M. Umer Chapra

The Future of Economics


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who argued in his speech that:

      “Islam and the principles of socialism are not mutually repugnant. Islam preaches equality and socialism is the modern technique of attaining it ... Pakistan cannot last without the supremacy of Islam. A socialist form of government does not rival that supremacy. On the contrary, socialism will make the whole population the custodian of Islamic values.”68

      Socialism and Islam were both exploited to legitimize any and every government intervention considered by socialist dictators to be in their interest.69

      Socialism has, however, brought nothing but misery to the Muslim world. Arbitrary nationalization along with ill-conceived policies and excessive controls have ruined the economies of practically all the countries where it was resorted to. Large-scale enterprise was promoted in urban areas at the expense of rural development. Excessive budgetary deficits financed through debt and monetary expansion are still taking a heavy toll on these economies in terms of inflation and debt servicing. Corruption has increased and development has been slowed. The performance of socio-economic justice has been nothing but disappointing. The condition of the masses has only worsened even in oil-producing countries like Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Indonesia, where oil revenues, if utilized effectively, could have brought prosperity. Hence all the three arguments (eliminating corruption, accelerating development and prosperity, and socio-economic justice) advanced in favour of socialism have proved to be merely wishful thinking.

      Looking at the record of Muslim history, one does, however, find that the kind of just and concientious state desired by Islam has not always been realized. While there have been excellent rulers, there have also been those who were corrupt and despotic and who exploited the masses to serve their own vested interests. This has perpetuated a conflict between the rulers and the pious ʿulamā70 – a conflict which has played an adverse role in the cycle of Muslim decline, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. This may lead one to conclude that the call for laissez faire in the West may, perhaps, not have been a misconceived idea. However, laissez faire has not been, and cannot be, helpful in realizing justice. The welfare state has also had its problems. The question that, therefore, arises is whether a balance between the two can be attained. The West has been trying to establish a just balance between market failure and government failure, but does not seem to have succeeded so far. Can the Muslims succeed? They have no choice. The imperative of establishing a just society, makes it their moral obligation to struggle until they succeed.

      The effort to establish in Muslim countries a just society of the kind that Islam envisages is bound to be an uphill task. Democracy with proper checks and balances, combined with effective implementation of the Sharīʿah to ensure the honest and effective use of public resources for the well-being of the people, is indispensable for this purpose. However, most Muslim countries have neither democracy nor the rule of the Sharīʿah in the true sense of the term. Efforts are made by illegitimate rulers even to interpret the Sharīʿah in ways that suit the perpetuation of their despotic rule. The ʿulamā’ have become preoccupied with trivialities that have nothing to do with the establishment of a just and morally upright society. That scientific and technological advance which took place in earlier centuries with the support of government, does not seem to be making much headway. The kind of education system that would combine moral education with modern technical and scientific education is barely discernible. Those factors which brought the Muslim countries to this state of affairs will be analyzed in Chapters 3 and 6 while the measures that need to be taken for the reversal of this trend are discussed in Chapter 8.

       Notes

      1. Hodgson, 1977, Vol. 1, p. 73.

      2. Ibid., p. 87.

      3. For greater detail on the fundamentals of the Islamic paradigm, see Chapra, Challenge, 1992, pp. 201–12.

      4. Zubair Hasan probably reflects the Muslim consensus when he states that “amānah underlies Islam’s entire socio-economic philosophy” (Zubair Hasan, 1988, p. 41).

      5. The Qur’ān does not make any mention of the Prophets sent by God to people other than those in the Middle East. Their names were not familiar to them and the Qur’ān is not intended to be an encyclopaedia. It, however, states clearly that: “And indeed We have sent Our Messengers to every community in every period” (al-Qur’ān, 16: 36). “And We sent Messengers before you; some of them We have mentioned to you, while some others We have not mentioned” (al-Qur’ān, 40: 78).

      6. Z.I. Ansari, 1992, p. 142.

      7. For a brief discussion of the maqāṣid, see Chapra, Challenge, 1992, pp. 7–9. There has been a substantial discussion of the maqāṣid in fiqh literature, some of the most prominent exponents being: al-Māturīdī (d. 333/945), al-Shāshī (d. 365/975), al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1012), al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), al-Āmidī (d. 631/ 1234), ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1327), and al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388). For a modern discussion of these, see: Masud, 1977; al-Raysuni, 1992, pp. 25–55; Nyazee, 1994, pp. 189–268.

      8. This same idea has been beautifully expressed by Erfan Shafey by saying: “To a devout Muslim, and by definition, Islam is justice and justice is Islam.” (Comments on Zubair Hasan’s paper in M. Iqbal, 1988, p. 63.)

      9. The Qur’ān repeats the same message in a number of other places. For example: “Are you going to compel people to believe” (al-Qur’ān, 10: 99), and “You are not there to force them to believe. Exhort through the Qur’ān whoever takes heed of the Warning” (al-Qur’ān, 50: 45).

      10. Jurists have talked about necessities (ḍarūriyyāt), conveniences (ḥājiyyāt), and refinements (taḥsīniyyāt). However, all of these, as conceived by jurists, fall within the range of what may be called ‘needs’ in modern economics, and may be used to refer to all those goods and services which make a real difference in human well-being by fulfilling a need or removing a hardship. Anything that goes beyond needs has been treated by the fuqahā’ as prodigality and self-indulgence and is strongly disapproved of. The fuqahā’ have used a number of terms like taraf, isrāf, tafākhur, and takāthur for various aspects of wasteful and luxurious living.

      11. See al-Māwardī, Adab (1955), pp. 118–20.

      12. Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah, p. 158.

      13. Al-Māwardī, Adab (1955), p. 203. It may be worthwhile to see the whole section on “Madhāhib al-Nās fī al-Ghinā wa al-Faqr” (People’s Ideas About Wealth and Poverty), pp. 203–10. See also al-ʿAbbādī, 1977, Vol. 3, pp. 15–29.

      14. Cited from the Ḥilyat al-Awliyā’ of Abū Nuʿaym (d. 430/1038) by Arberry, 1950, p. 33.

      15. See Abū Bakr al-Khallāl, 1407 AH, pp. 50 and 90 respectively. He states that there are a number of verses in the Qur’ān which enjoin the establishment of Islam through the development of land, which is not possible without wealth. Moreover, wealth also enables a person to act upon his religion, to give charity to others, and to pray (p. 73). He also quotes the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, and a number of his Companions as well as people from the following generations to show that wealth is an asset for Islam (p. 75); the self-respect of Muslims lies in being able to dispense with the help of others (p. 28), improving their houses and living conditions (pp. 39 and 49), and developing their wealth (p. 41). He even states that wealth is like a weapon (p. 50). According to him, the Sufis were misguided in their rejection of marriage, wealth and food (p. 50).

      16. See Jaʿfar