success requires confidence and a sense of self-worth in addition to intellect. Lastly, social psychologists and economists have recently published several studies identifying attitudes and behaviors that Rousseau typically associates with amour-propre.21 It would be ill advised, therefore, to suggest amour-propre belongs to another age and is inappropriate for understanding modern life. It still has much to teach.
Rousseau’s Argument in Brief: Homeric Undercurrents in Modern Liberalism
Rousseau’s own analysis is far more ambitious than those of either early liberal theorists or twentieth-century social scientists. Rather than merely describe liberalism through amour-propre or identify instances of amour-propre in liberal democratic culture, Rousseau makes a systematic argument in which he demonstrates that liberal institutions and ideologies both awaken and corrupt the passion. His argument is shocking, resting upon two controversial premises.
The first, as previously mentioned, is that amour-propre is a classical aristocratic passion. In ancient Greece, being aristos referred to either those of high birth or those who distinguish themselves as best on the basis of talent and excellence. Rousseau has little sympathy for persons of high birth; he is most interested in the latter sense of the term. He thinks that amour-propre becomes inflamed when it is aroused by publicly rewarding excellences and merit. Although I will not present my case for this contention until Chapter 1, for now it is worth pointing out that his discussions are replete with references to aristocratic terms such as honor and “being best.” In the Second Discourse Rousseau describes amour-propre as “the genuine source of honor” and claims it results from the desire to be the best singer, dancer, orator, athlete, and so forth.22 In addition, in the First Discourse his stated enemies are the intellectuals, not the nobles.
The second premise is that the desire to be aristos in its second meaning, as being honored for excellence, is prevalent in commercial democracies. While modern liberals praise equality and celebrate the dignity of all persons, they also fiercely compete for socioeconomic status and believe social hierarchies reflect individual merit. Commercial democracies have their own aristocrats, whom Rousseau describes as possessing many of the attitudes and psychological traits attributed to the Homeric heroes. This includes amour-propre as well as an inclination to cruelty and a willingness to harm the weaker and poorer members of society.
These two premises lead to a startling conclusion: modern society is more classically aristocratic than is often appreciated and produces individuals who have the same desires and concerns as their counterparts from bygone ages. Rousseau thinks that modern liberals have not created a new age of democratic equality so much as refashioned aristocracy for the commercial age. This is perhaps Rousseau at his most radical, yet also his most relevant. His analysis invites his reader to confront how deeply inequality is imbedded in modern democracies.
Recent Scholarship on Rousseau’s Amour-Propre
This interpretation of Rousseau’s amour-propre is at odds with much of the current literature, which seeks to revive interest in his treatment of the passion by minimizing his radicalism and assimilating it into mainstream liberalism, especially Kantianism. Contrary to earlier generations of scholars, who generally believed amour-propre to be mostly dangerous and destructive, today’s scholars argue that it can be both good and bad. To correct for earlier onesided, grim views of amour-propre, these new scholars have dedicated themselves to uncovering numerous positive uses of it in Rousseau’s works. N. J. H. Dent, the godfather of this new approach, interprets Rousseau as a recognition theorist in the Kantian-Hegelian mold and contends that respect for rights and personhood originate from amour-propre.23 Laurence D. Cooper argues that amour-propre “is a necessary condition for many good things,”24 including familial and conjugal love,25 virtue, patriotism, compassion, moral heroism, and, from the “Savoyard Vicar” in Emile, self-esteem. Adding to this list, David Lay Williams notes that in the Dialogues Rousseau cites it as an antidote to laziness.26 Frederick Neuhouser, partially following Dent’s Kantian-Hegelian approach, ambitiously contends that “rationality, morality, and freedom—subjectivity itself—would be impossible for humans if it were not for amour-propre”27 In his account, the passion satisfies both cognitive and motivational preconditions for the establishment of the general will. Cognitively, amour-propre is a social and comparative emotion that allows people to view the world from other people’s perspectives. With regard to motivation, it encourages people to value public esteem over individual material gain. If amour-propre is linked to the general will, people will be inclined to conform to the sovereign good even if it violates their individual self-interest.
There is probably little point in contesting these claims. They have been well researched and are backed up with an impressive amount of textual evidence, especially from Emile. A casual perusal of Rousseau’s works confirms their case. Even in the decidedly negative Second Discourse Rousseau asserts that to amour-propre “we owe what is best and worst among men,” though he does qualify this statement by asserting that it is responsible for “a multitude of bad things [and] a small number of good things.”28 And in Emile he similarly claims it “is a useful but dangerous instrument,” though he again qualifies his position by stating that “often it wounds the hand making use of it and rarely does good without evil.”29 It is undeniable that Rousseau’s analysis of amour-propre goes well beyond noxious vanity. Granted, earlier generations of Rousseau scholars were cognizant of Rousseau’s claim of positive amour-propre.30 The “positive amour-propre” theorists—Dent, Cooper, and Neuhouser—devote far more attention to it, however, and put it at the forefront of their interpretations.
To their credit, moreover, the positive amour-propre theorists are careful not to exaggerate the potential utility of amour-propre and are acutely aware of its perils. Dent concedes Rousseau “often” refers to amour-propre in its most perverse sense and is “sharply aware of the potential for damage,”31 while Cooper notes “amour-propre never stops being dangerous—indeed, potentially calamitous—and hence needs to be sternly and thoroughly governed.”32 He also acknowledges that Rousseau’s own attempt to transcend it is implausible for an overwhelming portion of the population. Neuhouser is the most cautious of the three, at least in his first book on amour-propre, and does not believe that Rousseau offers a credible solution to the problems created by the passion: “The highly unusual and demanding conditions that these solutions to the problem of evil presuppose—not merely a godlike legislator and an improbably wise tutor but also a complete wiping of the historical slate (in the case of politics) and total seclusion from the particular bonds of family (in the case of education)—must make us wonder exactly what kind of possibility Rousseau takes himself to be demonstrating.”33 If amour-propre is beneficial in many ways and an ineradicable feature of modern human consciousness, there is nonetheless little chance of limiting its dangerous expressions.
Despite this stipulation, there is something deeply dissatisfying about emphasizing the positive dimensions of amour-propre. By casting Rousseau as a proto-German idealist who holds that equal social standing can satisfy the emotional needs of self-respect often associated with the passion, they blunt the critical edge of his daring political theory. The central message of his various discussions of amour-propre is not that it is a malleable passion capable of redirection toward some social or emotional good. Rather, it is that the emerging eighteenth-century democratic and commercial order corrupts the human need for self-love. It tolerates and nurtures high levels and specific forms of inequality that, combined with amour-propre, often result in domination and cruelty. Indeed, it is impossible to fully understand the view Rousseau has of amour-propre without putting it in the context of his social and political criticism. At its core, his political thought is about inequality in liberal democracies, as is his conceptualization of amour-propre.
To be fair, the three positive amour-propre theorists are not insensitive to Rousseau’s politics. Neuhouser, in particular, recognizes that the Second Discourse is primarily