but only the removal of that which was unlawful and sinful, so they hoped that “your Lordships, in the integrity of your hearts, without any byas or eye to self-interest” would do the same. It then suggests that in doing so, their lordships might thereby free some parochial income, which could be diverted into caring for the poor—a ploy likely to incur no small popularity at a time of widespread want.
There then follows seven reasons justifying the church’s aversion to patronage. First, it is contrary to God’s law. The practice of a great man choosing the minister is as much a usurpation as his choosing the elders and deacons would be. Scripture grants to no one the right, unilaterally, to nominate any officer in the house of God; the New Testament reveals that this is given to the people and presbytery.38 Secondly, it is contrary to the received doctrine of the Kirk. Patronage is a violation of the Books of Discipline and many Acts of the General Assembly, of which last, two examples may be cited, the Acts of 1562 (session 3) and 1570 (session 2), where both imply a rejection of the practice.39 Thirdly, the office of patron is superfluous to the exercise of ministry and therefore unworthy of preservation. Moreover, since he cannot make the laborer worthy of his wages, he can hardly give him right to those wages. As for defending the minister in his maintenance, it is the magistrate’s job to do so. Fourthly, a patron should have no right to meddle in the remuneration of a properly qualified, called and admitted minister, yet as things stand, if the incumbent has not a presentation, the patron may withhold his maintenance. Any other profession would regard such interference as most unjust. Fifthly, to be lawful, patronage has to be either a spiritual, ecclesiastical or civil right. It is none of those. Sixthly, any office that can tempt either its holder or another party into corrupt agreements such as simony, ought to be banned. Seventh, patronage is both unnecessary and a complying with the practice of papists and idolaters.
The contrast with Johnston of Wariston’s treatise of just a few years earlier is interesting, in that the cautious tone is gone. The former is pragmatic, the latter is about principle. For the former, what is important is to seek a modus operandi, for the other, the issue is one of boundaries. Most of all, the latter envisages a remarkable arrangement whereby the secular arm is to protect, preserve and uphold the Church, yet deny itself any interference in its life and work. It was a proposition that did eventually receive the state’s explicit agreement in legislative form, but it was not to come until 272 years later.40
Just over a week after receiving the memorandum, Parliament debated the issue, passing the Act Abolishing the patronages of Kirks [see Appendix II] on the 9 March. The preamble repeated, in much the same language, the justifications contained in the petition and memorandum. However, once again, it should not be assumed that this was a confirmation that the legislature was merely the puppet of the ministers. The Act was part of a programme that the Kirk envisaged for national improvement, but it was also symptomatic of a flexing of muscle by the middle ranks of Scottish society. What made it possible was the dramatic reduction in the presence of the nobility in the Estates after the Preston fiasco. John R. Young’s statistics show how the nobles’ attendance dropped from 56 in the 1648 Parliament to 16 in the one beginning 4 January 1649.41 It was this crucial circumstance that freed the laird class to go on and promote measures characterized by their potential to erode the feudal hegemony of the nobility and large landowners.
Thus it was, in the same parliamentary session, power was given to presbyteries and kirk sessions to pressurize landowners into shouldering concern for the poor in their locality. Again, on the 8 March, the Act in favours of the Vassals of Kirk-lands revived one of the contentious aims [see above, Chapter Two] of King Charles in his legislation of 1633. Charles had tried to “liberate” the vassals of the Lords of Erection by stripping the latter of their superiority and vesting it in the Crown. To the frustration of the former, this had not happened. Now, this Act attempted to make good the deficiency and the lords were obliged “to accept the same sums from the vassals themselves whilk they are liable and bound to accept from His Majesty for redemption thereof.” Another example was the legislation of 29 June, which sought to enhance the status of others beside the aristocracy in the shires and burghs, by encouraging the revival of the office of Justice of the Peace.42
By such means, Parliament attempted to free the lesser landowners from the dominance of the magnates and allow them greater freedom to contribute to the life of their localities. Accordingly, when the Act abolishing patronage appears, it is as a part of this context. As a motivation, there was indeed the principle that it was a burden under which the Church “groaned,” but there was also the underlying reality that the great man with the block of patronages was no longer to have the same sway in parochial matters. This realization was undoubtedly in the mind of those like the Earl of Buccleuch (who had seven churches in his gift) when, in protest, he and others walked out of the chamber during the debate. The contemporary writer, Sir James Balfour, describes the scene: “The Parliament past a most strange [i.e., foreign, alien] Acte this monthe, abolishing the patronages of kirkes, which pertained to laymen since ever Christianity was planted in Scotland. Francis, Earl of Buccleuch, and some others, protested against this acte as vrangous [wrongous] and all togider derogatory to the just rights of the nobility and gentrey of the kingdom of Scotland, and so departed the Parl: House.”43
The objectors had Balfour’s sympathy, especially as two other facets to the debate caused him annoyance. The first stemmed from his conviction that the leading role played by Argyll, the Lord Chancellor (John Campbell, first Earl of Loudoun) and Johnston of Wariston in favor of the Act, was entirely driven by their fear of losing the Kirk’s favor. The second was that the phraseology of the Act gave the implication that the people were about to be given the liberty to choose their own ministers. He considered this to be hypocrisy, since such an outcome was never likely. Whereas there was probably truth in his first point, Balfour’s claim that the people had been duped in their expectations was exaggerated, since it is clear that the wording, “suit and calling of the congregation,” is open to a variety of interpretations. Indeed, the framers recognized as much in the Act itself.44
Balfour was, however, correct about the disunity and confusion which surfaced at the Assembly four months later over what selection system should replace patronage. On the other hand, some clash of opinion should not have been unexpected. For reasons of tact and expediency, the Kirk had perennially shied away from plenary debates about patronage, so there had never been a regular opportunity for differing opinions to be aired and agreement reached on an alternative system. Differing opinions were to be expected: what did take observers, like Baillie, by surprise was the intensity with which they were expressed.
The directory for the election of ministers [see Appendix III]
The 1649 Act remitted it to the July meeting of the Assembly to draw up a directory which would determine in what way the congregation’s interest could be fittingly expressed when a vacancy is filled, and to form that into a standing rule. When the debate began, the starting point for most members’ thinking was the views previously expressed by George Gillespie. Despite his death on the 17 December the previous year, he had been held in the highest regard,45 and so when, shortly after, Gillespie’s brother Patrick published a series of articles by him, including one on congregational consent in vacancies, it was given widespread attention.
Although the work was concerned with proving, from scripture and the practice of the early Church, that the approval of the people is essential for a valid ministry, it was equally emphatic in rejecting any separatist notion of giving the people a juridical power, that is to say, one in which their judgement was legally binding. That would be to place “the whole essentality of a calling in election, accounting ordination to be no more but the solemnization of the