not be unjust to say that ambitious designs against one’s neighbours are not as a rule openly proclaimed, and that therefore the absence of such proclamation, and even the profession of unlimited and universal political, benevolence are not in themselves conclusive evidence for or against the existence of unpublished intentions.81
Would German expansion be peaceful, and economic in nature, or would Germany seek hegemony over Europe? The answer was fundamentally unclear.82
Unsurprisingly, German intentions became the subject of much debate within the British government. Regardless whether the Conservative or Liberal Party held power, pro- and anti-German groups struggled to assert their respective views. After 1902, Chamberlain and his son, both members of the Conservative Cabinet, argued that German intentions were inimical to Great Britain. Other ministers, however, perceived German ambitions in a more benign light. Foreign Secretary Lansdowne and Balfour, then prime minister, initially remained unconvinced by either side, but Lansdowne’s attempt to use reform of the colonial administration in Egypt as a “test case” for German goodwill brought disillusionment. Angered by Berlin’s recalcitrance, Lansdowne and Balfour became increasingly skeptical of German motivations.83
Disagreement over German intentions divided the Liberal Cabinet elected in late 1905 and became increasingly sharp as the naval arms race with Germany accelerated. During the debate over British naval requirements for 1909, Cabinet members Lloyd George and Winston Churchill rallied other ministers with favorable views of Germany to press for only four new battleships. The anti-German group, which included Grey, insisted that six dreadnoughts were necessary to retain a margin of safety over the German fleet. The debate was heated, and at one point, Grey threatened to resign. Only a compromise brokered by Prime Minister Asquith prevented conflicting assessments of German intentions from tearing the Cabinet apart.84
Within the British government, the balance gradually shifted toward the anti-Germans. This upwelling of mistrust was catalyzed by the autocratic nature of Germany’s regime. The lack of sources illuminating German intentions led British elites to focus on what they could observe: actions abroad and changes in military capability.
Colonial quarrels sparked initial British misgivings about Germany’s trajectory. The kaiser’s interference in relations between the Cape Colony and the Boers, the occupation of Chinese Kiaochow by German forces in 1897, German demands on the Portuguese colonies, and the acrimonious partition of Samoa—all were interpreted by the British Foreign Office as symptomatic of a more fundamental antagonism. By the turn of the century, Great Britain’s career diplomatic corps had become a bastion of anti-German sentiment.85 German assertiveness overseas likewise provoked growing anxiety in successive Cabinets. For Lansdowne and Balfour, German resistance to the consolidation of Great Britain’s position in Egypt appeared a harbinger of deeper ill will. Similarly, Grey regarded the diplomatic crisis triggered by the kaiser’s landing in Tangiers as indicative of enduring German hostility.86
The relentless expansion of the German fleet loomed large in British threat assessments and more than any other factor strengthened the hand of anti-German groups. Based on the technical specifications of the German fleet, Selborne, first lord of the admiralty and originally an advocate of an Anglo-German alliance, concluded in 1902 that “the German navy is very carefully built up from the point of view of a new war with us.”87 Coming to power in the midst of the first Moroccan crisis, Foreign Secretary Grey perceived Germany’s willingness to limit naval armaments as a touchstone of its intentions. The fruitlessness of the naval talks amplified the mistrust Grey already harbored.88 Minus the reassurance mechanisms of a democracy, Germany’s maritime buildup cast an ominous shadow over its rise.
“The Emperor Is a Very Odd Man”
An autocratic system lent additional uncertainty to Germany’s ascendance by placing the kaiser at the epicenter of foreign policy. Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany was a mercurial monarch. His instability concerned Great Britain as early as 1895, the year perceptions of Germany’s rise became widespread. Reporting to London, the British Embassy in Berlin warned that the kaiser’s mind was “subject to hallucinations.”89 Prime Minister Salisbury, in response to the report and other information about the kaiser, noted: “The conduct of the German Emperor is very mysterious and difficult to explain. There is a danger of his going completely off his head.” Moreover, Salisbury perceived the kaiser as the source of extreme German behavior. He believed that “outrageous” German demands for territory in Africa could only reflect the kaiser’s decision to go against the wishes of more responsible statesmen.90
In January 1896, the kaiser’s impulsiveness directly fueled British mistrust of Germany’s rise. After the Jameson Raid—a botched attempt by British citizens from the Cape Colony to overthrow the Transvaal Republic—the kaiser, in a fit of rage, dispatched a congratulatory telegram to the Boer president. What became known as the Kruger telegram directly challenged British interests in the Transvaal by implying recognition of the Boers’ independence. Through rumor, the British government discerned that Wilhelm had disregarded the advice of the chancellor and others when sending the telegram.91 This episode demonstrated to British leaders that German intentions could rapidly change due to the kaiser’s erratic nature.
The kaiser remained a key point of uncertainty as German power expanded. In the midst of the Anglo-German alliance negotiations, Balfour observed: “The Emperor is a very odd man.” The first lord of the treasury worried that failure to fulfill the expectations of “so impulsive a being” might produce an abrupt turnabout in German foreign policy—the kaiser would seek an arrangement with France and Russia, then Great Britain’s chief adversaries.92 Negotiating with Germany over the fate of Samoa in 1899, Salisbury complained: “It is a great nuisance that one of the main factors in the European calculation should be so ultra-human.”93 On reading a description of the kaiser’s talks with the czar in 1905, Foreign Secretary Lansdowne echoed his colleagues: “the Kaiser’s language and demeanor fills me with disquiet. What may not a man in such a frame of mind do next?”94 Lansdowne’s successor, Grey, on meeting the kaiser, concluded that he was “not quite sane.”95 Centralization of authority in the hands of the kaiser rendered German intentions doubly opaque and compounded British concerns arising from Germany’s colonial assertiveness and naval buildup.
Friendless in Berlin
As the power transition with Germany moved forward, British leaders had few avenues for the shaping of strategic behavior. In a political system that centralized authority, only one point of access existed: the kaiser and his closest advisers. However, this point of access was unfriendly toward Great Britain. During his posting in Berlin, Spring-Rice noted: “the Emperor and his people are actuated by feelings of hostility against England which are only limited by the German regard for law and by the practical fear of reprisals.”96 Later reports from the British Embassy in Berlin confirmed the kaiser’s animosity toward Great Britain. In 1904, the British ambassador informed Lansdowne: “I hear from other sources that the Kaiser has been generally letting out against England.”97 This message, along with news that Wilhelm had become convinced that Great Britain was planning a surprise attack, led Lansdowne to wonder whether the center of political power in Germany was not actively hostile: “They cannot seriously believe that we are meditating a coup against them. Are they perchance meditating one against us?”98
Keenly aware of their inability to shape Germany’s foreign policy from within, British elites gravitated toward a theory of “two Germanies.” The kaiser and his advisers were dangerous and warlike, while the majority of the German people were peace loving.99 This view made inroads among even some of the pro-German members of the Liberal Cabinet. Lloyd George came to espouse the “two-Germanies” theory after a visit to Berlin in 1908. The chancellor of the exchequer was “gravely disturbed by the expressions of distrust and suspicion I had encountered…. It seemed to me to be ominously significant of what must be the general opinion at the time in leading German circles.”100
If democratic rule had prevailed in Germany, the kaiser’s antipathy would not have deprived Great Britain of friends in Berlin. The British government could have cultivated