Stephanie Dornschneider

Whether to Kill


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      By contrast, cognitive mapping has been applied by researchers from various other disciplines. Indeed, as Elpiniki Papageorgiou and Jose Salmeron note in their review of fuzzy cognitive mapping over the past decade, the approach has “gained considerable research interest” (2013: 66; my italics). Examples range from economics (Lee et al. 2012; Zhang, Shen, and Jin 2011; Krüger, Salomon, and Heydebreck 2011), to engineering (Mendonca et al. 2013; Zarandi et al. 2012; Bhatia and Kapoor 2011), to medical studies (Georgopoulos and Stylios 2013; Giabbanelli, Torsney-Weir, and Mago 2012; Papageorgiou 2011), geography (Soler et al. 2012), and biology (Wills et al. 2010; Wehner and Menzel 1990). Indeed, cognitive maps have become a subject of research themselves (Peng, Wu, and Yang 2011; Miao 2010; Eden 2004; Montello 2002; Nadkarni and Shenoy 2001; Brotons 1999; Chaib-Draa and Desharnais 1998; Young 1996).

      What Is New About the Application of Cognitive Mapping in This Book

      What all applications of the cognitive mapping approach have in common is that they investigate behavior by focusing on the actors’ belief systems. This makes cognitive mapping a powerful tool to investigate human behavior, bridging the gap between actors and external structures, and allowing study of the mechanisms underlying human behavior. What is new about this book is the application of cognitive mapping to the study of violent individuals. It is extremely difficult to identify and locate violent individuals, and to convince them to consent to be interviewed. Therefore, violent individuals who agree to be interviewed add a group of particular interest to the existing literature on political violence. Several researchers have conducted interviews with violent individuals, but to my knowledge none of them has applied the cognitive mapping approach to analyze these interviews.

      Moreover, my construction of cognitive maps from ethnographic interviews adds to the more general cognitive mapping literature, which often uses policy transcripts or public speeches. The individuals who participated in these interviews not only include individuals who engaged in violence, but also individuals who engaged in nonviolent activism, both Muslims and non-Muslims. This diversity adds analytical rigor to the cognitive maps by involving control groups that often remain absent from the study of political violence.

      What is also new about the application of the cognitive mapping approach in this book is the formalization of cognitive maps into DAGs. As described, this formalization copes with the complexity of cognitive maps that has led to the abandonment of the approach in political science. Based on recent literature in graph theory and computer science (see Pearl 2000; Koller and Friedman 2009), this formalization cannot only be used to rigorously compare the cognitive maps of different individuals but also to model alternative worlds in which individuals would not have decided to engage in certain behavior.

       Part 1: Main Elements and Structure of Cognitive Maps

      Beliefs

      Beliefs are a major component of cognitive maps. Specifically, beliefs identify the factors motivating human behavior. In this study, beliefs identify the factors motivating individuals to take up arms, or to refrain from doing so (see Chapters 46).

      Beliefs are usually defined as mental states.4 More specifically, beliefs are “a person’s subjective probability that an object has a particular characteristic (for example, how sure the person feels that ‘This book is interesting’ …)” (Fishbein and Ajzen in Oskamp and Schultz 2005: 11). Since they are held by individuals, beliefs are by nature subjective. However, beliefs may be inter-subjective or shared (it is possible to say “we believe in X”; cf. Bar-Tal 2000). This is possible because many beliefs address observations that are accessible to anybody. As Nilsson writes, “I believe I exist on a planet that we call Earth and that I share it with billions of other people” (2014: 1). Such beliefs are called true beliefs or knowledge. Since they address observations, true beliefs are verifiable by a perspective external to the subject who holds them. Beliefs can also address other factors, which may not be observable. For example, they can address abstract ideas, such as today is Monday; moral rules, such as it is forbidden to kill somebody; religious beliefs, such as God exists; feelings like I am happy; social encounters like I am visiting my brother; or even assumptions that contradict observations in the world, such as all swans are black. Table 4 gives an overview.

Subjective beliefs A subject believing something to have a particular characteristic
Intersubjective beliefs Several subjects believing something to have a particular characteristic
True beliefs Are believed to have a particular characteristic (verifiable from an external perspective)

      When theorizing about political behavior, it is important whether the beliefs held by the actors are true beliefs, intersubjective, or purely subjective. The most significant beliefs are true beliefs, rather than intersubjective or purely subjective beliefs, because true beliefs identify factors that can be verified from an external perspective. As I elaborate in Chapters 4 and 5, the major beliefs identified by this study are true beliefs. These show that violent individuals are neither mentally ill nor driven by religious beliefs. More specifically, they show that both violent and nonviolent activism are primarily motivated by state aggression. Whether beliefs are true, intersubjective, or subjective is indicated by what the beliefs address and is called propositional content.5 The form of propositional content is (I believe) that X. For example, the propositional content of my belief that there is a car in front of my house is “that there is a car in front of my house”; the propositional content of my belief that tables can talk is “that tables can talk”; and the propositional content of my belief that lying is wrong is “that lying is wrong.”

      Different propositional contents may identify different types of beliefs, and the following paragraphs identify six types of beliefs. Rather than being exhaustive, these types show that beliefs can be used to study various types of factors, such as observations, abstract ideas, social norms, and feelings.

      The first type addresses observable things that can be verified in the external world by one’s senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch). Examples of such beliefs are “I believe that dogs have four legs,” “I believe that there is a desk in my office,” or “I believe that fish live in water.” Since these beliefs are verifiable from a perspective external to the subjects holding them, they can be called true beliefs.6

      The second type addresses something that logically contradicts an observable thing. Some examples are “I believe that tigers are pink,” “I believe that trees can fly,” or “I believe that the world is flat.” Based on verification in the external world, beliefs that address such propositions can be called false beliefs. Although what is addressed by their propositional contents is false from empirical evidence, people may nevertheless hold such beliefs, for example when they dream, when they deny certain things, or when they hallucinate.

      The third type addresses abstract ideas. Abstract in this sense means that what is described by this type of belief cannot be perceived by one’s senses. Some examples are nationality, time, or religion. Nevertheless, abstract ideas may be verifiable in the external world by certain things or words. For example, it is possible to verify my belief that I am Australian by checking my passport; it is possible to verify my belief that I am unpopular by asking people who know me what they think about me; and it is possible to verify my belief that it is the year 2060 by looking at a calendar. Thus, beliefs of this type may be true beliefs or false beliefs.

      Nevertheless, some beliefs of this type cannot be verified in the external world. Such beliefs cannot be true beliefs or false beliefs. Examples