Markus Gabriel

The Meaning of Thought


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my own positions. What matters is nothing but the truth. And since it’s not so easy to ascertain the truth purely through the self-exploration of human thought, there will always be differences of philosophical opinion. Believing that we could somehow answer our questions once and for all would therefore amount to a fundamental error. Instead, the crucial thing is to set our thinking in motion, so that we can open up new forms and fields of thought.

      As we’ll see in due course, I take it to be a decisive criterion of reality that we can get it wrong. And because thought itself is something real, we’re not somehow immune from error when we tackle the question of what exactly it is. Thinking about thinking is no easier or less likely to lead to mistakes than thinking about any other part of reality. Though, needless to say, I’m fairly convinced that my own answer is correct, else I would hardly bother to set it out here.

      To unravel the meaning of thought, I will introduce you to the notion that there is an actual sense of thought. The key thesis of the book says that our thought is a sense, just like sight, taste, hearing, feeling or touch. Through thinking, we touch a reality accessible only to thought, just as colours are usually accessible only to sight and sounds to hearing. At the same time, I argue the case for giving our thought a new meaning, in the sense of a new direction. I want to provide orientation in an age in which – as in all ages before it – we find our thinking thrown into confusion by a multitude of ideological currents and their propagandists. Just think of the thoughts you’ve recently had about Donald Trump! Was it really sensible to have had all of these? Isn’t it precisely one of the traps laid by Trump’s savvy media strategy that we spend so much time talking about the ever-swelling tide of scandals that engulf him?

      1 1. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, ed. and trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 537 (9:23).

      2 2. Ibid.

      3 3. Ibid.

      4 4. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Terry P. Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 50 (§74); Paul Artin Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007).

      The human being is the animal that doesn’t want to be one. This is because, at some point or other, it began to wonder who or what it really is. Insofar as we have an implicit or explicit image of ourselves as human beings, we also make claims about the nature of the good life. Ethics* is the discipline that asks what a good life looks like. It is therefore based upon anthropology, the discipline tasked with figuring out what precisely distinguishes the human both from other animals and from the lifeless expanses of the inanimate universe.1

      Our image of the human being is closely intertwined with our values. A moral value is a yardstick for human behaviour. It distinguishes between actions that ought to be performed – the good ones – and those that ought not to be carried out – the bad, morally deficient ones. Every value system should also have room for actions that, at least in most cases, are neither good nor bad (driving on the left-hand side of the road rather than the right-hand side, twiddling your thumbs, taking a deep breath, buttering bread, and so on), as well as for actions that are utterly unacceptable – that is, evil (torturing of children, for example, or poison gas attacks on civilian populations).

      Not every morally wrong action is automatically evil, because not all morally wrong action causes far-reaching harm to the value system itself – think of those occasional white lies told to protect a friend or of cheating at a board game. Evil, by contrast, completely undermines the value system in which it arises. Thus, the prototypical sadistic totalitarian dictator, of which the previous century has provided us with all too many examples, subverts his own value system. Unable to trust anyone or anything, he has to create a total surveillance apparatus.

      Unfortunately, it is very difficult, impossible even, to determine who the human being is from a neutral standpoint. For it is necessarily a matter of self-determination to attempt to determine what the human actually is. This self-determination cannot simply consist in naming natural facts, because the human is a specifically minded animal, where human mindedness (or Geist, as we say in my neck of the woods) is the capacity to lead a life in the light of a representation of who the human being is. More concretely, this capacity finds expression whenever and wherever we develop stories and images of our lives and of the conditions under which we deem them a success. We thereby aim to be happy, but without being able to give anything like a universally valid account of what happiness is.

      From a philosophical point of view, happiness designates nothing other than a successful life. There are no universally valid standards for this; neither is there a set of principles of which we might somehow draw up a definitive catalogue. At best, we can state the framework conditions that are valid for any successful pursuit of happiness – namely, human rights. Yet this does not mean that philosophy or any other discipline could come up with a recipe for happiness.

      Today, however, the concept of the human being hangs in the balance. The digital age has already brought about a world in which what was previously the privilege of humans – that is, solving problems in an intelligent fashion – is now carried out, in a range of situations at least, with far greater speed and efficiency by the machines that we have built in order to make our life and survival less burdensome.

      The first key thesis of this book states that thought is a sense, just like our sense of hearing, touch and taste, our sense of balance, and everything else that we nowadays count as belonging to the human sensory system. This thesis runs counter to the now widespread idea that thinking is basically a matter of information processing and therefore a procedure which can essentially be re-created in silicon or some other non-living material. In short: computers ultimately think just as little as do the good old ring binders familiar from our analogue bureaucracy. Programs are simply systems of data management, which we can use to solve problems far quicker than