1 Recce, volume 2. Alexander Strachan

operation in Angola on 15 January 1981. Later that same year, on 29 December, he distinguished himself once again during an operation in Angola and was awarded the HCG Bar. Walker therefore received the HCG twice and was the most highly decorated soldier in the SADF.

      Only six HCG decorations were awarded in South Africa. Another recipient of the HCG was an operator from 5 Recce, Cpl. Gabriel Fernando. Fernando received his (HCG no. 3) posthumously for his bravery in action on 1 August 1980. Walker received HCG no. 4 plus Bar as a member of the air force; the army received three HCG decorations and the navy one, which was awarded to Able Seaman Paul Burger Whiley. Because Walker received two, no. 5 was the last number of the HCGs that were awarded.

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      On 4 January 1978 lance corporals CF Mennigke and C de Wilzem were killed in an enemy ambush – the first operators from 1 Recce to die in Rhodesia. On 28 January 1978 Cpl. Manuel Ganhão, also from 1 Recce, died during an ambush set by the team under the leadership of Lt. Kokkie du Toit. Du Toit’s team had attacked a railway substation and the enemy had fled. Frelimo followed up quickly, and he decided to lay an ambush for them. Ganhão was fatally wounded in the fierce firefight. But Du Toit and his team were unaware that the Frelimos who had landed in their ambush were merely the reconnaissance team of a much larger follow-up force. In the subsequent skirmishes with the larger group, Du Toit and his group cut and ran while carrying out Ganhão’s body.

      SW Fourie recalls that they were deployed in a big team of about ten men:21 ‘It was one of the first deployments of 1 RC. We jumped in at night, and as usual the landing was softer if you hit a tree. On the Russian Front I soon learnt that you hit a contact within two days. The terrs were good at tracking – in any case, we left such deep tracks in the soft sand that tackie boots were no use. I remember Kokkie woke me one night and told me I had to take my Puma hunting knife and Beta light and go sort out the frogs that had been croaking all night. We found out later that you had to walk for about 30 minutes before you reached the frogs.

      ‘As junior operator in the team, I had the “privilege” of carrying the Syncal 30/TR 48 radio. We were in the vicinity of the railway line, walking in formation, when we hit contact for the very first time. Just before the shots rang out, I heard a trumpeter hornbill calling – that grating sound would stay in my memory and remind me of that day for my rest of my life. It was also the first time in my life that I saw a terr. He had a yellow complexion and wore the olive-green cammies [camouflage wear]. That split second while I wondered why he was yellow nearly cost me my life. In the exchange of fire that followed, Manuel Ganhão was killed. Losing a buddy was very tough on us, and he had to be airlifted out by helicopter.’

      But that was not the team’s last fatality. Shortly afterwards, in early February 1978, the attack on the railway line in the vicinity of Madulo Pan took place, and Lt. Kokkie du Toit was shot dead by a wounded Frelimo (the incident related at the beginning of the chapter).

      In keeping with Recce tradition, they carried Du Toit out with great difficulty with a large group of Frelimos in hot pursuit.

      One of the team leaders, Sgt. Louis Klopper, confirms that being chased by groups that far outnumbered them was the modus operandi during nearly all deployments on the Russian Front: ‘It was the pattern of the deployment … you would jump in with a team of six to eight men, execute the attack, and then be pursued almost immediately by a numerically superior Frelimo force – sometimes up to company strength – in follow-up operations.’

      During the last deployment of Du Toit’s team, 1 Recce’s commander, Cmdt. Jakes Swart, visited the group at Buffalo Range. Swart was accompanied by Maj. Hennie Blaauw, Alpha Group’s commander, and Capt. Woody Woodburne, SSO Ops Navy. Blaauw had come to orient himself to take over command from Venter, and was in the Tac HQ when Du Toit’s team made radio contact and confirmed that they had just had a contact (this was the ambush).

      A few minutes later Blaauw left the Tac HQ and as he stood talking to Swart and Venter some distance away, the signals officer, Lt. Bam de Wet, came rushing up to them. He had just received a report from Du Toit’s team that Du Toit had been fatally injured.

      Lt. Kokkie du Toit’s death on Friday 11 February 1978 brought to four the number of outstanding soldiers 1 Recce had lost in the space of four weeks.

      On the Sunday, everyone at the Tac HQ decided spontaneously to attend the service at the Methodist church in Chiredzi. According to Venter, their little group were the only men in uniform at the church: ‘I don’t think the congregation had seen soldiers in uniform at the church service before. Some of the churchgoers started talking to us, and an elderly man and his wife spoke to me in Afrikaans and thanked me that the South Africans had come to their aid. So the Recces’ cover was not watertight. But I don’t believe it had any repercussions in this case. The Recces did not look like Rhodesian soldiers, and the congregation noticed this but made no fuss about it.’

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      Hannes Venter and his counterpart in the SAS at Buffalo Range were now operating under enormous pressure. They deployed several teams on the Russian Front (in Gaza). The teams would parachute in, infiltrate to predetermined ambush positions and spring the ambush. They would then withdraw, move to the next ambush position and spring that trap too, after which large numbers of Frelimos would hunt the Recce and SAS teams of six to eight men. Two and sometimes more contacts per day were not uncommon; in fact, it was the norm.

      The daily firefights with Frelimo and Zanla guerrillas were frequently without sustained close air support. Helicopters and attack aircraft were simply not available at all times. Nearly every day the deployed teams were engaged in escape-and-evasion procedures while the Frelimo patrols followed close on their heels. Occasionally some of the team members would be injured, and no helicopters would be available to evacuate the casualties. The Rhodesian air force flew continually, and problems on the ground were attended to in terms of priority. Consequently, the deployed teams had to wait their turn to receive air support.

      Bravo Group was deployed for six weeks and had numerous contacts. Besides the four operators who lost their lives, there were injuries as well. The teams adapted quickly and did a good job in achieving their objective of disrupting the enemy. The use of the daily Telstar deployments gave everyone confidence, and the communication was excellent. It was, however, extremely stressful for one officer to sit in the Lynx plane on a daily basis while there was no support at the Tac HQ. To relieve the pressure, an operator officer was utilised as operational officer. Apart from manning the operations room, he also performed Telstar duties. This improved the command-and-control, and effective support was provided to the deployed teams.

      Cmdt. Swart subsequently decided to replace Bravo Group with Alpha Group. On 13 February 1978 Hennie Blaauw returned to Durban in the plane that evacuated Kokkie du Toit’s body. He gave orders to his group, and a couple of days later he was back at Buffalo Range where he took over from Venter. The rotation of the two groups was wrapped up within a few days.