confession of his discouragement. I had to send him a reply replete with advice and an analysis of the situation in an attempt to lift his spirits. But his letters suggested the disintegration that would later overcome the Liberation Army and catch the Cuban troops in its mesh.
On June 30, when the engagement at Front de Force was already underway but no news of it had yet reached us, I wrote a monthly review in my diary:
This is the most pathetic review so far. When everything seemed to suggest that a new period was opening for us, Mitoudidi died and the fog became denser. The exodus to Kigoma continues. Kabila has repeatedly announced his return but never carried it out; there is total disorganization.
On the positive side is the idea of men going to the front; but on the negative side, there is the announcement of an attack that may be crazy or totally ineffective, and would alert Tshombe’s forces.
A number of questions remain to be clarified. What will be Kabila’s attitude toward us, and especially toward me? In a word, is he the right man for this situation? Will he be able to size it up and see that everything here is chaotic? It’s impossible to tell until we meet in the field, but on the first question at least, there are serious signs that he is not at all happy with my presence. It remains to be seen whether this is due to fear, envy or feelings hurt by the method.
During these days I wrote a letter to Pablo Rivalta, our ambassador to Tanzania, and among other things instructed him to inform the government of my presence here, to apologize for the way in which I had arrived, to explain the problems resulting from the fact that Kabila had not then been in the country, and to emphasize that the decision had been mine, not the Cuban government’s. The bearer of the letter was first to meet Kabila in Kigoma and to discuss his views. But when he learned of my intentions, Kabila categorically forbade anything to be said, saying he would talk to me about it when he returned to the Congo.
1. The diagram Che mentions was not in his original manuscript.
2. Those who died in this action were: Wagner Moro Pérez (Kawawa), Norberto Pío Pichardo (Nne), Víctor M. Valle Ballester (Thelathini) and Crisógenes Vinajera Hernández (Ansurune).
I received no fewer than four different verbal or written messages from Kabila before he arrived. I no longer believed anything despite all these promises, and focused my attention on a number of concrete problems.
From time to time Mundandi would write, each letter more critical than the last and all heaping blame on the Congolese: their lack of fighting spirit would leave him without men to make the revolution in Rwanda; all his cadres were dying; he had thought of continuing as far as Albertville before heading for Rwanda, but by then he would no longer have any combatants left, etc.
They had tried small-scale operations such as exploratory patrols at Front de Force to establish the enemy’s location and to look for men who might have been abandoned by their compañeros as no one knew the exact numbers missing. But it was all to no avail, and the Rwandans refused to go farther than the first descending mountain slopes. Faced with our complaints, Mundandi explained that it was a political question and that his men were disheartened by the lack of cooperation from the Congolese and that’s why they refused to act.
It was difficult to know what to make of these statements as one of his concerns had been to keep away from the Congolese troops. He had taken the initiative for the operation and its failure could be attributed to him, and maybe us, but there was no reason to implicate the Congolese from whom he kept his distance.
Wounded men kept arriving from Katenga and Front de Force. The peasants gradually brought them in because the combatants were also unwilling to carry someone on a makeshift stretcher along mountain paths.
Once again I tried to speak to those in charge. This was Major Kasali at that time, but he didn’t receive me because he had a “headache,” sending Compañero Kiwe, an old acquaintance, to speak with me and pass on my views to Kigoma.
I didn’t have a lot to say:
a) What was being done with the 40 of our men who had recently arrived? Where were they being sent?
b) For the record I expressed my disagreement with the way everything for the attack on Bendera had been handled.
At the same time I gave him a brief letter for Kabila, explaining that my presence at the front was becoming daily more necessary.
Certainly, symptoms of the decomposition could be observed among our troop. Already during the retreat from Front de Force some compañeros were saying that they would no longer fight alongside such people and would withdraw from the struggle; it was rumored that some might formally propose to leave the Congo. Maintaining the morale of the Cubans was one of my fundamental concerns. I had requested an urgent reply to my note, but none arrived. I sent another letter via Commissar Alfred, in which I analyzed the defeat at Front de Force and added some further observations:
The attacks had not been coordinated; the Front de Force group attacked on the 29th and the Katenga group on the 30th, but Mundandi was not the only one to blame as nothing had been done on the other front either.1 I recommended the creation of a single command to unify operations across the entire front, and suggested that a Cuban should be part of it. As we have seen, the conflicts made it impossible to transfer even a box of bullets from one group to another. I again insisted that it was necessary for me to be present at the front.
I went to the Upper Base to explain the defeat to our compañeros and to give the new arrivals a solemn warning. My analysis of our defects was as follows:
First, we are underestimating the enemy. We thought they would be like the rebel soldiers confronting them. So we attacked bare-chested in the spirit of conquerors, thinking we could just sweep the enemy aside, without taking into account that they had had military training and seemed to be on the alert in well-protected positions.
Second, lack of discipline. I emphasized the need for rigid discipline. Even though it was painful, it was necessary to criticize Nne’s action, which, although heroic, had done a lot of damage by leading to the death not only of three other Cuban compañeros but also of more than a dozen Rwandans.
Third, decline of fighting spirit. I insisted emphatically that it was necessary to keep morale high.
I publicly criticized Compañero Azima for making defeatist statements, and I was explicit about what awaited us: not only hunger, bullets and all manner of suffering, but sometimes even death at the hands of compañeros who had no idea how to shoot. The struggle would be very hard and long. I gave this warning because, at that point, I was willing to accept that the new arrivals should express any doubts and return if they wanted; this would no longer be possible later. My tone was severe and my warning clear. None of the new arrivals showed signs of weakness, but to my surprise three combatants who had taken part in the attack at Bendera (and who had returned with messages) planned to leave. Even worse, one of them was a member of our party.2 These were Abdallah, Anzali and Anga.
I reproached them for their attitude and warned that I would ask for the severest penalties against them. I made no commitment because I was speaking with the new soldiers in mind, but I did promise to let them go at an unspecified future date.
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