look at how I have approached the issue of the relationship between structure and action, on the one hand, and path-dependent and path-forming development processes, on the other hand. This is followed by an account of various concepts that will aid the examination of gradual institutional change and the introduction of historical and sociocultural traditions from China and East Asia, which I then integrate into my analysis in a nonculturalist manner.
STRUCTURES, STRATEGIC CAPACITIES, AND CHANGE
In societies where capitalism prevails, social actors are subject to external imperatives to act. Unlike orthodox liberal explanations, which postulate a balance of rational individual choices, such constraints result in practices that are not merely the result of intentional action. For this reason, relationships between structure and action (as well as their meaning) have to be looked at dialectically, as it were (Hay 2002). In addition, the different strategic capacities of social actors—the difference between Chinese migrant workers and influential entrepreneurs, for example—also have to be taken into account because such differences result in an uneven playing field for conscious or strategic intervention.
Human labor power is marked by its creative ability to recognize problems and find innovative ways of solving them. This creative ability is one of those phenomena that are difficult to capture in theory, let alone predict. Similarly, entrepreneurial innovations are difficult to comprehend rationally and, indeed, often come about as a result of spontaneous ideas, or even by chance, during search and learning processes (see Sauer and Lang 1999). Innovations require conditions that, in most cases, do not exist at the moment of innovation, which is why there is only a limited scope to calculate risks rationally. For societal dynamics under capitalism, it is important that not only the socially privileged but also the middle and lower social classes attempt to seize opportunities for advancement: “The exceptional level of commitment or motivation that capital valorization is based on can only be achieved with a strong focus on advancement” (Deutschmann 2009b, 47, my translation). Thus, to facilitate an examination of political economies, the actors’ normative orientation must be factored in. An analysis of social structures must always take into account actors’ options and strategies, as well as their motivation and perceptions:
In stressing the interdependence and co-evolution of … interrelated semiotic (cultural) and extra-semiotic (structural) moments in complexity reduction and their consequences for meaning-making and social structuration, [one can] avoid two complementary theoretical temptations. The first is seen in different forms of structuralism and social determinism, which reduce agents and actions to passive bearers of self-reproducing, self-transforming social structures…. The second temptation is the sociological imperialism of radical social constructivism, according to which social reality is reducible to participants’ meanings and understandings of their social world. (Jessop 2009, 8–9)
Unlike analyses where historical developments are ordered within the tight frame of reference to capitalist development logic, drivers of capitalism should generally be examined within the context of their historical change. In reality, structural dynamics and imperatives to act are shaped by social and political strategies, that is, strategies based on normative motivation, including the power elite’s strategic projects. The latter may possess the power to form structures. Drivers of capitalism must not be viewed in a functionalist light as they are embedded in social, political, and other sociocultural institutions and processes.
On the one hand, specific traditions and social structures give political economies distinctive foundations for economic action. In relation to the postcommunist regimes in Russia and Central Europe, for instance, Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley refer to path dependencies that fuel the continued existence of what they refer to as “political capitalism.” This can also apply to China’s recent history:
Political capitalism is capitalism in the sense that it is oriented towards the rational acquisition of profits, but it is political because this happens under the tutelage of the state and/or in conditions of systematic political interference in the economic system. There are many reasons why managers who have become owners might feel more comfortable navigating a Weberian world of political capitalism rather than a world governed by the conditions of laissez-faire competition. As former socialist and post-communist managers, they know the rules of the game in a system in which economics and politics are interconnected. (Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 2000, 172)
With regard to institutional change, on the other hand, the creation of new paths is essential, as explained by Streeck:
Since institutions always require a modicum of good faith on the part of their constituents, the high social legitimacy under capitalism of creative cleverness in relation to social obligations must give rise to a typical conflict between rule makers and rule takers in which the latter permanently test the vigilance of the former. The result is a particular direction in the evolution of capitalist institutions, in the course of which these are continuously redesigned to anticipate and adapt to a systemic bad faith of interest-seeking rule takers…. The typical rule taker that capitalist institutions must reckon with as the normal case is a rule bender: He reads rules entrepreneurially, untiringly looking for ways of twisting them in his favor. (Streeck 2010b, 14–15)
Here, an understanding of path dependency and path shaping underlines the relevance of evolutionary mechanisms of variation and selection, as well as the partial preservation of institutions. From an institutionalist point of view, the evident relevance of the past’s ongoing effects on the present has long since played a role in China research (see McMillan and Naughton 1996). Nevertheless, any purported tendency toward stability in path-dependent processes ought to be called into question (Beyer 2006).
In line with this, a concept for understanding historical institutional change, which may make a valuable contribution to existing China research, is presented below.
GRADUAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
More recent typologies of gradual institutional change (see Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005) are helpful in facilitating an understanding of the astonishing changes that have taken place in China since the 1970s under the continued existence of party rule. Recently, these typologies have also been applied to China research (see Tsai 2006, 2007; X. Huang 2011; Young 2011).
Here, in order to factor in the transitional, adaptable, indeed, hard-fought historical character of institutions, rather than take a formalistic approach, institutions are seen as social regimes or Herrschaftsverbände (organizations of rule) à la Max Weber (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Specifically, social power structures and class conflicts are examined—past structures and struggles that led to the formation of institutions and present constellations that change the face of the institutions under the influence of the past (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 7–8).
To avoid historical determinism, it is important to take into consideration the political processes behind the formation of institutions as well as the significance of social conflicts and compromises in relation to the transition to a new institutional form. Institutions adapt as a result of changes in the political coalitions on which they are founded. As a rule, such changes are incremental and cumulative; sometimes, however, they can be abrupt and intermittent. The addition of new elements can bring about significant change. Generally speaking, institutional change is associated with radical historical upheaval (war, revolutions, and severe crisis in society). There is also evidence, however, of institutional change that is based on continuous incremental change but that brings about transformational results nonetheless. Thus, far-reaching change can come from small endogenous changes, not from a one-off exogenous shock (see also Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).
When exploring social change in a historical context, it is important to move beyond the scope of static institutional reproduction to examine the ramifications for and feedback loops of institutions. Throughout their development, institutions may very well call themselves into question, thus embodying quite the opposite of path-dependent reproduction. While institutional reproduction refers to phenomena where the routine processes and organizational forms within institutions prevail even in the context of historical caesura—in the PRC, on the surface, this would appear to be the Communist Party—consequences for institutions that point to evolutionary change are evident time and again. And it is this very change