The Crisis of the Dictatorships. Nicos Poulantzas

the changes involved in the present phase of imperialism, been reproduced and internalized actually within the socio-economic and political structures of these countries?

      The first point to consider here is that of the changes within the dominant classes of these countries. We must recall once again the points made as regards the new forms of dependence characterizing the relationships that certain dependent countries have with the imperialist centres: on the one hand, the rapid destruction of pre-capitalist modes and forms of production, on account of the forms assumed by the present imports of foreign capital in these countries; on the other hand, the process of dependent industrialization, due to the tendency of foreign capital to invest in the directly productive sectors of industrial capital, in the current context of internationalization of production and capital.

      This permits the emergence or development of a new fraction of the bourgeoisie in these countries, which is very clear in the cases of Greece and Spain, and to a somewhat lesser extent also in Portugal: a fraction which I have referred to elsewhere as the domestic bourgeoisie. As this industrialization gets under way, there develop nuclei of an autochtonic bourgeoisie with a chiefly industrial character (directly productive capital), grafting itself onto this process in the domain of light industry in the consumer goods field, more occasionally in heavy industry (consumer durables, textiles, engineering, as well as steel and chemicals), and finally in the construction industries (cement, etc.). This is particularly the case, in Greece, with the domestic bourgeoisie organized in the Union of Greek Industrialists; in Portugal, with certain autochtonous capitals of the Lisbon/Setubal/Porto industrial belt, these capitals promoting the change in economic policy that was attempted, but failed, under Caetano, by R. Martins and his Fomento Industrial plan of 1972. In Spain, finally, the domestic bourgeoisie encompasses a large part of the autochtonic bourgeoisie, with the Catalan and Basque bourgeoisies in its lead, but also including a section of public capital under the control of the INI (National Industrialization Institute). These bourgeoisies are not simply confined to the industrial domain, but also extend to fields directly dependent on the industrialization process, such as transport, distribution (commercial capital), and even services of various kinds (particularly tourism). They are distinguished from earlier fractions of the bourgeoisie by the new complexity of their relationships with foreign capital.

      Above all, they are distinguished from the comprador bourgeoisie, which is still very important in these countries. This comprador bourgeoisie (sometimes referred to as the ‘oligarchy’) can be defined as that fraction whose interests are entirely subordinated to those of foreign capital, and which functions as a kind of staging-post and direct intermediary for the implantation and reproduction of foreign capital in the countries concerned. The activity of this comprador bourgeoisie often assumes a speculative character, being concentrated in the financial, banking and commercial sectors, but it can also be found in the industrial sector, in those branches wholly dependent on and subordinated to foreign capital. In Greece, a typical case is that of shipping (Onassis, Niarchos, etc.), and capital invested in marine construction, petrol refineries, etc. In Portugal, the small number of big comprador groups (CUF, Espirito Santo, Borges e Irmao, Portugues do Atlantico, etc.) centre around banking, and while controlling a large part of autochtonic production, they are at the same time oriented to the exploitation of the African colonies – being closely tied to foreign capital both in Portugal and in its colonies. In Spain, finally, there is the characteristic case of a very substantial banking and financial comprador sector (industrial banks in particular), and industries that directly depend on it. From the political point of view, this bourgeoisie is the true support and agent of foreign imperialist capital.

      The domestic bourgeoisie on the other hand, although dependent on foreign capital, also has significant contradictions with it. This is principally because it is cheated in its share of the cake, as far as the exploitation of the masses is concerned; the lion’s share of the surplus-value goes to foreign capital and its agents the comprador bourgeoisie, at the domestic bourgeoisie’s expense. There is also the fact that since the domestic bourgeoisie is concentrated chiefly in the industrial sector, it is interested in an industrial development less polarized towards the exploitation of the country by foreign capital, and in a state intervention which would guarantee it its protected markets at home, while also making it more competitive vis-à-vis foreign capital. It seeks an extension and development of the home market by a certain increase in the purchasing power and consumption of the masses, which would supply it with a greater market outlet, and also seeks state aid to help it develop its exports.

      It must still be made clear – and this is very important as far as this domestic bourgeoisie’s policy towards the dictatorships is concerned- that it is not a genuine national bourgeoisie, i.e. a bourgeoisie that is really independent of foreign capital and which could take part in an anti-imperialist struggle for effective national independence, such as sometimes did exist in these countries in the past (in Spain above all), during the earlier phases of imperialism. The development of this domestic bourgeoisie coincides with the internationalization of labour processes and production, and with the internationalization of capital, in other words with the induced reproduction of the dominant relations of production actually within these various social formations. By this fact alone, while its existence involves certain contradictions with foreign capital, this domestic bourgeoisie is to a certain extent itself dependent on the processes of internationalization under the aegis of foreign capital: dependent on technological processes and labour productivity, on a complex network of sub-contraction for foreign capital, on the sector of light industry and consumer goods in which it is frequently confined in this sector’s relationships with heavy industry (the privileged sector for foreign multinational corporations), as well as on commercial outlets. This explains, among other things, the political weakness of this domestic bourgeoisie, which, although it tries to translate into political action its contradictions with foreign capital and the big comprador bourgeoisie, is unable, for the most part, to wield long-term political hegemony over the other fractions of the bourgeoisie and the dominant classes, i.e. over the power bloc.

      Two other important characteristics should be added to this.

      a) The domestic bourgeoisie does not fall entirely on one side of the divide between monopoly and non-monopoly capital. While the domestic bourgeoisie does include a section of non-monopoly capital in the countries with which we are concerned (the ‘small and medium-size firms’), it also includes entire segments of monopoly capital; and conversely, there are also segments of non-monopoly capital entirely subordinated to foreign capital by way of sub-contracting agreements and commercial channels. Thus although the domestic bourgeoisie exhibits a certain political unity in its contradictions with foreign capital, it is itself deeply divided, particularly in so far as it is cleft by the contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital, and this fact is not without effect on its political weakness.

      b) Since the domestic bourgeoisie is itself still relatively dependent on foreign capital, the contradictions between the various foreign capitals in these countries, particularly those between United States capital and capital from the Common Market, and between capitals from different fractions of internationalized capital (industrial, banking, commercial), are all reflected and reproduced actually within the domestic bourgeoisie itself, according to the divergent lines of dependence that cut across it. The domestic bourgeoisie is marked by the same ‘externally centred’ character as the entire economy of these countries, which is polarized towards a process of internationalization under the aegis of capital from the dominant countries. And this is always a factor in the political weakness of this bourgeoisie.