into Security Council decision making in 1991 created a political opening for subsequent debates about humanitarian intervention in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Security Council Involvement in Iraq, 1990–1992
The Baath Party began its rule of Iraq in 1968 and Saddam Hussein became the regime’s president in 1979. Hussein’s regime was repressive, with “virtually every important liberty, except the freedom of worship, denied to the country’s 17 million people.”12 The mukhabarat, Arabic for secret police, ensured that no political dissent was publicly expressed. Its power over the population extended beyond Iraq’s borders—its agents were responsible for many assassinations of and assassination attempts on exiles who engaged in political activity in opposition to the governing regime.13 The civilian and military leadership of the Baath regime were disproportionately dominated by Sunni Muslims and by members of Saddam Hussein’s family and allied tribes and clans. Saddam Hussein’s personal autocracy was characterized by the political exclusion of a majority of Iraq’s population. The non-Arab Kurdish population in the north (who made up 25 percent of the population) and the Shi’a Muslim population in the south (50 percent of the population) were excluded from power and accused of separatism by the regime. Because of regime fears of disloyalty, both populations were politically and economically disadvantaged and subject to significant political violence committed by the regime.14 The Kurdish population was particularly vulnerable to regime repression, particularly after the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran headed by Ayatollah Khomeini allowed Kurdish guerillas who opposed the Iraqi regime to operate across the border from bases in Iran.15
The Kurdish minority in Iraq numbered between three and four million and lived primarily in the mountainous northeast part of the country adjoining the Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey and Iran. Combined, the numbers of Kurds living within the three states numbered approximately 20 million but international borders made them minority populations in each.16 Violent oppression of the Kurds by the Iraqi regime was persistent since the early 1980s and included mass disappearances, arbitrary arrest and extrajudicial detention, forced resettlement in an effort to change the demographics of the northern region, extrajudicial killings, chemical weapons slaughter, and many other forms of persecution.17 The most devastating was the 1987–88 Anfal or “spoils” campaign, which had long-lasting demographic, economic, and psychological effects on the Kurdish population.18 During this period, the Iraqi regime destroyed approximately five hundred Kurdish villages in northern Iraq, killing between 50,000–100,000 Iraqi Kurds in an attempt to permanently defeat an internal Kurdish insurgency movement as well as to destroy Kurdish culture and way of life.19 International human rights organizations characterized the Iraqi regime’s campaign against the Kurds as genocide.20 In the particularly egregious incident described at the beginning of the chapter, 5,000 civilians living in Halabja near the Iranian border died following a chemical gas attack on the area by Iraqi armed forces in March 1988.21
On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and overthrew the Kuwaiti regime—only two years after acceptance of a UN-brokered cease-fire that ended its eight-year war with Iran. Saddam Hussein initially tried to justify his invasion of Kuwait as “invited,” but the underlying motive for Iraq’s “forced coup” was based in large part on a long-standing border dispute between the two countries.22 Iraq sought control of the Khaur Abd Allah Channel to expand territorial access to the gulf. This control was particularly important in August 1990 because of the closure of the Shatt al-Arab River due to war-related damage from the Iran-Iraq War. The Shatt had carried nearly two–thirds of Iraq’s nonoil cargo.23 Additionally, Iraq was facing significant economic problems as a result of the Iran-Iraq War including cash shortages and mounting foreign debt. Iraq was pushed to the brink of a financial crisis in February 1990 when the price of oil dramatically decreased, and the Iraqi regime blamed Kuwait for driving the price of oil down by refusing to stick to its oil production quotas, even accusing Kuwait of intentionally harming Iraq by stealing oil and manipulating oil prices. Saddam Hussein was further angered when Kuwait refused to cancel Iraq’s debts and offered no financial assistance despite Iraq’s financial crisis.24 Saddam Hussein’s treatment of Kuwaiti citizens and other residents of Kuwait in the immediate aftermath of the invasion mirrored his treatment of his domestic population. Hundreds were killed and wounded, thousands detained, and hundreds of thousands forced to flee Kuwait. The human rights violations leveled against Kuwait’s civilian population included extrajudicial executions, torture, rape, and large-scale arbitrary imprisonment.25
The international response to the Iraqi invasion and its treatment of Kuwaiti civilians was openly hostile. During an emergency meeting on 2 August that convened at 5:10 A.M. in New York, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 660 condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, identifying it as a breach of international peace and security, and demanding immediate and complete Iraqi withdrawal.26 In total, the council passed twelve resolutions between 2 August and 29 November 1990 affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait and demanding that Iraq withdraw its armed forces from Kuwaiti territory. Security Council resolutions became increasingly punitive as Iraqi noncompliance continued. In addition to condemning Iraqi violations of international law and demanding compliance with its past resolutions, Resolution 660 created an economic, military, and financial embargo of Iraq. Resolution 660 has been described as “one of the most sweeping ever produced by the United Nations” because it prohibited trade with Iraq and banned financial transfers except for food, medicine, and basic necessities.27 Subsequent resolutions froze Iraqi assets, established a naval blockade of Iraq, and enacted a restrictive sanctions regime backed by force.28
On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing member-states of the United Nations cooperating with the government of Kuwait “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area” under Chapter VII of the Charter.29 Iraq was given until 15 January 1991 to comply with this and all preceding resolutions or face military force. Resolution 678 passed with the approval of twelve Security Council members (see Table 2.1). Only Cuba and Yemen opposed the resolution, while China abstained. China justified its abstention based on its principled opposition to the use of force to settle international disputes but explained that since Iraq had acted forcefully against Kuwait, China would abstain rather than veto the resolution.30
The near unanimity of the council’s condemnation of Iraqi aggression and its defense of Kuwait were notable. Both permanent and nonpermanent members regarded the Security Council response as “historic” for the United Nations because the council was “rediscovering its true mission”—the maintenance of international peace and security and the use of enforcement action to reverse aggression.31 For example, the U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, made the following statement preceding the vote on Resolution 678:
Table 2.1. Security Council Support for Key Resolutions, Iraq
Permanent members of Security Council are in bold type.
With the Cold War behind us, we now have the chance to build the world which was envisioned by the founders of this organization—the founders of the United Nations. We have the chance to make this Security Council and this United Nations true instruments for peace and justice around the globe…. But if we are to do so, we must meet the threat to international peace created by Saddam Hussein’s aggression. And that is why the debate that we are about to begin will, I think, rank as one of the most important in the history of the United Nations; It will surely do much to determine the future of this body.32
Addressing Iraqi aggression was deemed so important that the UNSC convened at the ministerial level twice, which doubled the previous number of Security Council meetings at the foreign ministerial level.33 Indeed, the resort to force against Iraq would mark “the start of a new era for the United Nations” because it would transform the collective security system and create a flexible interpretation