of the fittest may perhaps be the most logical behavioural pattern. Value judgements may be unwarranted and all three filtering, motivation and restructuring mechanisms may be developed by human beings alone through reliance on their own reason and experience.
However, if all human beings have been created by the Supreme Being and the resources they have at their disposal are a trust from Him, then they are automatically all related to one another by a natural bond of brotherhood and are also accountable to Him. They are not then absolutely free to do what they please, but are rather expected to use the scarce resources and interact with each other and their environment in such a way that helps realize the well-being of all individuals, irrespective of whether they are rich or poor, white or black, male or female, children or adults. They would also be expected to ensure not only the realization of material goals but also spiritual and humanitarian goals, particularly social harmony and the absence of anomie. Here, Revelation and reason would both play an important role in filtering, motivation and restructuring, and value judgements would not be out-of-bounds.
The method of economics is also determined by its worldview. Linguistically, the term method refers to the rules and procedures of a discipline followed in a certain logical order to achieve a desired end.10 What the method essentially does is to provide criteria for the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions as a part of the discipline.11 The steps taken and the criteria for acceptance or rejection thus depend, as Caws has rightly indicated, on the end sought.12
If survival of the fittest is an acceptable behavioural pattern and if individuals are free to do what they wish in accordance with their preferences and their wealth, then the allocation and distribution brought about by market forces cannot be questioned. There would be no point in talking about humanitarian goals. Economics would accept the status quo, pass no judgement on it, and make no policy recommendations to change it. Its function would be just to describe (make positive statements about) how resources are actually allocated and distributed by the operation of market forces, and to analyze, theoretically as well as empirically, the relationship between the different variables involved in such allocation and distribution, with a view to helping make predictions about what may happen in the future. Economics would then be strictly a positive science with no normative role to play.
If, however, the purpose of economics is also to help realize humanitarian goals, then the method may not be just to describe, analyze and predict, but also to compare the actual results with the desired goals, to analyze the reasons for the gap between the two, and to show how the gap may be removed without unduly sacrificing individual freedom. Value judgements may not then be out-of-bounds. Since the purpose of Revelation is to help make such value judgements, it too may be welcome and economics may then be based on both Revelation, and reason and experience. There may then be no justification for creating a watertight distinction between its positive and normative functions, as both may be closely integrated and together constitute an indispensable part of its raison d’être.
The vision, the mechanisms, and the method of economics are all, therefore, the logical outcome of the prevailing worldview. Even though none of the current major worldviews is either totally materialist and hedonist or totally humanitarian and spiritual, there are nevertheless, significant differences among them in terms of the emphasis that they place on material or spiritual goals. The greater the difference in the emphasis, the greater may be the difference in the economic disciplines of these societies. Feyerabend frankly recognizes this in the Introduction to the Chinese edition of his thought-provoking book, Against Method, by stating that: “First world science is only one science among many; by claiming to be more it ceases to be an instrument of research and turns into a (political) pressure group.”13 Even with respect to institutional economics, the worldview of which is nearly the same as that of conventional economics and many of whose proponents feel that neoclassical economics and institutional economics are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, the Nobel Laureate, Professor Douglas North, clarifies: “Introducing institutional analysis into static neoclassical theory entails modifying the existing body of theory. But devising a model of economic change requires the construction of an entire theoretical framework, because no such model exists.”14
However, if there is a substantial difference even in worldviews and visions, there is no reason why there cannot be greater differences in the disciplines. One discipline may just seek to explain what exists, refuse to make value judgements, and not concern itself with social change for realizing a certain vision of life. Another discipline may not find ‘what is’ to be acceptable and so seek to help realize the desired social vision. A discussion of how, and through what process, the vision may be realized is then, perhaps, unavoidable.
To say that the effort to create Islamic Economics leads to isolationism15 is true only if arrogance and bigotry prevail in either one of the two disciplines and prevent mutual interaction. A rational and amicable discussion of different worldviews and disciplines may, in fact, promote greater depth and breadth in the analysis of both disciplines through cross pollination, and thus make the world richer and better off. Feyerabend is, hence, right in asserting that the “proliferation of theories is beneficial for science while conformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also impairs the free development of the individual.”16
The above discussion may appear to be abstract, but once we start discussing conventional and Islamic Economics, it would be possible to see why the development of Islamic Economics is necessary if the Islamic vision of human society is desired to be realized.
Notes
1. Brzezinsky, 1995, p. 53.
2. Alfred North Whitehead, cited by Milton Myers, 1983, p. v.
3. See the three papers on “Economics and Happiness” by Oswald, Frank, and Ng, in the Economic Journal, November 1997, pp. 1812–58.
4. It may be useful to be clear about the difference between the terms distribution and redistribution. Distribution refers to the allocation of resources that takes place automatically through the operation of market forces. However, when a society uses extra-market or other non-market processes to change that distribution in accordance with the concept of justice embodied in its worldview, it is referred to as redistribution.
5. Easterlin (1973), in Heilbroner and Thurow, 1975, p. 538. See also Easterlin, 1995; Oswald, 1997.
6. Literature on the determinants of human well-being is growing rapidly. For a survey, see David Myers, 1993.
7. For a more detailed discussion of these, see Chapra, Challenge,1992, pp. 213–33.
8. Values refer in this book to the moral obligations of individuals towards themselves as well as to their families and society. They indicate the desired behaviour by specifying what is good or bad, right or wrong, and just or unjust. Their objective is to tone down the serving of self-interest by individuals to ensure justice, the well-being of all, and social harmony. The incentive for fulfilling moral obligations comes from love of God, and the desire to gain His pleasure and reward in the Hereafter. This may not, however, always be sufficient to make everyone act righteously. It is also necessary to have this-worldly rewards and deterrents.
Values become institutions when they are converted into formal rules, laws, conventions and constitutions, such that they are no longer just a moral obligation but also a legal obligation. The institutionalization of values implies setting in place a mechanism for detecting and punishing the violators, irrespective of their wealth and position.
9. Lovejoy, 1960, p. 7.
10. See the words method and methodology in Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. See also Caws, 1967, p. 339; Blaug, 1980, p. xi.
11. See Machlup, 1978, p. 54; Blaug, 1980, p. 264.
12.