was sent. Both organizations were utilized immediately (ODCEM, n.d.).
While still within the first hour of the incident, numerous response agencies and volunteers arrived. In order to better organize them while keeping resources nearby, at least three staging areas were created. Individuals, equipment, and goods were kept separate in an effort to organize these resources while reducing confusion.
Operational response agencies and personnel were placed in the Personnel Staging Area. This was located just outside of the disaster zone. These were the people that would go into the active disaster zone and crawl through the rubble or treat patients as needed. They were staged close enough that they could quickly deploy (within minutes), but far enough away that they could not interfere with ongoing operations (ODCEM, n.d.).
The resources that arrived at the Personnel Staging area included local, state, and federal law enforcement officers, fire, and rescue crews, EMS personnel, the first of many federal government resources from Tinker Air Force Base, the first contingency of the Oklahoma National Guard, and other resources too numerous to list. They continued to arrive throughout the day, and staged resources were put into service as they were needed (ODCEM, n.d.).
An additional staging area was set up to receive donations that began coming in within the first hour. These donations included just about everything you can imagine (ODCEM, n.d.). From tools, to toilet paper, to work clothes, the community began to bring what they thought might help. At this staging area, the donated items were sorted and categorized. This allowed agencies to ask if there was the availability of a specific item, and this donation staging area could identify and provide the item if it was available. This would later be moved and turn into a donation's management warehouse.
Not long after the explosion, at least three different heavy equipment companies arrived at the Incident Command Post (ICP) offering all of their resources (ODCEM, n.d.). The Incident Commander (IC) tasked one company with setting up a staging area for heavy equipment and shoring materials, and then organizing the construction/demolition staging area. A liaison was placed in this staging area to ensure effective communication. These companies cooperated and collaborated together and with public safety. In one instance, a police escort was provided to one company that was bringing an extremely large crane from 15 miles north of the bombing site. This escort was given to provide a quicker response (Final Report, 1996). The After‐Action Report (AAR) identified that there were some issues with staging, but Incident Command knew where their resources were and could check availability of a resources within seconds (ODCEM, n.d.).
The Oklahoma City Fire Department had already set up a Command Post on a street corner, and they had initiated ICS from the beginning of the incident. The fire department had put the key people in place to fill General Staff, and Command Staff positions. Because of the size of the incident, there were not enough law enforcement officers on scene to control the multitude of untrained people that came to help. An area of 48‐blocks was affected, and it was determined that it would be a monumental task to try to keep people out. When it was thought that a secondary explosive device was found (90 minutes into the response), the entire 48‐block area was evacuated (ODCEM, n.d.).
This provided an opportunity to regroup and move the initial Incident Command Post (ICP) to a safer location two blocks away. The new location was a small parking lot. Because it was still early in the incident, the only Mobile Command Centers that were present at that time were the Oklahoma City Fire and separately Oklahoma City Police command centers (Final Report, 1996).
As part of this regrouping and because of an earlier request for more law enforcement and the Oklahoma State National Guard, it was determined that enough resources were on hand to secure entry to the main site. This was based on the number of military personnel, National Guard personnel, and law enforcement that were staged, or who were already working top secure part of the perimeter. When it was determined that there was not a secondary device, rescuers were let back into the area, but access was restricted, and each individual trying to enter the area had to provide security personnel a valid reason of why they should be let in the area. This action substantially increased accountability throughout the disaster area (ODCEM, n.d.).
By 10:55 a.m., less than two hours after the explosion, the Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams from Phoenix Arizona and Sacramento California were activated by FEMA (ODCEM, n.d.). Nine additional Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams were alerted that they may be soon deployed to the incident. A total of teams would eventually assist in the response and recovery. The Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams that worked at the Oklahoma City bombing site included teams from New York City, NY, Montgomery County, MD, Virginia Beach, VA, Los Angeles, CA, Fairfax County, VA, Dade County, FL, Puget Sound, WA, Menlo Park, CA, and Orange County, CA (Oklahoma City National Memorial and Museum, n.d.).
Additionally, FEMA's Regional Director and his staff were deployed from Denton, TX, to Oklahoma City at approximately 11:00 a.m., so they could support what would be an ongoing operation. FEMA arrived in Oklahoma City within four hours of the bombing, and they offered the full cooperation of the federal government. This is important to note because they did not try to take over the response, they were there to support it (ODCEM, n.d.).
Around 11:00, the National Weather Service notified the Incident Command Post (ICP) that harsh weather was moving into the area. It was initially thought that a tent could be erected by the National Guard so that workers could get under cover in inclement weather; however, the lot in which the Incident Command Post (ICP) was located did not have sufficient room for it. This was due to the lot had begun to fill with other mobile command centers, and it became a problem that needed to be solved. The additional command centers that arrived were manned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with each taking a fair amount of space (ODCEM, n.d.).
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company was also represented at this location. They set up a truck, so they could loan cell phones to all legitimate first responder's. This integration of a nongovernmental agency was voluntary. The company wanted to ensure that all personnel that responded to this disaster had working and valid communications. Any time these phones were used, they would take priority over all calls, including that of private citizens. While it took a few hours to erect, the phone company also erected a mobile cell tower to facilitate better communications (ODCEM, n.d.).
Due to the room constraints of this parking lot, it was decided to move the Incident Command Post (ICP) to the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (headquarters) parking lot. The use of this parking lot was personally offered to the Incident Commander (IC) by the CEO of Southwestern Bell. The Southwestern Bell parking lot presented substantially more accommodations than the previous area. It provided a much larger parking area and a sheltered parking garage where volunteer organizations and private businesses could distribute food, and it provided a place that would protect and store the multitude of donations that were already arriving. The adjacent office building also met the sanitary needs of the emergency and relief personnel (ODCEM, n.d.).
Shortly after changing Incident Command Post positions, additional mobile command units began arriving. Additional mobile command units that arrived included two vehicles from the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety and one command center from the US Marshals Service (ODCEM, n.d.). This Command Post provided an area where all agencies meet and\or liaison with other agencies in an effort to have a more integrated response. If in the event one agency needed to coordinate with another, they only had to walk a short distance to their command center.
After the move to the new location, the Oklahoma National Guard and the Oklahoma City Public Works worked together to set up the National Guard's tent. The tent was used as an Incident Command Post for the National Guard operations. This tent was used for the forward operations for the National Guard until the end of the incident (ODCEM, n.d.).
Shortly after moving to the Southwestern Bell parking lot, the Fire Chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department assumed command of the incident. Soon thereafter, the FBI and the new Incident Commander ([IC] the Fire Chief) met. Because this incident was a federal building, as well as other reasons, it was determined that the FBI would be the lead investigative agency. The FBI discussed the need