groupthink go well beyond regarding the company as a single organism made up of virtually identical parts that are interchangeable. It is also responsible for the way the Japanese structure themselves in groups and act together as teams and factions.
And there is, of course, another positive side to the shudan ishiki syndrome. The ingrained ability of the Japanese to work in groups with extraordinary efficiency is one of their primary economic assets. An analogy I like to use is that the Japanese team behaves like a highly trained military squad, while their foreign counterparts tend to behave like a bunch of weekend warriors.
THE FACTION FACTOR
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