moral ideas of mankind at large?
In answering this question I need not dwell upon such obvious means of information as direct experience, or records of moral maxims and sentiments found in proverbs, literary and philosophical works, and religious codes. The sources which, from an evolutionary point of view, are of the most comprehensive importance for our study, are tribal and national customs and laws. It is to these sources that the present chapter will be devoted.
We have seen that a custom, in the strict sense of the word, is not merely the habit of a certain circle of men, but at the same time involves a moral rule. There is a close connection between these two characteristics of custom: its habitualness and its obligatoriness. Whatever be the foundation for a certain practice, and however trivial it may be, the unreflecting mind has a tendency to disapprove of any deviation from it for the simple reason that such a deviation is unusual. As Abraham Tucker observes, “it is a constant argument among the common people, that a thing must be done, and ought to be done, because it always has been done.”1 Children show respect for the customary,2 and so do savages. “If you ask a Kaffir why he does so and so, he will answer—‘How can I tell? It has always been done by our forefathers.’ ”3 The only reason which the Eskimo can give for some of their present customs, to which they adhere from fear of ill report among their people, is that “the old Innuits did so, and therefore they must.”4 In the behaviour of the Aleut, who “is bashful if caught doing anything unusual among his people,”5 and in the average European’s dread of appearing singular, we recognise the influence of the same force of habit.
1 Tucker, Light of Nature, ii. 593. Cf. also Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, i. 65 sqq.
2 Sully, Studies of Childhood, p. 280 sq.
3 Leslie, Among the Zulus and Amatongas, p. 146.
4 Hall, Arctic Researches, p. 569.
5 Dall, Alaska, p. 396.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that not every public habit is a custom, involving an obligation; certain practices, though very general in a society, may even be reprobated by almost every one of its members. The habits of a people must therefore be handled with discretion by the student of moral ideas. Yet when he has no reason to conclude as to some special habit that it is held obligatory, he may, probably always, be sure that it is either allowed, or, in spite of all assurances of its wickedness, that the disapproval of it is not generally very deep or genuine. In a community where lying is a prevailing vice, truthfulness cannot be regarded as a very sacred duty; and where sexual immorality is widely spread, the public condemnation of it always smacks of hypocrisy. Men’s standard of morality is not independent of their practice. The conscience of a community follows the same rule as the conscience of an individual. “Commit a sin twice,” says the Talmud, “and you will think it perfectly allowable.”6 Hence for the study of the inmost convictions of a nation, its “bad habits” form a valuable complement to its professed opinions.
6 Deutsch, Literary Remains, p. 58.
The dictates of custom being dictates of morality, it is obvious that the study of moral ideas will, to a large extent, be a study of customs. But at the same time it should be borne in mind that custom never covers the whole field of morality, and that the uncovered space grows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness develops. Being a rule of duty, custom may only indirectly be an expression of moral approval, by claiming, in certain cases, that goodness should be rewarded. But even when demanding praise, custom is not always a reliable exponent of merit; it includes politeness, and politeness is a great deceiver. Custom may compel us to praise a man for form’s sake, when he deserves no praise, and to thank him when he deserves no thanks. Moreover, custom regulates external conduct only. It tolerates all kinds of volitions and opinions if not openly expressed. It does not condemn the heretical mind, but the heretical act. It demands that under certain circumstances certain actions shall be either performed or omitted, and, provided that this demand is fulfilled, it takes no notice of the motive of the agent or omitter. Again, in case the course of conduct prescribed by custom is not observed, the mental facts connected with the transgression, if regarded at all, are dealt with in a rough and ready manner, according to general rules which hardly admit of individualisation. Yet the incongruity between custom and morality which ensues from these circumstances is on the whole more apparent than real. It is rather an incongruity between different moral standards. The unreflecting moral consciousness, like custom, cares comparatively little for the internal aspect of conduct. It does not ask whether a man goes to church on Sunday from a religious motive or from fear of public opinion; it does not ask whether he stays at home from love of ease or from dissent of belief and avoidance of hypocrisy. It is ready to blame as soon as the dictate of custom is disobeyed. The rule of custom is the rule of duty at early stages of development. Only progress in culture lessens its sway.
Finally, the moral ideas which are expressed in the customs of a certain circle of men are not necessarily shared by every one of its members. This may, in the present connection, be considered a matter of slight importance by him who regards morality as “objectively” realised in the customs of a people, and who denies the individual the right to a private conscience. But from the subjective point of view which I am vindicating, individual conviction has a claim to equal consideration with public opinion, nay frequently, to higher respect, representing as it does in many cases a higher morality, a moral standard more purified by reflection and impartiality. At the lower stages of civilisation, however, where a man is led by his feelings more than by his thoughts, such a differentiation of moral ideas hardly occurs. The opinions of the many are the opinions of all, and the customs of a society are recognised as rules of duty by all its members.
In primitive society custom stands for law, and even where social organisation has made some progress it may still remain the sole rule for conduct.7 The authority of a chief does not necessarily involve a power to make laws. Even kings who are described as autocrats may be as much tied by custom as is any of their subjects.
7 Cranz, History of Greenland, i. 170. Dall, op. cit. p. 381 (Tuski). Dobrizhoffer, Account of the Abipones, p. 95. Shooter, Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country, p. 101 sq. Holden, Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, p. 336. Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior of Africa, p. 16. Scaramucci and Giglioli, ‘Notizie sui Danakil,’ in Archivio per l’antropologia e la etnologia, xiv. 39. Earl, Papuans, p. 105 (Arru Islanders). Forbes, A Naturalist’s Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago, p. 473 (Timorese). Dalton, Ethnology of Bengal, p. 51 (Manipuris). Rockhill, Land of the Lamas, p. 220 (Eastern Tibetans).
The Rejangs of Sumatra “do not acknowledge a right in the chiefs to constitute what laws they think proper, or to repeal or alter their ancient usages, of which they are extremely tenacious and jealous.” There is no word in their language which signifies law, and the chiefs, in pronouncing their decisions are not heard to say, “So the law directs,” but, “Such is the custom.”8 According