hurrying to join Marlborough, when, hearing that it was his intention to fight a battle in defence of Oudenarde, and unable to bring up his troops, he hastened forward alone and joined the English army. Between Marlborough's army and Oudenarde ran the river Dender, which the French determined to hold to cover the siege. Alost, which lies a little to the north of Oudenarde, they already possessed; at about an equal distance to the south, also on the river Dender, was the entrenched camp of Lessines. Could they occupy this they would be in a good position to cover the siege. Marlborough foresaw their intention, and determined to forestall them. Although the river between Lessines and Alost makes a considerable curve, and Marlborough, on the convex side of it, had almost twice the distance to traverse that the French had, he pushed on with such rapidity that he secured Lessines and the passage of the river before the French columns appeared in sight. It was now evident to the French generals that Marlborough intended to fight. They drew in their detachments, and marched rapidly to cross the Scheldt at Gavre, to the north of Oudenarde. Marlborough marched direct upon that city, so that the converging lines of march would speedily meet. It was known that there was much disputing and ill-feeling between Vendome and the Duke of Burgundy, and that the latter Prince intended, if possible, to avoid an engagement. With all speed Marlborough sent forward General Cadogan to secure the passage of the river, and prepare bridges for his army. After he had performed this duty, Cadogan rode forward to reconnoitre, and saw the French troops crossing at Gavre, and, in ignorance of the immediate vicinity of the English, quietly sending out foragers. With such troops as he had he drove in the outlying posts of the enemy, who now, apprised of the approach of Marlborough, found a battle inevitable.
Battle of Oudenarde. July 11, 1708.
A little to the north of Oudenarde the river Norken joins the Scheldt, after a course almost parallel to that river. Between the Norken and the Scheldt an irregular semicircle of hills sweeps with the convex side of one of its arms at Oudenarde, while the other, surmounted by the village Oycke, overhangs the Norken; it contains in its hollow two little brooks which fall into the Scheldt just north of Oudenarde. On the other side of these brooks, closing the opening of the semicircle, is an irregular mass of rising ground sloping away northward towards the junction of the Scheldt and Norken. Vendome gave orders to occupy this irregular mass and the valleys of the brooks, the arm of the semicircle between Oudenarde and the course of the brooks being occupied by Cadogan. But the Duke of Burgundy counter-ordered his commands, and arranged his troops upon what was doubtless a stronger position, the range of hills beyond the Norken. But though stronger for defence, it was much less favourable for an offensive battle. These contradictory commands cost the French their first loss. Seven battalions of their troops having pushed forward towards Oudenarde as far as Eyne, were fallen upon and destroyed by Cadogan, who thus crossed the brook and ascended the irregular high land beyond it. Had Vendome's order been carried out the position of Cadogan would have been very precarious. He was almost unsupported, although Marlborough was coming to his assistance with some cavalry, which he led forward for several miles at a gallop. As it was, however, the English army came up by degrees, and took position with their left on the semicircle of hills, and their right supporting Cadogan beyond the brook. Thwarted in his first schemes, Vendome now wished to remain beyond the Norken, knowing that the enemy were wearied with a long march (it was already four in the afternoon), and that he would have an opportunity of withdrawing quietly in the night towards France. The Duke of Burgundy again thwarted him. He commanded the right wing, and insisted upon sending his troops forward across the Norken into the valleys where the brooks ran. The country was there broken up with enclosures, and a fierce hand-to-hand battle was fought with the English right, which Marlborough had intrusted to Eugene. The exhibition of all the English cavalry upon the high lands beyond the brooks held the French left entirely in check; and while Eugene and the English were disputing the hedges and enclosures in the valley, Marlborough, passing to the left, observed that the extremity of the semicircle, which overhung the Norken and was occupied by the village of Oycke, was unguarded by the French. He caused Overkirk with the Dutch reserve to march round the hills to occupy this point, and thus completely envelop the French right. The effect was the total annihilation of that part of the French army, and it was owing to an accident alone that any part of it escaped. The two extremes of the enveloping English line came so close together, that in the darkness they fired upon each other. The mistake was happily soon discovered, but fearing a repetition of the accident, the general gave orders rather to let the French escape than to run the risk of renewing such a disaster. Some 9000 men thus broke through at a gap in the semicircle of hills near the Castle of Bevere, and made their escape to France. The rest of the beaten army retired toward Ghent.
Battle of Oudenard. July 11th, 1708.
Both armies were speedily reinforced. Eugene's troops arrived from the Moselle, and joined the English; Berwick, with part of the army of the Rhine, which had been observing them, reinforced the French, but the relative numbers of the troops were not much changed. Marlborough and Eugene had now to settle upon a further plan of action. Before them lay the great city of Lille, one of the earliest conquests of Louis XIV., newly fortified with all the skill of Vauban. Siege of Lille. Dec. 9, 1708. That the allies should cross the frontier and enter France was speedily determined. But while Marlborough suggested the bold plan of leaving troops to mask Lille, while the main army marched direct to Paris, Eugene, though by no means a timid general, urged the more regular course of besieging and capturing the great fortress which lay in their way before proceeding further. The arguments in favour of this plan were too plausible to be disregarded. It was decided that while Eugene in person undertook the siege, Marlborough should command the covering army. Even to bring the siege material to the spot was a matter of no small difficulty; the artillery alone required 16,000 horses, and the progress of the siege was watched by a French army of 100,000. When these preliminary difficulties were triumphantly overcome, there still remained the great fortress itself, occupied by 15,000 men, under the able command of Boufflers. At one time the Dutch deputies were so alarmed at the slowness of the progress made that they urged the renunciation of the project. One of the greatest difficulties experienced by the allied commanders was the provisioning of the army; the land communication with Brussels was entirely cut off, all provisions had to be brought from Ostend, whither they had been conveyed by sea. The French determined to interrupt this line of communication also, and to destroy one of the convoys which had been intrusted to General Webb, with a most insufficient detachment of troops. It has been suggested that Marlborough was here playing one of his old tricks, that, in his jealousy of Webb, he wished for his destruction, and had intentionally exposed him to this danger. If such was the case he was thoroughly disappointed. When the French troops fell upon the convoy at Wynendale, Webb made a most gallant defence and beat them off. The very slight notice taken by Marlborough in his despatches of this gallant action gives some colour to the rumour. The victory of Wynendale was at all events the turning-point of the siege; from this time rapid progress was made. On the 22nd of October Boufflers found it necessary to capitulate for the town, while retaining the citadel, and on the 9th of December he marched out of his last stronghold with all the honours of war. The reconquest of Ghent and Bruges followed upon the fall of Lille.
Capture of Port Mahon.
In other directions the war had been languid. In Spain only had anything been done. There Stanhope had taken the command in conjunction with Staremberg, the Imperial general, and had succeeded without much difficulty in capturing Port Mahon in Minorca, a place then regarded as more valuable than Gibraltar, and of the highest importance as affording a safe winter harbour for the English fleet in the Mediterranean.
For some years the exhaustion of France had been great. The finance ministers had been reduced to the most ruinous expedients to maintain the war, and the whole people were suffering terribly. Exhaustion of France. 1709. To crown their misery, the winter of 1708 was of extraordinary severity and duration. The corn crops were frozen in the ground, the very apple trees perished with cold. Famine threatened to destroy what the war had spared. Louis became very anxious to treat; and as for some years it had been supposed that the Dutch were inclined to accept a separate pacification, it was to them that Louis addressed himself. The war party was however for the present in the ascendant,