How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute
CML18/2009) PRC, 2009, May 7
[79] In doing so, it literally articulated its historic rights claims for the first time:
“China’s sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao and relevant rights and interests in the South China Sea have been established in the long course of history, and are solidly grounded in history and law“ (PRC Gvt., 2016h).
In an official statement, called ’on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea’, the PRC government, reiterated this claim:
“i. China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao, consisting of Dongsha Qundao, Xisha Qundao, Zhongsha Qundao and Nansha Qundao;
ii. China has internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, based on Nanhai Zhudao;
iii. China has exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, based on Nanhai Zhudao;
iv. China has historic rights in the South China Sea“ (PRC Gvt., 2016e).
Interestingly, just like the previous White Paper, this statement did no longer refer to the nine-dash-line, even though the PRC’s maritime and territorial claims are closely associated with it106. The nine-dash-line had been utilized as a means to express the PRC’s historic rights in the SCS in an indirect manner until the publication of the Tribunal’s final verdict. Ever since the PRC literally has been articulating its historical rights claims, yet the precise scope and nature thereof continue to remain rather ambiguous. Moreover, the PRC started to assert its overall maritime and territorial SCS claims in a much more direct, frequent and blunt manner, thereby attaching a much greater significance to the (pro)active protection thereof than it used to be the case in pre-award times. As a result, the PRC constitutes the key SCS claimant party. It lays down the largest territorial and maritime claims by far, and its capacities to assert those claims undoubtedly exceed those of any other SCS claimant party. Hence, any progress in terms of conflict management, let alone conflict resolution, can only be achieved with Chinese active support and approval.
[80] 3.3 Official Position and Claims by the Philippines
Aside from those features (Table 14) that are actively occupied, the Republic of the Philippines’ general claims extends to both Scarborough Shoal and a grouping of 50 features (part of Spratlys) known as Kalayaan Islands (KIG). They are unrelated to Philippine archipelagic state status as they are located entirely outside archipelagic and territorial sea waters. Both groups of features, Scarborough Shoal and Kalayaan Islands, are located (as confirmed by the Arbitral Tribunal107) within the Philippine 200 EEZ, which, yet, does not provide the country with any territorial sovereignty over land features108.
Table 5: Features claimed/occupied by the Philippines
| Spratlys (occupied) | Paracels (occupied) | Claimed |
| Ayungin or Second Thomas Shoal | Scarborough Shoal | |
| Balagatas or Irving Reef | (claimed by several | |
| Kota or Loaita Island | parties, controlled by | |
| Lawak or Nanshan Island | the PRC since 2012) | |
| Likas or West York Island | ||
| Melchora Aquino or Loaita Cay | ||
| Pag-asa or Thitu Island | ||
| Panata or Lamkian Cay | ||
| Parola or Northeast Cay | ||
| Patag or Flat Island | ||
| Rizal or Commodore Reef |
Source: Own representation
The United States officially recognized Philippine independence in 1946. As a result, all territory (land and waters) that had previously been ceded to the [81] United States after the Spanish-American War as stipulated by the Treaty of Paris109, was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines without objections by an attendant110. Consecutively, in several pieces of legislation, the government in Manila further specified its territorial claims, thereby partly neglecting the boundaries originally determined by the Treaty of Paris. That said, it drew 80 (Republic Act. No 3046, 1961) straight baselines to specify the Philippine archipelago. Based on this model, Manila started to officially consider all waters inside these baselines as its internal waters and all waters between the baselines and the border as provided by the Treaty of Paris as territorial sea. Republic Act. No 3046 was criticized by several states including the U.S. as excessive (Roach & Smith, 2012), particularly on the issues of freedom of navigation and archipelagic innocent passage.
Moreover, the Philippine archipelagic baseline claim was set out by Republic Act No. 3046 (Philippine Gvt., 1961). The latter was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 5446 (1968). In addition, by means of Presidential Proclamation No. 370 (March 20, 1968) Manila exerted its claim to control over natural resources in and jurisdiction of its continental shelf for the first time. Accordingly, a 200 nm EEZ was established by Presidential Decree No. 1599 (Philippine Gvt., 1978). Subsequently, the Philippines ratified the UNCLOS Convention in 1984. Moreover, in 1994, a 200 nm continental shelf (as measured from the archipelagic baselines) was established. In 2009, Manila passed Republic Act No. 9522 (Philippine Gvt., 2009a), which marginally adjusted previous archipelagic baselines to conform with the technical rules and regulations provided by UNCLOS, yet without significantly deviating from its previous claims in excess of the Treaty of Paris. In the same year, Manila submitted its claims for an extended continental shelf to the CLC. As a result thereof, the country was granted a total continental shelf of 350 nm in the Benham Rise area by the CLS in 2012.
To be sure, Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal111, both at the heart of the Philippines v. China arbitration case (2013–2016), were not covered by the [82] Treaty of Paris or by previous legislation on the Philippine archipelagic baseline. Therefore, its claims to both groups of maritime features are referred to as extra-archipelagic claims. According to the official Philippine point of view on this issue, there are no maritime features in SCS waters that are simultaneously claimed by both China and the Philippines (e.g. Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef) and qualify as islands within the meaning of Art. 121 (1) UNCLOS. Thus, none of these features are said to generate any Chinese entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf in the area. Therefore, all contested maritime features are said to fall within the Philippines’ EEZ given its archipelagic state status112 and its extended continental shelf. Finally, it can be concluded that the Philippines are among the most proactive claimant parties. It regularly engaged in joint efforts and measures with Vietnam in order to safeguard its SCS claims more effectively. This has generated severe tensions with the government in Beijing, along with the special