The Emergence of a Regional Elite
There was something deeply unstable about the independent emirate of Bijāya. The high-level officials were mercenaries who were unattached to city or country. They did not have ties to an ancestral home nearby and were not related to the powerful Bedouins that supported the local emirate—although on occasion ḥājibs formed politically motivated marriage alliances with Bedouins. The alliances they built were not long-lasting and, ultimately, their influence was never routinized. The death of a ḥājib or his elimination from the political scene was the chance for new contests and the formation of new coalitions that often rejuvenated old enmities and created new ones. No party or faction had overwhelming political advantage, and this led to a high turnover of officials. High turnover, in turn, not only produced discontinuity in the management of the government’s affairs, it fostered a whole class of functionaries who worked a few years in Bijāya, then in Qasanṭīna, then in Tilimsān or Granada. Instead of having the sons of Bijāya run the independent government of their city, the ḥājibs relied on politically less threatening outsiders. The result was the emergence of a group of administrators, jurists, and tax collectors who could find employment in any city, but who believed Tunis to be the real capital. Even when they belonged to the old families of Bijāya, like the Ghubrīnīs, they attempted to appoint their sons and grandsons to judgeships and other official positions in Tunis.
Conflicts between Ḥafṣid emirs, ḥājibs, members of the urban elite, and Bedouins undermined the autonomy of the Ḥafṣid emirate of Bijāya. The perceived weakness of the ruler of the city undoubtedly encouraged the expansionist aspirations of the ‘Abd al-Wādids, Marīnids, and Catalans who saw in his weakness a political opportunity. But they, too, were unable to do more than pick favorites among the major local players. The possibilities were becoming narrower with every conspiracy that ended in blood, every costly and wasteful siege, and every battle that saw loss of life and treasure. No Ḥafṣid emir in Ifrīqiyā seemed to be able to rally a strong enough coalition to eliminate all the others and bring back a regional emirate. The situation was ripe for a political earthquake, and since it did not come from within, it had to come from outside.
Elite Rule Challenged (1346–64)
Commoners and the Rule of the Elite
In 1346, the aging Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46) learned that his son Abū Zakariyā, who was the emir of Bijāya, had died. He decided to send his other son Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar to replace him. When Abū Ḥafṣ arrived in the city, he quickly realized he was not welcome there. Popular opposition to his appointment was fierce and led to the appointment of the people’s favorite instead. Ibn Khaldūn describes the situation as follows:
The scoundrels (awghād) of the court forced Abū Ḥafṣ to use violence.42 The people (al-nās) feared the consequences and consulted one another. Then there were days of great fear in which a great number of [people among the] populace (kāffa) [tried to] force their [will] on the incoming emir. They marched around the Kasbah bearing arms calling for the rule of their [deceased] emir’s son. Then they scaled the [Kasbah’s] walls and assailed [Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar’s] house, and captured him. They then proceeded to take him out [of the Kasbah] after they had pillaged all his possessions and took him to the home of the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, their [deceased] emir’s son and their lord, who was ready to break from them and join the caliph [Abū Bakr], his grandfather.
His uncle permitted [Abū ‘Abd Allāh to accept their offer] and they pledged allegiance to him in his house. The following day, they took him to his palace in the Kasbah and made him their ruler. He appointed his client Fāriḥ as his ḥājib….43 The sultan became aware of the affairs of Bijāya and he sent them Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān, a most pious sheikh from the Almohads, to placate them. He sent with him a letter investing his grandson Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, son of the emir Abū Zakariyā, [with the office] following their desires. [After that] they were relieved and enjoyed the rule of the son of their [deceased] lord.44
Before these events, the participation of commoners (kāffa) in the politics of Bijāya had never been so significant that they could decide which Ḥafṣid emir would rule. While Ibn Khaldūn’s description makes it seem that the populace made the emir, his reference to a protégé of the Banū Sayyid al-Nās suggests the involvement of the elite behind the scenes. It is also possible, however, that Fāriḥ, who had benefited from Andalusi support in the past, was acting independently of Ibn Sayyid al-Nās and that he was behind the armed commoners. In any case, the “commoners” in question were not completely alien to local politics. If the involvement of non-elites in politics did not produce a complete redrawing of the political map this time, they soon after had a chance to make their presence felt in even more significant ways.
Marīnid Conquests and the Role of the Populace
In 1337, the Marīnid ruler Abū al-Ḥasan (r. 1331–48) took over the ‘Abd al-Wādid capital Tilimsān and became the most powerful monarch in the Maghrib. For the first time since the Almohads (1130–1269), a single dynasty was in the position of being able to bring the entire Maghrib under its rule. Growing Marīnid power threatened the autonomy of Bijāya and other cities in Ifrīqiyā, including Tunis.
Between 1337 and 1346, Abū al-Ḥasan’s influence on Ifrīqiyā expanded greatly.45 For the Ḥafṣid rulers of Bijāya, a consolidation of power on the western frontier did not bode well. Using a strategy that had worked before, the caliph of Tunis, Abū Bakr (d. 1346) sought to placate the Marīnids and hoped that a deal with Aragon would secure naval support in case of an attack.46 In 1342, Abū Bakr officially named his son Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad as heir, and saw it fit to include Abū al-Ḥasan as underwriter of his edict.47 Taking an oath guaranteeing the caliphal succession furthered the Marīnid ruler’s involvement in Ḥafṣid affairs.
At the death of Abū Bakr, his son Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar received the pledge of allegiance thanks to the political maneuverings of Ibn Tafrākīn, the leader of the Almohad sheikhs in Tunis.48 Hearing of the death of his father, the official heir to the throne, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad, ran back to the capital to claim his right, but Abū Ḥafṣ would not let that happen and had the heir and another two of his brothers killed. The Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan used this usurpation as a reason to get directly involved in the affairs of Ifrīqiyā.49 He enticed Ibn Tafrākīn to switch camps and join a host of anti-Abū Ḥafṣ groups in support of the Marīnids. In 1347, the Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan led an army to conquer Ifrīqiyā, leaving his son Abū ‘Inān Fāris in charge of his own capital. On his way, he obtained the peaceful submission of the powerful Dawāwida and of governors as far east as Ṭrāblus.
Abū al-Ḥasan took Bijāya from the Ḥafṣid emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh without a fight.50 The Marīnid ruler sent him and his brother, the emir of Qasanṭīna, from Ifrīqiyā to the western cities of Wujda and Naḍrūma, where they “ruled” as his clients. Abū al-Ḥasan then pushed toward Tunis and entered it without much resistance in September of 1347. The Marīnid sultan made a spectacular entry into the city on his horse, flanked on his right-hand side by the leader of the Zughba of the central Maghrib and the Almohad sheikh Ibn Tafrākīn, and on his left by two Ḥafṣid emirs whom he had freed from the jails of Qasanṭīna. He took possession of the palace of Tunis and then left for a campaign in the south to secure the region.
Next, Abū al-Ḥasan ordered an end to a practice that had allowed Bedouins to collect taxes in exchange for their military service, and offered to pay them instead for services rendered. For him, the Bedouins’ regular access to tax revenue gave them too much autonomy. Not wishing to lose this source of income, the Bedouins attempted to overthrow the Marīnids and restore a Ḥafṣid emir in Tunis. A coalition of Bedouin and Ḥafṣid emirs rallied behind the grandson of a former Ḥafṣid pretender by the name of Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām. In 1348, the two armies met and Abū al-Ḥasan’s army, which included many Ifrīqiyāns, disbanded. He barely escaped with his life: loyalty