of the 21st century will be China’s period of strategic opportunity. China should firmly grasp this opportunity to strive for big achievements.13 He obviously had the 9/11 episode, which dramatically changed the geostrategic structure of the world and diverted the U.S. attention from China and Asia to elsewhere for the purpose of waging the war on terror, in his mind when he made the comment. Since then, this concept has been used to justify China’s concentration on domestic economic and social development and keeping a low profile in international affairs. The assumption is that international environment including the periphery one is favorable to China.
However, the ominous developments since 2010 triggered a debate about whether this period of strategic opportunity has abruptly come to an end. Quite a few scholars and analysts argued that with the U.S. return to Asia and subsequent deterioration of China’s peripheral environment, the window of China’s strategic opportunity was closing. Instead of “period of strategic opportunity”, the next 10 years could be the period of “strategic danger”. The “strategic danger” school based its judgment on the following reasons. First, the United States is already determined to take China as its strategy adversary. Second, domestically the reform dividends have almost exhausted and China’s economic development has begun to slow down and encounter new difficulties. 14 Another variation along the same line holds the view that while the window of strategic opportunities may still be open, the “golden decade” for China has definitely gone. China has entered a period of “strategic challenge”. For the longest time in the future, China will be in a period of strategic sensitivity, tension and friction.15
Others, however, tend to be more optimistic. While they also recognize that China’s peripheral environment has become less benign and tougher, the strategic opportunity is still there for China to grab. Among other things, domestically China’s economy still has great potential for continuous growth. In terms of geopolitical environment, the limited availability of resources does not allow the United States to effectively contain China.16 It is a mission impossible.
In addition, China’s periphery is not limited to East Asia and Pacific, while China did encounter difficulties and frictions in East Asia, strategic opportunities may exist in other parts of China’s periphery including Central Asia and Northwest Asia. China could explore these opportunities with more resources and efforts. That is why some Chinese scholars came up with the idea of “going westward”. Additionally, there are some bright spots in China’s periphery. Sino-Russian relations and cross-strait relations were both the best in history. Others also pointed out that China should not overestimate “enemy’s situation”. While China is a main factor in America’s returning to Asia strategy, it is not the only factor. The United States has other goals in its mind such as reviving the U.S. economy, preventing the disintegration of its alliance system in Asia-Pacific, etc. China should not take the strategy as exclusively targeting at China; thus, should not react excessively. In sum, while China’s peripheral environment did become worse and more complicated, that does not necessarily mean the period of strategic opportunity is gone. Rather, its intension has been changing, and is different from the past.17
This line of analysis later was acknowledged in an official discourse on the same issue. The work report of the 18th Party Congress reaffirms that “China remains in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved”, although it also admits that the nature and conditions of this period have been changing and these changes have to be correctly understood.18 In his speech at the high-level meeting on China’s peripheral diplomacy in 2013, Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of maintaining and making full use of China’s period of strategic opportunities. While characterizing China’s overall peripheral environment as stable, he also recognized that China’s peripheral environment and its relations with peripheral countries have changed a lot.19 This judgment was further confirmed by Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 in which he asserted that although China and the world are in the midst of profound and complex changes, China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development.20
Consistent with the reconfirmation of “period of strategic opportunity”, it is noticeable that as a general trend, China’s assessment of its peripheral environment has become more positive in the recent years. Some Chinese pundits believe that China’s deteriorating peripheral environment has been largely reversed in the last 5 years. While some hot spots in China’s periphery remain outstanding, the overall situation has improved. The peripheral configuration has been moving toward a better direction and China has enough reason to be highly confident about the peripheral development in the next 5 years.21
An editorial of Global Time at the end of 2017 typically reflected Beijing’s more sanguine views of its periphery.22 According to the editorial, 2017 witnessed the generally positive development in China’s relations with neighboring countries. Although some trouble spots remain, strategic stability has increased. As a rising power, China is getting to know better how to adapt to its surrounding nations. China made progress in managing the hot button issues and difficult relations in its surrounding area. By the end of 2016, tensions in the South China Sea started to ease and this trend was greatly consolidated in 2017. The Philippines and Vietnam have maintained their momentum of improving ties with China. ASEAN countries including Singapore have been attaching more importance to their relations with Beijing. The framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea has been agreed upon. The Sino-Japanese relationship has finally broken out of its slump. Ties between Beijing and Seoul returned to a more amicable path of collaboration since Moon Jae-in was elected as the South Korean President. China and India resolved the Doklam standoff peacefully. The biggest challenge in China’s periphery in 2017 was the situation on the Korean Peninsula, demonstrating the limitations of China’s ability to shape the landscape around it. With the unexpected thaw between ROK and DPRK and the prospect of DPRK–U.S. summit in 2018, however, even the tension on Korean Peninsula has significantly tempered. The editorial concludes that although problems on China’s periphery cannot be avoided in years to come, the progress in 2017 indicates that “emerging China has the resources to solve and control the problems even as they increase.” As long as Beijing keeps its strong development momentum, China will be able to implement even greater strategic initiatives in its periphery.
This upbeat assessment was echoed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in his remarks at the year end of 2017. He asserts that China has been able to maintain the stability and the momentum of cooperation in its periphery in the last 5 years. Among other things, China improved its relations with Vietnam, Mongol and the Philippines. China–ROK relations walked out of the shadow of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and began to recover. The long-frozen relationship between China and Japan has also began to show some signs of thawing. China’s relationship with India also has stabilized after the Doklam standoff.23
Not everyone agrees with this confident assessment. Some analysts emphasize that the overall periphery security situation has not changed fundamentally. It remains highly complex and risky like never seen before.24 Security pressures from all directions have not reduced. The cost of maintaining peripheral security has been on the rise. Therefore, China has to pay more attention to the new situation and new changes in China’s periphery. First, the assault of traditional geopolitical conflict on China’s peripheral stability cannot be underestimated. The geopolitical conflict in China’s periphery resulting from major power interference constitutes the major external security pressure for China. Second, the military adventures by hegemonic powers with regard to maritime security in general and South China Sea in particular in the region cannot be underestimated. Third, the impact of peripheral security on China’s internal stability cannot be underestimated. The Internet era has increased the connection and interaction between peripheral security and internal security. As a result, there is no absolute peripheral security and no absolute internal security.25 These two securities are highly intertwined making the management more difficult.
What Caused Changes: Others or Self?
Irrespective of the different assessments about the degree and nature of changes in China’s peripheral environment, most agree that significant