Against Empire. Matthew T. Eggemeier

Trump and American Foreign Policy.”

      109. Heilbrunn, “Neocons Paved the Way for Trump.”

      110. Wendy Brown has expressed two different views of the relationship in her writings. First, in “American Nightmare,” Brown offered a version of the approach proposed by Hall, Harvey, and Wolin by arguing that neoliberalism and neoconservatism serve as two distinct political rationalities that converge as a politics of de-democratization. But, more recently, in In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, Brown endorses Cooper’s analysis by analyzing Hayek’s assault on social justice and the regulatory and distributive functions of the state as linked to his defense of traditional morality. More broadly, see Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism, 58. See also Wolin, Democracy Incorporated.

      111. Cooper, Family Values.

      112. Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 7.

      113. Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism; Connolly, Aspirational Fascism; and Connolly, “Trump, the Working Class, and Fascist Rhetoric,” 34n1.

      114. Connolly, “Ethos of Democratization,” 168–69, and Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism, 8.

      115. Connolly, “Wolin, Superpower, and Christianity.”

      116. Connolly, “Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine,” 879.

      117. Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism, 48–49.

      118. McGill, “The Trump Bloc,” and Kriner and Shen, “Battlefield Causalities and Ballot Box Defeat.”

      119. Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, 10. See also Brown, “Neoliberalism’s Frankenstein,” 75.

      120. Milanovic, Global Inequality.

      121. Mounk, People vs. Democracy, 154.

      122. Nancy Fraser argues the same point, observing that “having abandoned the populist politics of distribution, Trump proceeded to double down on the reactionary politics of recognition, hugely intensified and ever more vicious.” Fraser, “From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump—and Beyond.”

      123. Connolly, Aspirational Fascism, 12.

      124. Connolly identifies the common drive of much of the politics on the right as a form of Nietzschean ressentiment that directs its frustrated desires at its own impotence toward others. Often ressentiment is cultivated among constituencies with a sense of entitlement who experience a series of rapid changes that threaten their privilege and social standing. Connolly maintains that “the feelings of ressentiment are likely to be aimed at those constituencies and forces who have injured you most and/or opened a wound in your creed. Carriers of ressentiment typically look for vulnerable constituencies to castigate, punish, or attack” (“World of Becoming,” 228).

      125. Connolly, “Wolin, Superpower, and Christianity.”

      126. Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism, 15.

      127. Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism, x.

      128. Connolly, “Ethos of Democratization,” 167.

      129. Connolly’s political assemblage is similar to Mouffe and Laclau’s “chain of equivalence,” Enrique Dussel’s “analogical hegemon,” and Romand Coles’s “a politics of countershock.” See Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy; Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics, 72; and Coles, Visionary Pragmatism.

      130. Connolly, Identity/Difference, 214.

      131. Connolly, “Trump, the Working Class, and Fascist Rhetoric,” 32.

      132. Connolly, “Trump, the Working Class, and Fascist Rhetoric,” 33.

      133. Connolly, “Trump, the Working Class, and Fascist Rhetoric,” 33.

      134. “Trump, the Working Class, and Fascist Rhetoric,” 33.