plants.
Seventh priority, rubber – The destruction of the two principal plants was called for.
Since during the course of 1943 the German submarine had become a serious threat to our successful waging of the war, the facilities supporting underseas craft were moved to top priority in a list of target categories given to the U.S. Eighth Air Force by the theater commander in October 1942:
First priority, five submarine bases
Second priority, aircraft factories and fields
Third priority, twelve railroad “marshaling yards”
THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE
From the above it seems quite evident that definite progress had been made in the sphere of target selection in the planning prior to the drawing of the final blueprint for the combined bomber offensive in 1943. It was true, nevertheless, that certain things were lacking in the preparations for the air offensive against the Western Axis. No directive emanating from the top policy levels had been issued to control the combined operations of the two Allied air forces that were operating against Germany; no directive of sufficient clearness and definiteness and been given to the U.S. Eighth Air Force; and no unified analysis of enemy economy had been made that was sufficiently thorough to serve as a basis for the best target selection.
Two of these defects in strategic planning were eliminated by the work of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943: a directive was issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and this directive proved to be quite clear and definite. There had apparently never been any disposition on the part of the Combined Chiefs to depart from the intention to use strategic air power as one of the primary offensive measures against Germany, but there had been some pressure exerted to have the U. S. Eighth abandon daylight precision bombing and join with the British in night bombing.
The Commanding General of the Eighth was called to Casablanca and given opportunity to defend the United States doctrine of day bombing. His defense emphasized the greater accuracy of this type of operation which permitted small targets like factories to be found, seen, and hit. Day bombing, he declared, was more economical in the employment of forces, for a smaller number of bombers could destroy a given target. This meant reduced exposure to enemy action and consequent lower losses for a given result. Also, day attack was more economical because all forces could carry bombs, whereas at night large numbers of pathfinders and target illuminators were required. It was stated, in addition, that day bombing used in conjunction with British night bombing would heavily tax German defenses by allowing no rest during the daylight hours, and would prevent congestion and provide more economical use of English airdromes. The general’s defense of precision bombing likewise stressed the fact that American training and equipment would require modification if successful night operation was to be possible, for American crews would need a long period of additional training to make them capable of coping with English weather at night and U.S. planes would have to be flame dampened, thus reducing their power and range. Furthermore, the point was made that day bombing provided an excellent means of cooperating with the RAF night effort, in that the AAF bombers could find difficult targets and mark them by setting fires, whereupon the RAF could complete the job of destruction at night. Moreover, day bombing would permit the destruction of the enemy’s day fighters, thus causing the greatest reduction of his air force. Finally, it would (as a complement to night bombing) result in the greatest havoc to the enemy’s industrial system.
General Eaker spent an hour with the British Prime Minister at Casablanca and was assured by the latter that he would be given an opportunity to prove his case.
The Casablanca directive that was issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21 January 1845 is noteworthy because it governed the operations of both U.S. and British bomber commands in the United Kingdom, because of its excellent statement of the mission of strategic bombardment, and because of the target systems that were selected for attack.
The mission of the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom was “the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”
The target systems to be attacked in the accomplishment of this mission were in five categories in the following order of priority:
1 German submarine construction yards
2 The German aircraft industry
3 Transportation
4 Oil plants
5 Other targets in enemy war industry
The directive stated that strategical developments might vary the order of the five categories and that there were other targets of military and political importance, such as submarine operating based on the Biscay coast and the city of Berlin, which were worthy of attention. Attacks were to be made in the Mediterranean theater when the occasion demanded, and the units of the German fleet were to be hit when opportune. Daylight attacks were to be pressed against targets within Germany in order to maintain continuous pressure on German fighters, and to take enemy fighter pressure away from the Soviet and Mediterranean theaters.
The Report of the Committee of Operations Analysts
The target selection in the Casablanca directive was not, however, much different from nor perhaps any better than that in the earlier planning. The thing that had been lacking in all this planning was a thorough study of the enemy economy by a single agency, such a unified analysis being necessary for the proper selection of strategic objectives. This phase of planning had developed its own principles and techniques, which involved a detailed knowledge of the enemy’s productive system and a careful balancing of economic and military factors; but no agency had been created to apply these techniques in preparing a comprehensive report.
Not all of the intelligence of the enemy necessary for target selection can be obtained directly by an air force or a bomber command. Such intelligence is obtained by many regular and special governmental agencies and by a variety of individual experts. Its sources are as varied as its collectors. Aerial reconnaissance photographs, ground reports, captured weapons, interrogations of refugees and prisoners of war, current and prewar enemy technical publications, the prewar experience of Allied technical experts abroad, our own production practices and Allied data on bombing effectiveness are but some of the courses used in making a selection of targets for strategic bombing.
Before industrial systems can be ranked in target priority a number of economic and military criteria must be applied. Most important, perhaps, is the military use of the products of a system. Some of the economic factors which must be considered are the depth of an industry (measured by the time required to get products from industry to the front line), the cushion (idle capacity that can be brought into production), the reserve stocks, the attrition rate, the existence of substitutes, the possibility of exercising economics, and the ability of an industry to recuperate.
Military factors relating to the vulnerability of targets and the capabilities of the attacking air force must be applied. The structural characteristics and concentration of buildings, their susceptibility to various types of munitions, the dispersal of plants, and distances from bases all govern the possible destruction of a telling fraction of an industry by an air force.
The appointment of a body to make the analysis of German economy that was necessary before further progress in target selection could be achieved was made on 9 December 1943 by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. This body, known as the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) and placed under the direction of the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Management Control, was instructed to submit a report which would show the rate of deterioration of the German war effort that would result from air operations and which would indicate an approximate date when invasion of the Continent would be possible. This was the body that filled the gap that had existed in the strategical planning before 1943 by making a thorough-going study of German economy upon which a dependable choice of target systems