Hard power is military might and payments and soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through cultural and educational exchange. Soft power, according to Nye, “rests on the ability to shape the preference of others.”97 For decades, the United States has been able to get much of what it wants because other countries admire American values, ideas, and policies.
Everything suggests that the United States is losing its ability to exercise soft power. In general terms, the world does not overwhelmingly admire American democracy, but rather criticizes it. The world does not have confidence in the United States and its president. It does not see Trump as an international leader. The world is not embracing the current administration in the United States; it is rejecting it. A poll conducted by Pew in 37 nations and published on June 26, 2017 found that a median of 22 percent “has confidence in Trump to do the right thing when it comes to international affairs.”98 In the last years of the Obama presidency, 64 percent had a positive view of the United States. Today, that percentage is 49 percent.
Of the countries included in this volume, the confidence that Trump would do the right thing in world affairs, according to Pew, is very low: South Korea 17 percent; France 14 percent; UK 22 percent; Japan 24 percent; Brazil 14 percent; Chile 12 percent; Mexico 5 percent; Peru 17 percent. On the question of confidence in various leaders to do the right thing, Angela Merkel obtains the highest percentage with 42 percent, followed by Xi Jinping with 28 percent, Vladimir Putin with 27 percent, and Donald Trump with 22 percent. Although Americans are perceived in a positive fashion—58 percent have a favorable impression of Americans—it seems that the world is increasingly reluctant to follow the United Sates.99 It is difficult to believe that with Trump in the White House, the United States will be able to influence other countries in quite the same way as it has in the past. Soft power will be a scarce resource for the Trump administration.
A negative perception of the United States can affect the formation of alliances and as a result, the possibility of resolving international problems. North Korea’s nuclear race is a clear example of this. It is doubtful that the United States will be able to successfully engage Kim Jong-un over the on-going development of nuclear weapons in his country, unless China can change the dynamic. China has its own interests with North Korea and in the region that could be seriously affected if the tension between the United States and North Korea increases. What is more, a hostile US policy towards China will complicate the possibility of resolving the tension between Pyongyang and Washington.
On the positive side, countries around the world recognize that what is happening in the United States could provide a lesson for others. De Chantal argues that the election of Obama became “a symbol of inclusion” in France, a country where “racial minorities feel that the social promises are empty.” Anne-Lorraine Bujon criticizes the Electoral College in the United States and the reluctance to change it but argues, “we are finally struck by the great respect of the rule of law which prevails most often, in the United States, over indignant call to change.”100 Even in the face of criticism of the Electoral College, Hillary Clinton and her followers respected the institution. Even in moments of profound criticism of Trump’s chaotic presidency, other countries acknowledge important strengths of the American political system and political institutions. Other nations’ perceptions of the United States are not completely negative.
The view of outsiders is relevant for the United States because foreigners can shape—or at least help to shape—American public opinion. According to Danny Hayes and Matt Guardiano, citizens “construct their foreign policy attitudes according to the message transmitted by domestic elite actors.” However, under particular circumstances, “foreign voices can shape the contours of domestic public opinion.” In other words, international actors—especially foreign elites—can shape American public opinion with arguments articulated in the media, in particular when TV interview them.101
In a world that is highly connected and interdependent, what other countries think is essential for the United States and its interests. Looking through the foreign mirror is not an extravagance; it is an exercise in humility that helps counteract the ethnocentrism that manifests itself in an incapacity to see beyond US borders. In a time of fast and immediate communication around the world, understanding others is a tool that facilitates coexistence and a more productive dialogue with both friends and foes.
This book is an attempt to see America, and the 2016 presidential election, through the eyes of others. Each author was guided by three main questions: (1) What is the relevance of the United States for your particular country? (2) What is your country’s general view of the United States? (3) What was your country’s view of the 2016 presidential election? The volume is an attempt by authors from twelve different countries—selected with the aim of offering distinct perspective and interest of countries from three continents—to analyze their countries’ views on American domestic politics. It is an endeavor to present a different take on the 2016 election in particular and American politics and international affairs in general, by bringing an outside view. We hope to contribute to a better understanding of the United States, its relevance to nations around the world, and the relevance of world opinion to American domestic politics and international affairs.
NOTES
I would like to express my gratitude to Catherine Boone, Bruce Kellison, Laura Isabel Serna, and Peter Trubowitz for their comments and suggestions on the first draft of this introduction. Of course, the responsibility for its content is mine.
1. “Cities Jammed in Worldwide Protest of Iraq War,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/15/sprj.irq.protests.main/.
2. Is Hann Tharoor, “Iraq War: Why was the Biggest Protest in World History Ignored,” Time, February 15, 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/02/15/viewpoint-why-was-the-biggest-protest-in-world-history-ignored/.
3. Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the core of Europe,” Constellations 10, no. 3 (2003): 291–292.
4. Umberto Eco, Turning Back the Clock: Hot Wars and the Media Populism (New York: Harcourt, Inc, 2007), 204–206.
5. Regis Debry, “The French Lesson,” New York Times, February 23, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/opinion/23DEBR.html.
6. Fernando Savater, “Europa, Necesitada y Necesaria,” El País, May 31, 2003, http://elpais.com/diario/2003/05/31/opinion/1054332006_850215.html.
7. “The Frat Boy Ships Out,” The Economist, January 25, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/12931660f.