expressed contempt for the Rada and for nationalists in general, ‘chauvinists in cahoots with the anti-revolutionary bourgeoisie’, part of a nation-wide network of ‘informers, spies and provocateurs’.25 Local SR leaders, petty landowners and former army officers generally regarded the anarchists as thieves and brigands, and pointed to other regions where land redistribution had taken place in an orderly fashion, and where anarchists had not seized control. While the parties squabbled, the Germans reached Aleksandrovsk, about 85 kilometres from Guliaipole, meeting limited opposition from Red Guards and Left SRs. All the same, the ease with which the Germans drove back revolutionary forces demoralised even the most optimistic of the anarchists.
Discussions took place in Guliaipole between various local structures – the Revolutionary Committee, the Soviet of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, the trade unions and the anarchist group. Makhno insisted that a joint communiqué be issued explaining the gravity of the situation to the workers, and appealing for volunteers to defend the revolution. He later wrote that young and old alike ‘poured into’ the local soviet to enlist.26 Guliaipole raised six companies of 220 men each, one apparently recruited entirely from the Jewish community. The anarchist group formed a detachment of a few hundred men armed with rifles, revolvers and sabres. About half had horses. A local doctor began to organise a field hospital and medical teams. Makhno asked for weapons from a nearby Red Guard reserve commander, taking him on a tour of one of the communes. Apparently impressed, the commander allotted some artillery, 3,000 rifles and several carloads of ammunition to the makhnovtsy,27 but the anarchists discovered that the artillery pieces lacked automatic sights.28
The Guliaipole detachments seemed battle ready. Makhno tried unsuccessfully to contact Bolshevik headquarters to obtain the needed gunsights, but the SRs had cut the telephone lines. Shortly afterwards, the SRs issued a proclamation calling on the peasants to welcome and help the ‘fraternal armies’ of Germany, Austria and the Central Rada. Rumours were reaching Guliaipole confirming that the advancing armies were destroying villages whose inhabitants resisted, but were providing those who cooperated with sugar, textiles and even shoes. The faint-hearted among the townspeople of Guliaipole began to weaken, and Makhno heard another rumour that a delegation had gone out to try to appease the advancing Germans. He responded with a proclamation dramatically headlined ‘The traitor’s soul and the tyrant’s conscience are as black as a winter’s night’.29 The anarchists launched a campaign (aimed at the SRs) against the persecution of ‘anarchism or its anonymous defenders’, summarily shooting one of the fiercest critics, a military officer called Pavel Semeniuta-Riabko.30 At the same time Makhno was conciliatory, continuing to negotiate with the SRs. His anarchist comrades were unconvinced, and Makhno consoled himself with the thought that this showed independent thinking.31
Makhno was then summoned to meet Aleksandr Egorov, the commander of the Southern Front, but in the confusion could not find him.32 He was then diverted by a summons to one of the communes, where drunken sailors were terrorising the inhabitants. After dealing with the problem, he caught the train for Verkhnii Tokmak to find Egorov. As we have already noted, Makhno tended to deal with every small crisis in person and single-handedly.33 This trait had near-catastrophic consequences, when his undisciplined supporters were facing an approaching German army, and local landowners were mounting vigorous opposition to the anarchists. It was precisely at this crucial moment that Makhno left the front-line on what turned out to be a fool’s errand.34 Mid-journey Makhno heard that the headquarters had moved: even the commander of the Bolshevik reserves had lost contact. He considered returning to Guliaipole, but decided to continue his journey, chasing the elusive headquarters eastwards and trying to keep in touch with Guliaipole by telegraph. On 15 April he received a message from his comrade Boris Veretel’nikov urging him to return.35 There was great confusion, and suspicion that an attempt was to be made on his life, and the Germans were expected hourly. Makhno immediately turned around and set off homewards.36
Things were falling apart, and the journey was difficult; when he reached the village of Tsarekonstantinovka he received a desperate appeal from Veretel’nikov:
On the night of 1st April, on a forged instruction bearing your signature, the anarchists’ detachment was recalled from Chaplain and disarmed … The wretched traitors, by a subterfuge, forced the Jews to perform this ignominious task … come quickly … rescue us.37
The Rada’s troops had occupied Guliaipole without resistance and disarmed the anarchists. One former anarchist comrade ‘strode in at the head of the haidamaky’, ripped the anarchist banner from the wall and trampled on the portraits of Kropotkin and Bakunin.38
Makhno and Marusia Nikiforova (atamansha of the Aleksandrovsk anarchists)39 tried to recruit retreating Red Guards for a counter-attack on Guliaipole.40 Although two armoured cars were available, the Bolsheviks were unwilling, and all that could be rallied was a detachment of mixed cavalry and infantry from Siberia. Makhno and Nikiforova planned an operation to rescue the imprisoned anarchists and recover their weapons. Then a third message from Veretel’nikov arrived: pressure from the peasantry had resulted in the release of the anarchists. The bourgeoisie and most Jews had fled. The anarchists were preparing to go underground, and Veretel’nikov now advised Makhno not to return.41 Makhno heeded this advice and decided to call off the counter-attack. He had been distracted, events had overtaken him, and he had lost touch with the centre and source of his power, Guliaipole. Reluctantly he joined the general eastward movement towards Taganrog, in the hope of collecting any followers that he could find along the way.42
The Germans were losing patience with the Rada: on 24 April a senior official wrote that ‘… cooperation with the current government … is impossible … The Ukrainian government must not interfere with the military and economic activities of the German authorities …’43 There followed a list of demands that the Rada would clearly never accept. On 26 April the German commander, General Hermann von Eichhorn, placed Kiev under martial law,44 and two days later Pavlo Skoropadskii was proclaimed Hetman of Ukraine, reviving an eighteenth-century military title.45 Skoropadskii – a wealthy, conservative officer – consented to German demands: to recognise Brest-Litovsk; to form a Ukrainian puppet army; to dissolve the soviets and land committees; to adopt legislation on the compulsory delivery of grain; and to sign a free-trade agreement with Germany. He agreed to restore property rights, permit private ownership of land, and preserve the large estates ‘in the interests of agriculture’.46 The Hetmanate relied upon the professional administrators of the old Tsarist state apparatus: its police force, the Dershavna Warta or State Guards, were noted for their brutality. General Erich Ludendorff commented that ‘we [had] found a man with whom it was very easy to get along’,47 and German officials began planning a puppet Ukraine modelled on British dominions, with a government of dependable local notables.48
In Taganrog, crowded with refugees and deserters, the authorities were trying to control anarchist activity. Nikiforova was arrested for her activities in Elisavetgrad and Aleksandrovsk, but an investigating commission acquitted her.49 The Bolshevik military commander Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko even endorsed her revolutionary spirit.50 But hers was not an isolated case: the Cheka moved against anarchists in other towns and cities such as Petrograd and Samara,51 charging that these fierce critics of Brest-Litovsk were hooligans and thieves. Lenin commented in Pravda on 28 April that anarchists opposed both socialism and communism and that ‘to put [them] down … requires an iron hand’.52
Late in the month, Makhno and his band held an impromptu conference in Taganrog and discussed the disaster at Guliaipole. Makhno was worried that Jews would be blamed for the fall of the town, but the meeting agreed that the Jewish company was not to blame.53 The German occupiers were largely indifferent to both the peasants’ feeling for the land and the intellectuals’ feeling for the nation, but it was only as resistance grew that the makhnovtsy began to be carried along on a wave of dissatisfaction not especially of their own making.54 The meeting agreed to wait for the harvest in June and July before attempting any armed resistance: it would then