application in medicine and technology.
G. W. F. Hegel presented a mode of thought that attempted to gather the various philosophic positions into a single System. He taught us to think in philosophy both historically and systematically. His System laid out the conditions—ontological, cosmic, historical, and personal—for the rationally free society. But he also taught us to think with constant attention to revelation. His own thought was rooted in his self-avowed Lutheranism. We have chosen selections from the introductions to his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
Finally, we have selected a small text from Martin Heidegger presented as a “Memorial Address” to peasant villagers of his hometown in Messkirch in Bavaria. Heidegger attempted to get back to what he called “the ground of metaphysics” as first philosophy and to rethink the tradition from there. The ground of metaphysics lies in a sense of the encompassing Mystery that is brought to awareness through the kind of thinking awakened by the arts and that emerges from meditation on ultimate things, such as one’s own mortality. The tradition of philosophy is fueled by that but has not considered it as such. Heidegger saw each great philosophy as a way of revealing fundamental truths about our position in the whole scheme of things, but also simultaneously as a way of concealing what is revealed in other philosophies; and he especially focused upon the rootage of thought in the life-world, in everyday life. As we noted previously, von Balthasar claimed that today theology must make Heidegger’s project its own. In effect, this involves the rootage of theology, not only in philosophy, but also and especially in the life of prayer. The current work provides an introduction to each of the works selected as well as lists of questions for focus and discussion and suggestions for further reading.
4.
There is no such thing as philosophical reading; there is only philosophical rereading and rereading and rereading. The idea is to consider each claim within the context of the philosopher’s view of the Whole, but also to think of that in terms of reflection upon one’s own experience. So when reading one has to anticipate and recall, correcting one’s preliminary understanding in the light of what comes later. By this tacking between part and whole of the text and between text and experience, one gradually builds up a view of the Whole to which each philosopher directs us. It is upon the habits developed in this manner that theology essentially draws in thinking through revelation.
One way to read well is to respond regularly and reflectively to what is read. Students would do well to keep a reflective journal in which they develop reasoned reactions to what might especially strike them, positively or negatively, in the texts. In this way they will learn to think for themselves, following the paths laid out in the readings.
Finally, the texts and the introductory remarks are meant to be supplemented by a seasoned teacher who, through lecture and discussion, can help bring to life what might otherwise remain only the dead letter.
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Two of the chapters have already appeared in print: “Phenomenology of the Mailbox” in Philosophy Today, “Hegel and Religion” in my Placing Aesthetics: Reflections on the Philosophic Tradition. They are reprinted with permission and with some modification.
FIDES ET RATIO
The human spirit soars on two wings, reason and faith.
—Fides et Ratio, John Paul II
READING
John Paul II, Fides et Ratio: On the Relationship of Faith and Reason (Boston: Pauline, 1998). You are invited to read the entire work, but you are expected to have read the following sections:
Introduction: 1, 3–5
I. Revelation: 12, 15
II. Credo ut Intelligam: 16–19
III. Intelligo ut Credam: 26, 30–33
IV. Faith and Reason: 36, 38–40, 43, 45–46, 48
IV. Magisterium: 49, 51–52, 55–56, 62
V. Philosophy and Theology: 64–68, 71–73, 75–77, 79
VI. Current Requirements and Tasks: 81, 83, 85, 86–90, 97, 106
1.
The epigram to Fides et Ratio presents an image that governs Pope John Paul II’s thought: “Faith and reason are like two wings upon which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth.” The image is suggestive: with one wing a bird cannot take off but only flutters around in a circle, pivoting around itself. One wing—faith alone or reason alone—gets one nowhere in the greater scheme of things. Fideism or rationalism are the extremes to be avoided. But there is also a third option to be avoided: rejection of both faith and reason.
In this encyclical John Paul II addresses the contemporary intellectual situation. He finds currents of materialism, scientism, positivism, phenomenalism, historicism, subjectivism, relativism, skepticism, agnosticism, atheism, evolutionism, pantheism, nihilism, and fideism, as well as, linked to fideism, biblicism and radical traditionalism.
Materialism is a position that claims to be the upshot of scientific development: everything is reducible to elementary particles that combine and separate according to invariant laws. Human awareness is wholly governed by brain-functioning (Faith and Reason, #80, p. 101; henceforth 80/101). It is also called reductionism. It appears as evolutionism insofar as it sees no link between matter and spirit but reduces the latter to the former. Materialism is linked to positivism. The pope also calls it scientism (88/109), which claims that our only knowledge is sensory (46/62). It is also linked to instrumentalism, which the pope sees as in turn linked to pragmatism (89/110–11), which holds that through science we can know how to develop the means to our ends without any ability to assess ends (47/63). Phenomenalism is broader than positivism because what appears is more than sensory, for example, our own awareness; but phenomenalism denies knowledge of ultimates beyond phenomena (54/71; 83/105).
Relativism is the generic position that denies all absolutes (5/14; 80/101). Its two variants are subjectivism and historicism. Subjectivism claims that all opinions and especially all values are merely relative to individual preference. Certain brands of existentialism make that claim with regard to values. Historicism broadens the claim to cover cultures and epochs: truth and goodness are determined by culture or the historical time frame within a culture and there is no way to judge better or worse with regard to differing cultures or different historical time frames (54/72; 87/109). Skepticism withholds judgment on everything. Nihilism (from the Latin nihil, which means “nothing”) goes further than skepticism to claim that there is nothing at all to value or even to ultimate intelligibility (46/62; 90/111). Agnosticism withholds judgment on the existence of God (5/14), while atheistic humanism denies the existence of God as a block to the maturity of humankind (46/62), and pantheism claims that everything together is God (80/101). On the other side of the ledger are fideism, biblicism, and radical traditionalism (52/69; 55/73–74). Fideism refers to the position of those who accept absolutes by reason of their religious belief system and reject the work of reason. Biblicism narrows the belief system to what the Hebrew-Christian Bible is thought to teach, radical traditionalism to what has been taught in the past. All these forms either distrust or place unwarranted limits on reason. With a distrust of full-fledged reason goes reliance upon individual feeling regarding the most fundamental things.
The pope discerns in all of these movements a denial of the competency of reason, except as merely instrumental reason, as a tool to get what we want. But there are also positions which affirm that competency. He singles out three that he finds inadequate: rationalism, ontologism (52/69), and eclecticism (86/108). The term eclecticism is derived from the Greek for “selection.” It refers to a position that accepts truths wherever they might be found, but without a comprehensive view of the compatibility of the frameworks within which they have been formulated. Rationalism claims the omni-competence of reason and its superiority to faith, though (for example, in Hegel) it is not necessarily opposed to the truths of faith. Ontologism involves the claim that in the notion of Being (Greek on, genitive ontos) we intuit God himself. John Paul also points to “some forms of idealism” that attempt to transform faith into reason (45/62), though he