we have identified and explored the nature of these threats to our safety and security, we can devise and adopt an aggressive, effective approach to prevention. That approach is set forth in the second section of this book, Prevention.
In our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and other disasters from occurring, our first and foremost priority is to keep dangerous individuals from entering our country or to remove those who are already here. Part of that strategy involves what we do at our nation's borders. An essential part of homeland security must involve border security, which includes reducing the number of individuals who enter illegally. And it also involves interior enforcement—dealing with people who are already here illegally. Porous borders are an engraved invitation to terrorists, gang members, criminal fugitives, and drug and human traffickers to come here and do harm. Yet most individuals who have crossed our borders came for economic reasons and pose no physical danger to the country.
In Chapter 3, “Securing the Border—and Reforming Immigration,” I advocate a two-pronged approach to the problem. First, we must make our borders more secure. This we are doing by building pedestrian and vehicular fencing and deploying more manpower and technology, particularly at our southern border. And second, Congress needs to pass comprehensive immigration reform, in part to free our border patrol and immigration enforcement officers to spend more time pursuing truly dangerous people.
While protecting the nation's borders is paramount, our borders are not our sole line of defense. Our aim is to deal with the threat posed by dangerous people before as well as after they arrive. This requires the deployment of a number of vital tools or options. Chapter 4, “Using Every Tool,” lays out an array of options available to the U.S. government to prevent acts of terrorism from being visited on America. They range from the military option, deployed against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda in Iraq, to information and intelligence gathering and sharing, to law enforcement tools used against terrorists whom we have prosecuted in our civilian criminal courts. But the most promising preventive tool of all is highlighted in Chapter 5, “Why Soft Power Works.”
What is soft power? It refers to the various humanitarian, political, and economic activities we are engaged in throughout the world, actions that may not only reduce terrorist recruitment but wean hearts and minds away from radical ideologies and to a more hopeful, democratic future. Why is soft power the best preventive tool? The reason is simple. The best way to prevent terrorism is to attract people to alternatives to terrorism and to its animating ideology.
For many people, any discussion of preventive measures against terrorism begs the obvious question: Why was the United States unable to prevent the 9/11 attacks? In Chapter 6, “Why Washington Won't Work,” I identify what I call structural obstacles as part of the answer. Basically, every official in government is confronted by a set of powerful impediments to advancing the national interest. In this chapter, I explore some of these obstacles, how they helped derail pre-9/11 efforts to deal with looming dangers, and how we are working hard to counter these obstacles in the future.
While preventing people from launching attacks has been an integral part of our strategy for securing the homeland, it is not the only part. The third section in this volume, Protection: Reducing Vulnerabilities, focuses on the need to identify its vulnerabilities to disasters, natural as well as man-made, and then reduce them.
In Chapter 7, “Protecting and Preserving Infrastructure,” I highlight the need to protect key structures, from chemical facilities to other essential national assets. Since most of the country's critical physical infrastructure is owned and operated by private individuals and businesses, top-down government micromanagement is not the solution. The answer is for government to issue safety and security goals and timetables and then let these individuals and businesses determine how to meet them. This has been our fundamental strategy in dealing with every sector of our economy, most notably the chemical industry. The chapter also tackles the nationwide problem of infrastructure maintenance. What good is it to protect critical infrastructure from a terrorist attack, only to see it crumble due to lack of preventive maintenance? Most of the damage to New Orleans in 2005 from Hurricane Katrina was caused by the collapse of levees that had been inadequately maintained.
In Chapter 8, “Cybersecurity,” I lay out the special problems and risks confronting our cyber infrastructure. At stake are not only commercial and governmental operations, but also such crucial concerns as the uninterrupted functioning of the nation's power grid.
In Chapter 9, “Responding to IEDs at Home,” I deal with the domestic threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These range from conventional explosives to so-called dirty bombs containing radioactive material capable of contaminating the areas in which they are detonated. Unlike a nuclear weapon, an IED is relatively simple to assemble and its materials easy to obtain, which is partly why it has long been the terrorist weapon of choice throughout the world.
In Chapter 10, “Managing Identity,” I discuss another vulnerability that terrorists and others who seek our harm are attempting to exploit, namely identity. The problem of identity theft and fraud has been increasing dramatically over time, and I suggest some practical answers that will likely be applied as technology advances.
Despite our diligent efforts to guard the nation from disasters, the stark reality is that total avoidance of them is ultimately impossible. In fact, a strategy that is designed for this purpose will not only fail, but will be self-defeating. For example, if we wished to eliminate the risk of airliners being blown up, we could shut down all the airports. But that would destroy the airline industry and much of our commerce, effectively handing the terrorists the victory they seek.
It is neither possible nor desirable to pursue a risk elimination strategy. Instead, we must do two things. First, we must adopt a strategy that seeks to manage rather than eliminate risks. Second, we must engage in preparedness planning so that when disasters do happen, we can respond in a manner that minimizes the consequences, saving as many lives as possible.
The fourth section, Preparation and Response, deals both with risk management and with the need to prepare and plan for the possibility of catastrophic events and respond when they occur. In Chapter 11, “Managing Risk,” I make the case for a more sensible and strategic approach to risk, not just for the United States but for the world. I cite three key areas in which government must step in and help people and businesses handle risk more effectively. However, I caution against a mindset of overregulation driven by the fruitless quest for risk elimination.
The need for comprehensive emergency planning can be readily seen when we examine the risks of unleashing weapons of mass destruction against our country. In terms of consequence, there is no greater threat than that of a nuclear device being detonated in one of our major cities. A more likely event, however, and one that deserves greater consideration than it gets, is a biological incident. In Chapter 12, “Biological Threats and Bioterrorism,” I survey the challenges and possible consequences of unleashing a biological agent in the United States. Our society has prepared in various ways for such an event, but it clearly must do more, and the time to do more is today.
No discussion of national preparedness and response is complete without examining the role played by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In Chapter 13, “The Question of FEMA and Homeland Security,” I focus on FEMA's crucial role in that arena. Unfortunately, there are some who argue for removing FEMA from DHS. I make the case that FEMA must stay. FEMA remains an integral part of the overall mission of DHS and can pursue its own mission far better