and Practice,” 455–58.
20. In chapter 4, I will return to the concept of the implied author, addressing concerns that it is required to appreciate multiauthored works and cases where there is a disjuncture between the person who appears to have authored the work and facts about its actual author.
21. Livingston, Art and Intention, 142–43, quotation from 199. For a more extended discussion of moderate intentionalism and its congruence with current musicology, refer to Penner, “Intentions in Theory and Practice,” 458–64.
22. Here I am referring to Kendall L. Walton, “Categories of Art,” Philosophical Review 79, no. 3 (1970): 334–67. Even philosophers who are opposed to intentionalism as a general account of interpretation agree on the relevance of intentions to categorization. See, for example, David Davies, Art as Performance, 84–89; Levinson, “Intention and Interpretation,” 188–89.
23. Gregory Currie, Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5, also begins from this premise.
24. Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 25.
25. For arguments that films invariably have narrators, see Seymour Chatman, Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 115–16; Jerrold Levinson, “Film Music and Narrative Agency,” in Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 149–50. On theater, see Manfred Jahn, “Narrative Voice and Agency in Drama: Aspects of a Narratology of Drama,” New Literary History 32, no. 3 (2001): 674.
26. Currie, Narratives and Narrators, 65, puts forth an argument to this effect.
27. Others who have made similar observations include ibid., 28n3; Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009), 177; Monika Fludernik, Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (London: Routledge, 1996), 349–51; James R. Hamilton, “Mimesis and Showing,” in Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics, ed. Gregory Currie, Petr Kotatko, and Martin Pokorny (London: College Publications, 2012), 355.
28. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, “Y a-t-il une diégèse musicale?” in Musik und Verstehen, ed. Peter Faltin and Hans-Peter Reinecke (Cologne: Arno Volk Verlag, 1973), 247–57. An English summary of this study may be found in Nattiez, “Narrative Music?” 246–48.
29. For arguments in favor of treating titles as part of the work, refer to Hazard Adams, “Titles, Titling, and Entitlement To,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46, no. 1 (1987): 7–21; Jerrold Levinson, “Titles,” in Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 159–78. I see no reason why the same logic could not be applied to programs and pictures intended to accompany musical works.
30. I am grateful to Trevor Ponech for raising this objection.
31. Others who make similar claims include Aristotle, Poetics, ed. and trans. Stephen Halliwell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 48–53; Roland Barthes, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives,” in Image—Music—Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 105; Noël Carroll, “On the Narrative Connection,” in Beyond Aesthetics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 126; Dorrit Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 12; Jerry R. Hobbs, Literature and Cognition (Stanford: Centre for the Study of Language and Information, 1990), 39–40; Trevor Ponech, What Is Non-Fiction Cinema? On the Very Idea of Motion Picture Communication (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 128; Murray Smith, Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), ch. 1; Paul Woodruff, The Necessity of Theatre: The Art of Watching and Being Watched (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 68–72.
32. See, for example, Almén, Theory of Musical Narrative, ch. 4; Cone, Composer’s Voice, ch. 5; Marion A. Guck, “Rehabilitating the Incorrigible,” in Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music, ed. Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 57–73; Robert S. Hatten, A Theory of Virtual Agency for Western Music (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 32–34, ch. 7, 287–88; Gregory Karl, “Structuralism and the Musical Plot,” Music Theory Spectrum 19, no. 1 (1997): 13–34; Fred E. Maus, “Music as Narrative,” Indiana Theory Review 12 (1991): 1–41; Fred E. Maus, “Music as Drama,” in Music and Meaning, ed. Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 105–30; McClary, “Talking Politics”; Monahan, “Action and Agency Revisited”; Anthony Newcomb, “Action and Agency in Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, Second Movement,” in Music and Meaning, ed. Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 131–53; Philip Rupprecht, “Agency Effects in the Instrumental Drama of Musgrave and Birtwistle,” in Music and Narrative since 1900, ed. Michael L. Klein and Nicholas Reyland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 189–215.
33. Jerrold Levinson, “Music as Narrative and Music as Drama,” in Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 134n6, also makes this distinction.
34. Igor Stravinsky, “Some Ideas about My Octuor,” in Stravinsky: The Composer and His Works, 2nd ed., by Eric Walter White (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 574, 575. Stravinsky’s essay was originally published in The Arts in January 1924.
35. Walter Nouvel, Igor Stravinsky: An Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936), 83 (ellipsis in the original).
36. Walter Werbeck, Die Tondichtungen von Richard Strauss (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 1996), 147–56, 543–44; James Hepokoski, Review of Die Tondichtungen von Richard Strauss by Walter Werbeck, Journal of the American Musicological Society 51, no. 3 (1998): 608–9.
37. Stephen E. Hefling, “Mahler’s Todtenfeier and the Problem of Program Music,” 19th-Century Music 12, no. 1 (1988): 43. In a letter to Max Marschalk after the premiere of his Second Symphony, Mahler stated that he “was never concerned with the detailed description of an event, but to the highest degree with that of a feeling.” Quoted in ibid., 41.
38. Particularity is also stressed by Currie, Narratives and Narrators, 11; Woodruff, Necessity of Theatre, 98–101.
39. E. M. Forster, Howard’s End (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 30, 31, 36. I thank Linda Hutcheon for recommending this example.
40. Kivy, “Action and Agency.”
41. Michelle Fillion, Difficult Rhythm: Music and the Word in E. M. Forster (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 83, notes that Margaret’s and Helen’s responses dramatize the two modes of listening Forster juxtaposes in his 1939 essay “Not Listening to Music”: “music itself” and “music that reminds me of something.” Although Forster cautions that the latter approach may lead to “inattention,” he also states that “only a purist would condemn all visual parallels, all emotional labellings, all programmes.” E. M. Forster, “Not Listening to Music,” in Two Cheers for Democracy, ed. Oliver Stallybrass (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), 122, 123.
42. A musical work with accompanying pictures is Biber’s “Mystery” Sonatas (1676).
43. If Honegger had represented an athlete running a race, it is possible that this hypothetical work would be a narrative. The train, however, does not have desires or aims.
IN THE PAST FEW DECADES, OPERATIC PROGRAMMING HAS become ever more varied, including not