Irrisio (Geerard, CPG 1113) is not as readily available as R.P.C. Hanson’s edition,2. it may be helpful to provide a working draft here as a basis for some snippets of commentary that hopefully may furnish some new clues to such still unresolved problems as place of origin and date, literary antecedents, and genre. (Is it in any real sense an early Christian Apology?) In particular, the resemblances between Hermias and Lucian of Samosata, especially the latter’s Ikaromenippos, though they have not gone unnoticed, deserve a fresh look for the light they cast on the literary genre.
Translation
1
The blessed apostle Paul writing to the Corinthians,
[who sojourned in Laconian Greece]3. declared,
“Beloved ones, the wisdom of this world is absurdity with God” (I Cor 3.19, NAB).
His words were very much to the point; for, in my opinion,
worldly wisdom took its beginning from the revolt of the angels.
That is why the philosophers propose doctrines that are neither
harmonious nor in agreement when they speak one to another.
2
Indeed some of them say that the soul is fire,
others, that it is air,
others intellect,
others motion,
others, an exhalation (ἀναθυμίασις),4.
others, an energy flowing from the stars,
others, a mobile number,
others, generative water,
others, an element or a composition of elements,
others, a harmony,
others, blood,
others, breath,
others the monad,5.
and the ancients, contrary elements.
How many explanations have been given on this subject,
how many dialectical ratiocinations,
how many judgments of sophists, who contend about,
rather than discover, the truth!
3
Be that as it may! They are in contention with regard to the soul.
But with regard to the questions that concern it,
[surely?] they spoke in agreement.
Some call the pleasure of the soul [one thing, others another]:
one calls it a good,
a second one, an evil,
a third, an intermediary between good and evil.
Some say that the nature of the soul is immortal,
others, that it is mortal,
others, that it survives [after death] for a little while,
others transform it into beasts,
others dissolve it into atoms,
others re-incarnate it three times,
others limit it to a cycle of three thousand years6.
and indeed people who do not live even for a hundred years
make pronouncements about a future of three thousand years.
4
How, then, should we characterize these views?
In my view, portentous humbug, nonsense,
frenzied chaos, or all of these.7.
If they have discovered some truth let them be of one mind,
or give assent to the same opinions,
and then I myself would gladly be persuaded by them.
But if they tear and drag apart the soul in opposite directions (ἑστασίαζον),
one to one substance, another to another,
and alter one substance after another [i.e. on the composition of the soul],
then I confess that I am exceedingly grieved
by the ebb and flow of [these] matters.
At one time I am immortal and rejoice;
next thing I become mortal and weep.
Presently I am dissolved into atoms.
I become water, I become air, I become fire.
The philosopher makes me a beast, makes me a fish,
next thing I have dolphins for brothers.
Whenever I see myself,
I am afraid of my body and I do not know what to call it:
dragon, man, or dog, or wolf, or bull, or bird, or serpent, or chimera,8.
for, according to the philosophers, I change into all of the beasts:
land- and water- and winged-beasts,
manifold, wild and tame, mute and articulate, irrational and rational.
I swim, I fly, I creep, I run, I sit.
And, what is more, Empedocles makes me a bush.9.
5
Very good! Since the philosophers cannot arrive at unanimity
about the human soul, still less can they give a true opinion
about the gods and the world.
And, truly, they have this much solidity, not to call it stolidity,
that, being unable to discover the nature of their own soul,
they seek to understand that of their gods,
and people who do not know the nature of their own body
labor over the nature of the world.
6
At any rate, they stand wholly at odds with one another
on what is the first principle of nature:
that mind is the cause and master of the universe,
that it provides order for what is disordered.
Whenever Anaxagoras10. accepts me as a pupil, I learn this:
“The first principle of all things is Mind,
providing motion for what is motionless,
separation for what is intermingled,
and beauty for what is ugly.”11.
When Anaxagoras makes these statements,
I cherish him and am persuaded by his teaching.
But Melissus12. and Parmenides13. take their stand against him.
And Parmenides heralds abroad with poetical verse:
“Being is one, eternal, infinite, immovable, and perfectly identical in itself.”14.
Here I am once again.
In this teaching I do not know how to change.
Parmenides has chased Anaxagoras out of my mind.
7
Then, when I think that I have an unshakeable doctrine,
Anaximene,15. interjecting, cries out in turn:
“But I tell you, the universe is air and this,
when it becomes thick and condensed,
becomes water