in his cradle has now strangled his second serpent, and gives hopes that his future history will be answerable.
I enclose a packet which I have just received from General Washington, and which I suppose contains the articles of capitulation. It is a rare circumstance, and scarce to be met with in history, that in one war two armies should be taken prisoners completely, not a man in either escaping. It is another singular circumstance, that an expedition so complex, formed of armies of different nations, and of land and sea forces, should with such perfect concord be assembled from different places by land and water, form their junction punctually, without the least retard by cross accidents of wind or weather, or interruption from the enemy; and that the army which was their object should in the meantime have the goodness to quit a situation from whence it might have escaped, and place itself in another whence an escape was impossible.
General Greene has done wonders too in Carolina. I hear that a reinforcement was to be sent to him from the army in Virginia, and that there are hopes of his reducing Charleston. You have probably in the enclosed packet the account of his last great action. Count de Grasse sailed on the 30th with the fleet and part of the land forces. His destinaion is not mentioned. I have the honor to be, etc.,
B. Franklin.
MVI. FROM ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON
Philadelphia, 26 November, 1781.
Dear Sir:—
The Marquis de Lafayette, who has obtained leave to revisit his family for the winter, does me the honor to be the bearer of this and duplicates of two former letters to you. The degree of estimation in which he is held here you will collect from the enclosed resolutions relative to him, so that you may converse freely with him, and I doubt not that he will be able to satisfy your inquiries on many important questions relative to this country; on which account I may confine myself more to general heads than I would otherwise do.
As to intelligence, there is little of importance, the army all having gone into winter-quarters after the late glorious campaign, the enemy having been defeated on every hand. A party of about six hundred of them, who fell upon the western frontier of New York, were the last that quitted the stage, having been driven off by an inferior number of militia, with the loss of their leaders, and many privates killed, and about fifty, including the wounded, made prisoners. A body of troops is detached to the southward to reinforce General Greene, with orders to attempt Wilmington on their way, which the enemy occupy with about five hundred men, and keep up a connection with the disaffected counties in North Carolina.
We have not in a long time heard either from you or Mr. Jay, so that we are much in the dark respecting the probable prospect of a negotiation this winter, or rather are led to conclude from your silence that the prospect is extremely remote; in which case all your objects will concentre in preparing for the ensuing campaign, and directing the operations as far as possible to this country. The success of the combined operations this summer will give great weight to your arguments, especially as they are such as would deserve, independent of that, the most serious attention. But, sir, you will have a difficult card to play to induce France to do what not only our but her interests essentially require. Never was there a time in which money was more necessary to us than at present. The total abolition of paper, the length of the war, the restricted commerce we have carried on for the first five years of it, the arrears of debts, and the slender thread by which public credit hangs, put it totally out of our power to make any great exertions without an immediate supply of money.
Taxation will be carried as far as it can go; but this will fall very far short of our wants. The richest nations in Europe, unable to carry on a war by taxation only, are compelled to borrow. How, then, will it be expected that a nation, which has had every difficulty to struggle with, an enemy in the heart of its country, and all its considerable towns at one time or another in their possession, a superior navy on its coasts, and the consequential ruin of its agriculture and commerce,—how, I say, can it be expected that such a nation should find resources within itself for so long and bloody a war? And yet, in this situation, we are alarmed by our advices from you, by representations from the minister of France, by assurances from every quarter, that we must expect no further assistance in money. Surely it is not possible that France, after having done so much for us, after having brought us within view of the desired haven, should oblige us to lose the advantage of all she has done; and yet be assured that the most serious consequence may attend her stopping her hand at this critical time. Public credit, which is growing very fast, will drop to the ground. The contracts made for the ensuing campaign must be given up; the troops, who were made to expect pay in specie, will be dissatisfied; and, upon the least ill-fortune, a failure in supplies will show their discontents; recruiting will be checked, and the conclusion of the war on those advantageous terms, which one vigorous exertion next spring in this country would secure, will be postponed to a later period, when in fact all we wish, to enable us to accomplish these great objects, is less than one year’s continuance of the war will cost France.
You will, therefore, show the necessity of setting our credit upon a firm basis, the prospect we have of accomplishing it, from the great confidence in the integrity and abilities of the financier, from the economy which is introduced into our departments, from the industry which money excites and which a fluctuating medium had destroyed, and from the total debility which must attend another shock to public credit.
You are perfectly acquainted, sir, with the natural resources of the country; you know the value of our exports, and the security they afford for any debt that we may contract; in short, there are a thousand arguments on this subject which will suggest themselves to you, not one of which will you upon this occasion omit to urge, since you must be perfectly convinced of its importance in every view, both to France and to us. The Superintendent will write more fully upon this subject, which relates so particularly to his department.
I would beg leave to remind you of another want, which we depend on your representations, and good dispositions of the court of Versailles, to remove. The chase here seems to be pretty well over; the enemy, tired of running across the country, have taken to their burrows, and the whole business that remains to us is to take measures for unearthing them next spring. In order to do this, ships are absolutely necessary. The situation of New York and Charleston renders them untenable against a naval force, and extremely strong against an attack by land; besides that success in such an operation would not be decisive, since, after putting us to immense expense of men and ammunition of every kind, while they keep the command of the water, they might change their position and be as troublesome as ever. At any rate the reduction of both these places, from their distance and the difficulty of removing the men and stores, cannot be effected the same campaign without a naval force, and with it, it will be the business of a few weeks. The advantage to France, independent of her interests as they stand connected with ours, in keeping a great naval force on this continent, is obvious.
1st. The expense to which they put the English, by obliging them to maintain an equal force at this distance from home, at four times the cost at which the French navy may be maintained in this country, which, with proper management, need not exceed what they expend even in France.
2dly. The number of seamen they employ in the transport service, being so many deducted from what might supply their navy, with the same expense as if so employed.
3dly. The protection afforded to the trade on this coast, and the prospect of capturing the enemy’s victuallers, and the consequent ruin of their affairs.
4thly. But, above all, the decided advantage it will afford our combined operations, and the speedy termination of the war by an advantageous peace. It is true, France may have other objects, which may interfere with these. To this we can say nothing; she must judge for herself. All we can do is to point out what we conceive will be most useful to her as well as to us, and submit to her determination. It would be well, however, if we were apprised of it as soon as possible.
If a negotiation should open this winter, or there should be a probable prospect of it, you will do me the favor to give me the earliest advices of it. There are many delicate points on which you would like to know the sentiments of people on this side of the water, which I will endeavor