bases” across the country. Galloway said in his submission that he hadn't been paid for work in Johannesburg, Polokwane, Durban and Mbombela. Fraser's brother, Barry Fraser, was a director in the Galloway company.
Although PAN had already paid Galloway R58 million for what the investigators branded “poor quality” work, he wanted another R6.7 million. He had already obtained a default judgment against the NIA front company that had entered into the agreement with him but the agency ignored his requests for payment. A court sheriff tried to seize the assets of the company but was chased away by intelligence officials.
Following the visit of the sheriff, Galloway received a threatening lawyer's letter from SSA which accused him of breaking the law and said if he pursued his claim he would be charged and his farm attached. The farm they referred to was in the Swartland in the Western Cape, which he purchased with the proceeds of PAN for R4.25 million in 2008. The SSA eventually settled with Galloway and most of the other agents and paid them out rather than risk negative publicity.
The IG did recommend disciplinary action against a handful of managers and agents and commented on various “operational shortcomings” of PAN. As far as I can gather, no disciplinary action ever took place against any agent.
The former manager of the Covert Support Unit, Prince Makhwathana, was suspended in July 2010 for misconduct but was never supplied with a charge sheet. Makhwathana, a Fraser confidant, had entered into employment contracts with the 72 PAN agents. Paul Engelke and Kobus Meiring found that he did not have the authority to sign these contracts and that he was probably also complicit in financial misconduct. When SARS investigators commenced with audits of the PAN managers, they discovered that Makhwathana and his wife owned seven properties, four of which were purchased during the PAN programme period.
While on suspension, Makhwathana sat at home receiving his full pay and full benefits. He approached the courts in September 2013 after having written to SSA director-general Sonto Kudjoe a month earlier demanding that he be allowed to return to work. The High Court ruled in his favour, but he was recharged in January 2015 with more than a hundred violations, including illegal bugging and the promotion of several agency employees to salary levels that he was not authorised to approve.
The legal services manager of the SSA advised, however, that Makhwathana had no case to answer. David Mahlobo intervened and lifted his suspension. All charges against Makhwathana were dropped, and almost six years after being suspended and at an estimated cost of R6 million to the taxpayer, he returned to “the Farm”.
The last glimmer of hope – albeit a very small one – is the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI). The committee is an oversight body composed of members of the largest political parties. They all undergo top-secret security clearances and intelligence “training” and are bound by an oath of secrecy. They cannot talk about anything discussed during committee meetings.
The JSCI has probably an even worse credibility record than the IGI. Laurie Nathan says the committee has to take the blame for the failure of the country's intelligence services to be held accountable. One of the reasons for the malfunctioning of the JSCI was that it was chaired by a Zuma acolyte and security hawk, Cecil Burgess. He also chaired the ad hoc committee that dealt with the so-called Secrecy Bill (the Protection of State Information Bill), of which he was a champion. In addition, Burgess was appointed to the ad hoc committee that considered the spending of taxpayers' money on upgrading Zuma's Nkandla compound. That committee saw no wrong on Zuma's part or in the way in which he benefited from the upgrades. Under Burgess's watch, the JSCI repeatedly failed to publish its annual reports by the stipulated deadline and hardly ever met.
The Democratic Alliance (DA) has three members on the JSCI. They had got scent of the PAN investigation and had been asking questions ever since. The IG briefed the committee in 2015 about the results of her investigation. Committee members are not allowed to talk about the briefing but, from what I heard, it was short and to the point. The committee was informed that Arthur Fraser was not criminally liable and there would not be any prosecutions.
Since then, the DA members of the committee have insisted that they want access to the full report of Paul Engelke and Kobus Meiring. At the time of the writing of this book, David Mahlobo was considering their application. But don't hold your breath.
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On Wednesday, 23 September 2015, Her Excellency Faith Doreen Radebe, draped in an exquisite red Xhosa garb, was ushered in a horse-drawn carriage to the Royal Palace in Stockholm to present her letter of credence to King Carl XVI Gustav as South Africa's new ambassador to Sweden. Radebe wasn't the only one who was looked after following the undermining of Paul Engelke's PAN investigation. Shortly after Arthur Fraser's resignation, he went into business with Manala Manzini, his director-general, who had concocted the PAN scheme with him. Manzini's contract at the NIA had expired in September 2009.
The Sunday Times reported in August 2014 that the South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA) had blown millions in public funds on a suspect deal with Resurgent Risk Managers, a company that belonged to Fraser and Manzini. SASSA paid them R14.6 million to conduct a “threat assessment”, devise “mitigation strategies” and provide “strategic advice on security”. According to Fraser, Resurgent had followed all due processes in contracting with government.
The Post Office also made use of Fraser's intelligence expertise. Business Day reported that CEO Chris Hlekane hired Fraser to spy on senior executives who apparently posed a threat to his position.
City Press revealed in October 2016 that Resurgent Risk Managers had scored a R90 million contract from the embattled Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa) to provide security and risk advisory services for a period of two years. Resurgent also had to review and analyse Prasa's security strategy and provide training for security personnel. Prasa has been mired in controversy since it was revealed in 2015 that mismanagement led to the loss of billions of rand, through the acquisition of Spanish trains which were unsuitable for South African rails. Public protector Thuli Madonsela released a report, Derailed, which found evidence of widespread maladministration and impropriety in the awarding of tenders at Prasa. A Treasury probe revealed that only 13 out of 216 contracts awarded by Prasa between 2012 and 2015, all with a value exceeding R10 million, were above board.
According to Daily Maverick, the Treasury investigation found that Resurgent might have used a false tax certificate to score the contract, although Resurgent denied the claims. The forensic company that did the investigation for Treasury recommended that Resurgent's contract should be reported to the police for contravening the country's corruption laws.
The contract with Fraser and Manzini was awarded on the basis of a “confinement”, which refers to deals that are awarded without a tender, but only if they can be justified by factors such as urgency or a lack of competitors in the market. City Press said Resurgent had apparently invoiced Prasa on a monthly basis and had received about R30 million before the contract was put on ice. Their services were halted by Prasa in the wake of the damning public protector's report.
Fraser said that he had resigned from Resurgent by September 2016. He was, however, a co-signatory to the Prasa contract and many millions flowed to him and Manzini prior to his resignation.
City Press reported that the tender awarded to Resurgent was among a host of contracts that Treasury was investigating at the request of the public protector. Treasury might at some point release a report and claim the money back.
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The year 2016 hammered Jacob Zuma with remorseless savagery. It was what political commentator Max du Preez described as his annus maximus horribilis. By the middle of the year, Zuma was in a political maelstrom. The Constitutional Court ruled that he had failed to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution; the ANC had lost control of the country's biggest metros; and the rating agencies were yapping at his heels.
Zuma had to chortle his way through Parliament; a rebellion was brewing in his own ranks; and more evidence was emerging of his lovey-dovey relationship with his main benefactors, the Guptas. Journalist Richard Poplak remarked at the time that Zuma “looked as grey and wrinkled as an exsanguinated tortoise, and it did seem as if the end was nigh”.