ethics. Two possibilities exist.
First, the linkages may be taken seriously on the assumption that it is fitting to measure theological ethics by philosophical ethics as its appointed judge, as the court where the question of truth must be answered, because from the very first the distinctive content of the inquiry of theological ethics, or the empty space for it, is contained in a superior and original way in philosophical ethics, and has to be brought to conscious development—this is the business of apologetic argumentation—in order that the desired validation of its existence might be thereby achieved. If the linkages are intended in this way, they simply mean that the distinctive content of the inquiry of theological ethics is surrendered from the very outset. What is intended, established, and justified is something other than this inquiry with its distinctive content. Apologetics may then succeed, but it has become irrelevant before it has even commenced. The philosopher who really thinks he knows a higher principle by which to ask and answer the question of the whence and whither, and who thinks he can meet the theologian as a judge in the question of truth, is absolutely right when he feels that in a true theological ethics he is in an alien world. He can really be annoyed here. Theological ethics is no longer a proper theological ethics when it falls into the disorder in which it can no longer irritate such a philosopher. The theological question of the whence and whither, and the answer to it, consists neither of a necessary moment in our spiritual life, nor of the actualization of human reason, nor of the achievement of the good by man, nor of even the highest position on values, even though it acknowledges the holy in the form of personality and anchors the latter in the transcendent, nor of the moral principle known intuitively for a change instead of analytically. It consists of the truth of the Word of God, which as such cannot be derived from any other word, nor measured by any other word, nor tested as to its validity, nor spoken by man to himself, but which can only be spoken to him, which perhaps he may not hear, but which, if he has heard it, he can have heard only in obedience, without being in any position to find out why he must obey. The enterprise of a real theological ethics would not be vindicated in relation to philosophical ethics by the proof that philosophical ethics in some way contains it in itself. The principle of a real theological ethics would be concealed by this proof. Working with this principle, it would still be irritating to the philosopher. Philosophical ethics could accept that apology, ⌜be satisfied with those conditions of its existence,⌝ and give to a ⌜pseudo-⌝ theological ethics the desired license without for a single moment feeling disturbed in its verdict that a true and proper theological ethics, which the apologetic renounces as such, is something impossible and insignificant.
The second possibility is that the linkages ⌜between the problem of philosophical ethics and that of theological ethics⌝ are not meant in such a way ⌜that the latter must be given a basis in the former but⌝ rest on the very different assumption that the philosophical inquiry contains the theological inquiry within itself to the extent that philosophizing takes place on the premise of the knowledge that characterizes theology, namely, knowledge of the revelation of God’s Word. Philosophy has here come down from its judicial throne and set itself and its questions and answers on the same ground as theology—the conflict of the faculties is childishness—sharing the whence and the whither with theology and yet not ceasing on this account to be philosophy. On this assumption all the linkages might be more or less significant, not as an apology for theological ethics—philosophy itself would decree that such an apology is not needed—but rather to show clearly the justification and even the necessity of philosophical ethics alongside theological ethics. A philosophy which with theology and just as well as theology—for why should theology have any precedence or advantage in this respect, since it, too, is a human work?—has the hearing of the Word of God as its presupposition, can come to the side of theology as an equal partner, and in regard to these and similar linkages can raise the question and offer some indication of the possibility of the concept with whose reality theology methodologically starts. Often, too, it may perhaps be its living conscience, e.g., when recollection of the possibility of this concept ought to be calculated to invite to knowledge, to new knowledge of the constantly forgotten reality. This is the definition of the relation between theological and philosophical ethics that we actually have in view here. But when the linkages are meant in this way, they cannot signify a grounding and justifying of theological ethics in the sphere of philosophical ethics. It is admitted on both sides that the annexation is right. How can the distinctive starting point and goal of theological ethics be grounded or justified in terms of philosophy when with theology, philosophy itself, as in its own way Christian knowledge, is not rebellion but obedience? The result of our first discussion, then, is that in no case can a serious debate between theological and philosophical ethics have anything whatever to do with apologetics. Theological ethics cannot spare the philosopher vexation at its own conduct, for it will always be strange enough even to itself. From the philosopher’s standpoint it is an unheard-of annexation. It cannot please him as though there were no danger in it. It cannot make its distinctive whence and whither innocuous in order to ensure for itself a place in the sun. By its existence as true theological ethics it has to put the philosopher, like the theologian, like everybody, before the decision whether its enterprise is to be rejected as impossible and insignificant or whether he will adopt the presupposition on which this enterprise rests. It can come to a meaningful and mutually fruitful agreement with him only when it is and remains determined to show its colors as true theological ethics. ⌜There can be no apologetic of theological ethics in relation to a philosophical ethics that sets itself with it on the ground of its own presupposition. A philosophy that does this does not ask for any such apologetic. Whatever philosophy may say to its efforts, from the standpoint of theology apologetic means a veiling of the decision in which alone theological statements can and will be valid.⌝
2
The apologetic attitude of theological ethics vis-à-vis philosophical ethics is not the only one against which we must safeguard ourselves. Alongside apologetics, there has commended itself to theology, in the attempt to maintain its own existence, the method of isolation, diastasis rather than synthesis. This does not come alone, but forms a kind of expansion, continuation, and crowning of apologetics in much the same way as war is the continuation of politics with other means. In spite of apologetics, theology has never so fully lost its recollection of the uniqueness of its task and activity that it does not somewhere suddenly rediscover its self-awareness, that the proof of the philosophical basis of its task and activity is not in some way completed in the proof of its independence, its distinction, its special character as compared with the task and activity of the philosopher. What is thought to be the need to give an account to philosophy would have succeeded all too well if its result were that theological ethics ceases to be something other than philosophical ethics. It obviously cannot lead to this, as it came close to doing in, e.g., W. Herrmann,5 but when the theologian has validated himself to the philosopher, he must now for good or ill show also at some point that he is not a superfluous figure, a mere alter ego of the philosopher. With some fervor a little superiority is now maintained in relation to the philosopher, a little extra and better knowledge, and some attempt is made to define this. To this extent we have to do here with a second attitude of theological ethics that differs from the first. Covered by the linkages, theological ethics must and will demonstrate its uniqueness, particularity, and independence. What needs to be said in this regard may be summed up in four trains of thought. |
1. With E. W. Mayer (p. 191) the so-called Christian religious consciousness may be laid down as the source of theological ethics and with F. Schleiermacher its task may be defined as the description of the mode of action that arises out of the dominion of the self-consciousness with a Christian determination (Chr. Sitte, p. 33). Instead of the Christian religious consciousess De Wette (Lehrbuch, p. 2), Kirn (Grundr. d. E., p. 2),6 and Wünsch (Theolog. Erh., p. 64) can also speak of revelation. In contrast, De Wette, I. A. Dorner (Chr. Sittenlehre, p. 21),7 and E. W. Mayer name reason as the source of philosophical ethics, Kirn names experience, and Wünsch names reason and empirical experience. In all these cases what is obviously meant is not the self-consciousness with a Christian determination. |
2. The place of theological morals, as Schleiermacher in particular sharply emphasizes (pp. 33f.), is the church understood as the fellowship of those who share a Christian disposition. The ethical subject of theological ethics according to Wünsch (loc. cit.)