This regardless of whether there is torture, suppression or death accompanying the political process. The powers in place have cleverly played on this hypersensitivity.
Yet, one must go back to fundamental principles which are as much orientations of political activity in Islam. First, as we have already indicated in Part One, the articulation between the religious fact and the rational fact, in Islam, does not correspond to what it is, nor to what it used to be historically, in the strictly Judaeo-Christian culture. There is a methodological exactness that we cannot be distracted from when we approach the points of reference of these two civilisations. This consists, first, of looking for a general concept behind the terms used, a concept that gives these terms meaning. Then, extracting a conceptual range out of the logic from which these terms emanate. This, unless one insists on engaging in a political analysis of Islam, newly named “political Islam”, starting from the principle that all actions related to government are of the same nature in all religions, cultures and civilisations, and that it is sufficient to judge all by the established norm in the West. This formulation smells of excess, and yet it is this perfume that nowadays emanates from the declarations of some researchers. Furthermore, absolute rejection of the questioning suggested by Western intellectuals is also thoughtless. In everything, and a fortiori in politics, one must take things into consideration.
One often stumbles on words and notions without taking into account the real content of the respective points of reference. Thus, some Muslims reject the word “democracy” because it is part of Western history as also because “it is not found in the Qur’ān”. Similarly, some Western intellectuals have only a very vague notion of the Islamic concept of “shūrā”. For, they often ignore the latter or suspect it “hides” the famous model of theocratic organisation already referred to. It is, therefore, appropriate to clarify these elements.
1. The Religious and the Political
We have noted, in Part One, the status of the Qur’ān and that of the Sunna within Islamic thought. They are the points of reference that, in offering a concept of the universe and man, orientate thought by means of providing it with general principles. The latter are absolute, as they are for the believer the essence of what he believes in. Concrete realisation of these, according to time and place, is not given in the sources. Moreover, specific situations do not find a single and definitive solution. It is the ijtihād of the jurists which connects the general principle to its practical application. Ijtihād requires a rational process which imposes upon savants (‘ulamā’) the development of a specific and understood reflection by means of an internal logic, and this via a search of consensus (ijmā’) to deduction by analogy (qiyās), and from taking account of the historical or geographical context to consideration of customs (‘urf).
Islamic law swiftly accepted, in its formulation, the idea of plurality in interpretation and this even in rules of worship and from as early as the time of the Prophet himself (peace be upon him). ‘Ā’isha in this respect reports the following tradition: “One day in Ramaḍān, I travelled with the Prophet (peace be upon him) to perform the lesser pilgrimage (‘Umra). On the way, he broke his fast while I kept mine; he shortened his prayer whereas I performed the full version of it. Then, I said to him: ‘May my father and mother be ransom to thee! You eat while I fast, you shorten your prayer whereas I perform them fully’, and the Prophet answered: ‘You have done well.’” 1
Without a shadow of doubt, there are rules of interpretation. However, there exists, in a less certain fashion, a latitude in the reading and application of principles. The latter varies in function of the intelligence and experience of the reader and jurist. This plurality was lived, as it is nowadays, by the diversity of juridical schools, the most well known of which among the Sunnis are four. The ‘ulamā’ (savants) are in agreement with regard to the pillars and fundamental principles of Islam. However, their differences are numerous with regard to the domain of worship, just as they are substantial in that which concerns social affairs (in their ramifications, furū?). Each scholar thus developed his own method with its rules of reading and modalities of verification. Some by virtually thinking the most particular and potential (AbūḤanīfa), and others abstaining from doing so (al-Shāfi‘ī and Mālik). But all were influenced by the milieu in which they lived. 2 We know the story of the meeting between al-Shāfi‘ī and IbnḤanbal who were in disagreement about the qualification of one who does not observe prayer, that is whether he is a Muslim or not. This is an important question of theology, one which gave place to an exchange of views revolving around reasoning and logic. In this respect, al-Subkī reported the following story: “Al-Shāfi‘ī and Aḥmad disagreed one day on the subject of the person who fails to observe prayer. Al-Shāfi‘ī said: ‘O Aḥmad! Do you say that the person who does not observe prayer is an infidel?’ Aḥmad responded: ‘Certainly he is.’ Al-Shāfi‘ī continued: ‘And if he wants to become Muslim what should he do?’ Aḥmad answered: ‘He should declare that there is no deity but God and Muḥammad is His Messenger.’ ‘But our man has already pronounced the formula and has never denied it’, retorted al-Shāfi‘ī. Aḥmad said: ‘He becomes Muslim by performing prayer.’ But al-Shāfi‘ī concluded: ‘The prayer of the infidel is not allowed and it is not it that makes a person a Muslim.’ Imām Aḥmad at this point remained quiet.”
This, however, is but a difference of opinion on a point which is certainly fundamental and one can multiply such examples. Nonetheless, this has not prevented any Muslim from thinking that all juridical responses (fatāwā, sing. fatwā) are Islamic as long as they do not contradict the two sources which are accepted by all, and as long as they are given by acknowledged, competent persons. We can, therefore, retain at least four interdependent, fundamental principles regarding the relation of the religious with the political. The fundamentals which follow are part of the universe of Islamic rationality:
1. The Qur’ān and the Sunna are the two basic sources of reference. By means of these, a holistic concept of man and life is conveyed. However, these two sources do not respond concretely to the needs and relativity of historical and geographical situations.
2. Reflections based on these two sources, ijtihād, can be numerous so long as they do not contradict the former.
3. Each epoch and each community is responsible for the sane management of this diversity of situations and plurality of views.
4. The field of rational experimentation is huge and offers to reason a consequent autonomy to the point whereby very different applications are considered as “Islamic” if they respect the second enunciated principle. Thus, reason, backed by logic and the most modern scientific means, produce answers which are religious, in the sense of being Islamically qualified and justified.
We can see that the comprehension of “the religious” here does not cover what is meant by the same in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The spheres of the religious and the rational, the sacred and the profane are defined differently. They do not have the same limits, and they are articulated very specifically from one tradition to another. It is undoubtedly in the domain of the management of the political that these specificities are meaningful today. The debates on secularisation, laicity and democracy are there to prove the point. We realise, moreover, that it is very difficult for Western intellectuals to think the political with categories other than those which are the product of their history. Any formulation which departs slightly from that which is known is suspect. As for that which is only reducible to social categories with difficulty, it is appropriate for them to invent expressions which makes that which is unknown accessible. It is this that Louis Gardet undertook in the middle of this century when he described Islamic, political organisation as “a laic, egalitarian theocracy”. 3 A truly strange expression which tends to confuse anyone who tries to see clearly.
a. The domain of the political: the Islamic framework
What has just been said is of prime importance to the question which concerns us here. In effect, it is fundamental to attempt to arrange and distinguish that which belongs properly to the domain of Islamic sources revealed by God and/or stipulated by the