more than an eighth of the nation’s population in a country already struggling with economic hardship. Of the refugees who fled to Georgia, 70 percent settled in urban areas. The region bordering Abkhazia, just across the Induri River, absorbed 38 percent of refugees, especially those who fled from the neighboring Gali region. Tbilisi drew roughly a third of the refugees. The displaced primarily live in private accommodations (typically with family members) or makeshift collective centers (e.g., hotels, schools, and factories that have been taken over by refugee families).
Most IDPs live in extremely precarious circumstances, suffering from poverty, poor health, unemployment, psychological stress, and social alienation. Most of the communal centers lack adequate basic accommodations and are in urgent need of repair.50 IDPs are entitled to social support benefits similar to those provided to vulnerable Georgian residents, conditional on being registered with the Georgian Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation (MRA), which was established in 1996 to address the specific needs of IDPs in Georgia. Registered IDPs who live in private residences are entitled to US$8.00 per month, while those in collective centers receive US$6.50 plus free public utilities (e.g., water, electricity). The registry was updated in 2004, and the status of 210,000 IDPs from Abkhazia was verified ten years after the end of armed conflict.51 In 2006 the MRA launched a program that allows IDPs to register the titles to their land in Abkhazia in a state inventory to protect property and inheritance rights of ethnic Georgians.52 This could become a bargaining chip with Abkhazia should the parties restart negotiations over the rights of refugee to their property (as protected by international law).
In 2007 the Georgian government developed a new national strategy on IDPs. It again emphasized their right to return but made more explicit that integration into Georgian society need not hinder future return to their place of origin (including Abkhazia).53 The reemergence of armed conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia (another breakaway region) highlights the need for the swift implementation of measures to address IDPs’ short- and long-term needs, whether through repatriation or resettlement and integration in Georgia proper.
Assessment and Possible Lessons
Abkhazia, while formally agreeing to repatriation, has hindered the return of refugees both officially and unofficially for more than fifteen years. In 1995 the de facto authorities of Abkhazia offered to accept two hundred returnees per week, which observers argued was too few given the number of IDPs in Georgia.54 More recently Abkhaz officials claimed that resettlement to areas outside of Gali was “impossible now.”55 Unofficially, Abkhaz militias continue to terrorize ethnic Georgians who do return, while others expropriate the property of those who do not. Their actions continue to deter any substantial resettlement of IDPs in their homeland. The authorities have little incentive to combat these activities since the longer Abkhazia can keep returnees at bay, the greater the opportunity to cultivate an Abkhaz-centric society to which Georgian refugees would not wish to return if permitted.
For its part, Georgia has single-mindedly pursued the goal of resettling IDPs in Abkhazia. Critics claim that the needs of IDPs have been secondary to the issue of territorial control.56 Georgia has drawn criticism for being so committed to the right of IDPs to return to their homes in Abkhazia that it effectively denied IDPs other rights, such as legal rights to vote, own property, or work. Georgia has also failed to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to those who return of their own accord and denied displaced persons the full rights of citizens in Georgia.
In more recent years Georgia has taken steps to integrate IDPs into political and economic life, while taking precautions that these do not preclude their right to return. For example, IDPs were granted the right to acquire property in Georgia while maintaining their IDP status (and thus the right to return to and reclaim their property in Abkhazia). As yet there is no change in Georgia’s official policy toward Abkhazia, which is of course the most significant determinant of IDPs’ prospects for return.
Russia’s role has continually been a complicating factor. Initially, Russia refused to recognize Abkhazia’s independence for fear that it would be used to legitimate Chechnya’s calls for independence. However, Russia supplied weapons to Abkhazia and passports and pensions to its citizens, and imposed economic sanctions on Georgia at various times since 1994.57 Given that Russia had clearly taken sides in the conflict, it was an inappropriate choice to be the sole supplier of peacekeeping forces in the UNOMIG operation. This, no doubt, harmed relations between Georgia and Abkhazia.
So long as no political solution to the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is in sight, there remains little hope for the peaceful return of many ethnic Georgian IDPs to their homes in Abkhazia. Moreover, in recent years the Georgian government has begun to recognize that many IDPs may prefer not to return to Abkhazia, given their safety concerns. Thus, a durable solution may take the form of resettlement in Georgia rather than repatriation, regardless of how the territorial dispute is resolved. The Gali region may be an exception, as both Georgia and Abkhazia benefit from reversing the decline in agricultural production, which would involve restoring ethnic Georgian farmers to their land. Outside of this one area, there are no immediate prospects for the return of the remaining 220,000 to 250,000 Georgians to Abkhazia.58
Many national and international forces were marshaled to resolve the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia in such a way that those who fled their homes could return without fear of recurrent violence. However, the best agreements and outside assistance could not overcome the discord between parties, both of which have used the IDPs for political gain. This case study provides a cautionary tale of the importance of addressing the root cause of the dispute. The following are several lessons from the experience of Georgia and Abkhazia that may have broader relevance:
While formal agreements can be valuable for outlining the principles of returning IDPs to their homes, they are woefully inadequate if both parties are not committed to the process. The language of such agreements is typically broad enough that either party can stall the process without violating the letter of the law. In short, formal agreements are a necessary condition for resettling IDPs but not a sufficient one.
Without peace, repatriation is infeasible. The ethnic divide that caused the conflict between neighbors in the first place will reemerge if efforts to resolve the underlying issues are not successful. This was made apparent when, in 1998, the homes, schools, and farms of Georgian returnees to Gali, which had been rebuilt with international donor assistance and under international monitoring, were decimated by partisan attacks once again. In a matter of days, 40,000 people fled the renewed violence.59
Prolonged periods of displacement may make either eventual return or integration into the receiving country more difficult as IDPs’ lives remain fractured. Evidence collected from interviews with IDPs in communal centers in Georgia suggests that living as IDPs without integrating into Georgian society encourages many to relive the memory of the ethnic conflict in Abkhazia, thus hardening their outlook. They become less able to reconcile with the ethnic Abkhaz in their homeland and remain isolated from fellow ethnic Georgians in Georgia.60
IDPs can be used as a political bargaining chip, thus slowing progress on repatriation or other forms of settlement. It is important to understand what stake each party to the negotiations has in the outcome. The commitment to returning displaced persons to their homes can inadvertently lead to further disadvantaging them in the meantime. Granting the legal rights to vote, purchase property, and make a living is vital to the well-being of IDPs, and this can be pursued without abandoning efforts to return them to their homes.
The details of the conflict are critical to determining what will and will not be feasible solutions. For example, it has been argued that the solution offered by Georgia, namely that Abkhazia become a largely autonomous region within the Republic of Georgia, is dismissed out of hand by Abkhaz leaders because it is likened to the “autonomy” former Soviet republics had under Soviet rule, which was a fig leaf.61 Thus, improving the communication and trust between parties is critical to overcoming such semantic debates and developing a resolution to the conflict.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Issue and Outcome
In 1992, after the collapse of