that the first process, which typically occurs early in the socialization process, is essentially compatible with rational-choice assumptions: state actors make tactical concessions in pursuit of instrumental or material interests, such as releasing political prisoners to retain bilateral aid. In other words, state actors “adjust their behavior to the international human rights discourse without necessarily believing in the validity of the norms” (12). Risse and Sikkink note that sometimes repressive governments will return to repression once the pressure decreases, as Kenya did in the early 1990s. Sometimes, however, the regimes change their discursive practices and start institutionalizing international norms into domestic law for instrumental reasons, and “this in turn opens space for the domestic opposition to catch the government in its own rhetoric”; at this point “instrumental and communicative rationality intertwine,” and thereafter it is very difficult for the regime to deny the validity of human rights norms (15).
Risse and Sikkink argue that the argumentative/persuasion process is still “not sufficient to socialize states into norms-abiding practices” and caution that we cannot consider norms to be internalized in domestic practice until actors comply with the norms irrespective of individual beliefs about their validity (16). Thus, they propose a final type of socialization process, in which norms are gradually institutionalized to such an extent that human rights norms are incorporated as part of the “‘standard operating procedure’ of domestic institutions” (17). Once this stage of institutionalization is reached, changes in government and individual state actors matter less because norms are simply taken for granted and are implemented independently of the moral consciousness of the individual actors (17).
Ultimately, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) present a five-phase spiral model that assumes that political repression triggers activation of a transnational network of NGOs that invokes human rights norms and applies pressure on the repressive state to make concessions; the repressive state denies the validity of the human rights norms as a subject for international jurisdiction and instead asserts the norm of nonintervention; the regime eventually makes some tactical concessions to the transnational network; the regime then becomes trapped in its own rhetoric and concessions, which can lead to either the opposition bringing about a regime change or a process of gradual liberalization; the regime accepts international norms (ratifies treaties and institutionalizes domestically), and ultimately we see rule-consistent behavior due to the regime’s acceptance of the validity of human rights and to increased scrutiny under the monitoring and reporting mechanisms of the treaties.
WORLD SOCIETY APPROACH
A second perspective, the world society approach (for example, Boli-Bennett 1976; Meyer et al. 1997) perceives states to be embedded in an integrated cultural system that “promulgates cognitive frames and normative prescriptions that constitute the legitimate identities, structures, and purposes of modern nation-states” (Cole 2005, 477). Thus, with the proliferation of treaties codifying human rights norms, states’ legitimacy or “good nation” identity is increasingly linked to the formal acknowledgment of these norms (Cole 2005; Wotipka and Ramirez 2007). As Go (2003) notes, the approach posits that newly emerging or independent states will be likely to adopt standardized forms of government, and over time will appear to be similar to other nation-states around the world. As noted in Chapter 1, he finds strong evidence that “documentary constitutionalism has become a globally shared mode of organizing sociopolitical formations” (72). Further, he argues that the approach suggests not only that all states have constitutions, but also that all constitutions come in a very similar package because the larger world system dictates that they should. This perspective posits three mechanisms through which states are influenced by the world polity: the degree of participation in global civil society, particularly membership in international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) (Boli and Thomas 1997); participation in international human rights conferences (Goodman and Jinks 2004); and normative bandwagoning (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, as Cole notes, many states join the traditionally weak human rights regime “not out of deep commitment, but because it signals their probity to the international community,” and thus “a decoupling is endemic to the human rights regime” (2005, 477). As Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) note, this convergence in organization forms and policies does not necessarily lead to changes in state repression, as formal changes are often nominal (1383 and citations therein).
I believe these approaches fall within Most and Starr’s framework in that they perceive that a regime’s opportunities to use the tools of repression are either facilitated or constrained by both the domestic and global environment and influenced by both domestic and transnational actors. The constructivist emphasis on the transformative power of international normative discourse and repeated interactions with state actors assumes that states are socialized to accept new norms. Thus, constructivists would argue that international socialization changes both the menu of appropriate choices and the values through which the regime will evaluate the choices.
Liberal Economic Theory
There are two schools of thoughts concerning the somewhat indirect relationship between human rights and global economic interdependence. As Gilpin (1987) notes, liberals believe that an interdependent economy, and trade in particular, facilitates economic development:
Liberalism maintains that an interdependent world economy based on free trade, specialization, and international division of labor facilitates domestic development. Flows of goods, capital, and technology increase optimum efficiency in resource allocation and therefore transmit growth from the developed nations to the less developed countries. Trade can serve as an “engine of growth” as the less-developed economy gains capital, technology, and access to world markets. This is a mutually beneficial relationship since the developed economies can obtain cheaper raw materials and outlets for their capital and manufactured goods. (266)
Ultimately, liberal trade policies are expected not only to facilitate economic development but also to contribute to an improvement in social and political conditions in less economically developed states, and over time to lead to the emergence of a middle class that increasingly make rights demands upon their government (Lipset 1959)—which will ultimately foster democracy and civil liberties (Meyer 1998; Moran 1998). As Apodaca (2001) notes, according to the positive model of globalization theory, the new globalization/economic liberalization “is privileging individuals and weakening abusive governments” (590). On the other hand, the dependency theory critique of liberal economic theory argues generally that more economically developed states exploit less economically developed states, which leads to uneven development and hinders the socioeconomic growth of the states whose economies are vulnerable to the demands of multinational corporations (MNCs) and multilateral lending institutions. This malign view of developing countries’ integration into the global economy holds that “economic globalization exploits the developing world by means of cheap labor, minimal skill transmissions, restrictions on technology transfers and on long-term commitments to stay and invest,” and thus “foreign capital reinforces and strengthens repression in developing countries” (Apodaca 2001, 591). Ultimately, the less economically developed state’s options are constrained by its economic relationships with the developed world, and its decisions are made to benefit MNCs and domestic elites rather than to look out for its own citizens. Thus, the two positions disagree on how globalization would affect the cost/benefit structure of using coercive force. And they also disagree about what controls the menu of appropriate policy tools and priorities—the values and interests of the general public or those of MNCs and economic elites that. As we will see in the next section, empirical evidence has been rather mixed.
Public Law Perspective
The opportunity and willingness framework is also appropriate for the public law perspective, which would posit that a potentially repressive regime would be constrained by a written constitution with a bill of fundamental rights and freedoms that are protected by an independent judiciary empowered with judicial review (for example, Rosenthal 1990; Ramseyer 1994; Prillaman 2000; and Mutua 2001). Written bills of rights greatly extend the reach of the rule of law and provide individual protection from the over-extension of governmental power, providing new duties and standards of justice and fairness that both politicians and bureaucrats are now required