activities, they are means to a higher moral purpose. This being so, one needs always to be conscious of his obligations towards others. These obligations are flexible, one’s own capacity and the others’ needs being the two determinants of the obligation. Like all Islamic thinkers Ibn Taimīyah recognized inequality in worldly possessions but thought it did not imply social inequality which was to be banished from the Islamic society which was based on universal brotherhood in submission to Allah. To him this followed directly from the central Islamic doctrine of tawḥīd and its necessary corollary, justice. He writes:
Justice is related to tawḥīd as tawḥīd is the foundation of justice. The will to superiority relates to corruption as it is the foundation of injustice …
The person who seeks superiority over another person of his kind is an oppressor with respect to him, a transgressor. As the two of you belong to the same (human) kind, you are no more entitled to being superior to him than he is entitled to being superior to you. Justice and equilibrium require that men be brothers (to one another) as Allah has described the believers to be (brothers to one another) (Fatāwā, Vol. 18, p. 165).
Ibn Taimīyah was not a believer in an invisible hand taking care of the society. There were needs to be fulfilled and goals to be achieved. The relevant vocations and industries were regarded as socially obligatory duties (furūḍ kifāyah), which in normal circumstances got done by being prompted by motives ingrained in the nature of man. But the social authority could oblige performance, should circumstances so require. As the author argues in Chapter VII, section D of this book, Ibn Taimīyah envisaged a big economic role for the Islamic state, aiming at eradication of poverty, ensuring fair practices in the market, securing monetary stability, and planning for economic development.
According to Ibn Taimīyah, it is crucial, for the state to be able to play this role, that those appointed to public office observe the Sharī‘ah. Only the God-fearing and the competent should be entrusted with public office, as required in the Qur’ānic verse: ‘Allah bids you to deliver all that you have been entrusted with unto those who are entitled thereto, and whenever you judge between people, to judge with justice’ (4: 58). Opening with this ‘verse relating to the rulers’ his advice to the ruler of his day, which is his treatise entitled ‘Sharī‘ah Policies Relating to the Ruler and the Ruled’ (al-Siyāsah al-Shar‘īyah fī aḥwāl al-Rā‘ī wa’l Ra‘īyah), he goes to great lengths to emphasize that the ‘trust’ (amānah) mentioned in the above verse related to the dispensation of power and wealth. A just society would be one in which political power and material wealth are properly distributed.
The state plays a very active role in Ibn Taimīyah’s economy, being the custodian of public interest and the chief instrument for ensuring justice through enforcement of Sharī‘ah. It manages money but is itself barred from making a profit out of it (Fatāwā, Vol. 29, p. 469). It administers public property in the public interest, supervises the management of all waqf properties, and sees to it that private ownership rights are not exercised to the detriment of public interest. Through the institution of the muḥtasib, it makes all Economic agents fulfil their obligations towards one another, adhere to commonly-recognized norms of behaviour and scrupulously observe the relevant rules of Sharī‘ah. In this context, he comes down very heavily on those employing various kinds of tricks or legal ruses to circumvent the rules relating to barter or to currency exchange. These tricks are worse than outright ribā in his opinion. As a general rule, he regards not the form but the real purpose of and intent behind an act to be decisive regarding its validity. The strictures of Ibn Taimīyah against tricks leading to ribā and other unfair practices reflect the currency of many corrupt practices in the market during his days.
A similar situation prevailed in the realm of public finances. A number of extra-Sharī‘ah levies were being collected from the people and public expenditure, in many cases, was unjustifiable on grounds of public interest. Some of his contemporaries and predecessors had reacted to this situation by declaring all extra-Sharī‘ah taxes as illegitimate. While in some cases these levies were decidedly illegitimate, the public authority, faced with external aggression, did sometimes need additional funds to finance a war. It could also happen that the normal resources of the public treasury fell short of ensuring universal need fulfilment, which Ibn Taimīyah regarded as an inalienable duty of the Islamic state. He wrote: ‘It is a common consensus that those who are unable to earn sufficiently will be aided with money that suffices them … (Fatāwā, Vol. 29, p. 570). As elaborated in this book, toward the end of the eighth chapter, Ibn Taimīyah argued that an individual’s financial obligations towards society extended beyond the zakāt payments and the Islamic state could levy additional taxation if and when the Sharī‘ah levies did not suffice for fulfilling its duties relating to defence and need fulfilment. But he strongly criticized the unjust and irresponsible manner in which public money was being squandered. The first thing to do, therefore, was to confine public expenditure within legitimate limits. He came out very heavily against the numerous levies imposed by the rulers during his times, in Egypt and Syria. But he did not condone tax evasion in any case. He also exhorted the rulers to ensure vertical as well as horizontal equity, even in illegitimate taxation, as inequality and discrimination would destroy the social fabric. All this has been ably brought out by Dr. Islahi who has also reported that Ibn Taimīyah’s protestations had some impact on the ruler, Sultan Nāṣir Muḥammad bin Qalāwūn and resulted in some needed tax reforms.
Like every social thinker, Ibn Taimīyah had to take the existing socio-economic and political realities fully into consideration before he pronounced on any issue. This is exemplified by his stand on additional taxation as noted above. It is also exemplified by his opinion on land grants or iqṭā‘. As the author notes in Chapter VI, section D: ‘Ibn Taimīyah accepts iqṭā‘ system as a social necessity, as iqṭā‘ was granted to men of the army in lieu of salary. If iqṭā‘ was abolished, paying them would have become difficult in a period when monetary payment was not convenient or feasible.’
III
Ibn Taimīyah’s economics is mostly normative. He is concerned with how economic agents should behave and what economic policies should be adopted by the state. But positive analysis – how it works – does come up on a number of occasions, sometimes in a context quite unfamiliar to students of modern economics. Thus, price fluctuations are discussed in a chapter on qaḍā wa qadar (divine predestination) (Fatāwā, Vol. 8, pp. 520, 523).
Ibn Taimīyah distinguishes between man-made scarcities and natural scarcities and says that only the former justify state intervention. His discussion shows an awareness of the role supply and demand play in determining prices, as demonstrated by the author of the present work, who has also reported Ibn Taimīyah’s comprehensive discussion on price regulation in his treatise on al-Ḥisbah (supervision of the market).
While discussing the un-Islamic levies imposed on traders during his times, Ibn Taimīyah also looked into the incidence of these indirect taxes. The discussion shows his awareness of the shifting of the tax burden from the sellers, who pay the taxes, to the buyers who had to pay a higher price for the merchandise taxed (Fatāwā, Vol. 29, p. 253).
A similar excursion into the realm of positive analysis occurs during Ibn Taimīyah’s discussion on money, its origins, its functions and the changes in its value, reported by Dr. Islahi in Chapter V, section D of this book. Here is an example:
The conditions of immediate payment and reciprocal possession in it (i.e. in the exchange of currency for currency) ensures the purpose of exchange; that it is a means to securing what is desired. This can obtain only through possession (of the currency in exchange) not through (mere) obligation to pay, when it is money from both sides. Therefore, the Law-giver prohibited sale of money for money with deferred payment (Fatāwā, Vol. 29, p. 479).
IV
It