90 years (Liu, 2016). This action of cooperation reduced the tension from the South China Sea dispute.
The LMC mechanism also provides opportunities and the impetus to promote the ASEAN integration process. From the outset of the proposed mechanism, it was determined that LMC practical cooperation would be carried out through the three cooperation pillars, namely, (1) Political and Security issues, (2) Economic and Sustainable Development, and (3) Social Cultural and People-to-People exchange. This means that the objectives of the LMC are similar to the three pillars of the ASEAN community. They can promote practical and value-added cooperation in advancing sustainable development, narrowing development gaps, supporting the building of the ASEAN Community, and promoting the overall regional integration process. The five countries of the Mekong sub-region — Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam — are closely interconnected because they are all member countries of ASEAN and they have common goals in the building of a fruitful ASEAN community to share future peace and prosperity. China is a staunch supporter of ASEAN integration, and it is a major component of China’s ASEAN policy to help this regional cooperation organization to achieve its goal of integration through the development of the LMC mechanism.
It goes without saying that the successful operation of the LMC mechanism is also a positive opportunity for China. First, it is an important part in China’s implementation of the “Belt and Road” Initiative to establishing a community of shared future for humanity. The five countries downstream of China on the Mekong River represent a key area in the Belt and Road Initiatives. Thus, the LMC is considered by analysts to be an alternative mechanism for extending the sphere of influence of Beijing in a critical region, intending to promote regional peace and cooperation values (Cambodgemeg, 2018).
Second, the cooperation of the LMC is beneficial to the sustained, stable, and healthy development of China’s economy. The application of the LMC can also support China’s growth through infrastructure construction and by exporting its industrial capacity. This is just as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang told the leaders of the Southeast Asian neighbors — in the challenging economic situation, better regional cooperation could help the Chinese economy to counter downward pressures. “We will explore building economic zones and industrial parks, investment zones and transport networks and keep improving infrastructure in the region,” he said. He called for progress in the infrastructure projects, including the two railway lines connecting China’s Yunnan Province with the Lao capital, Vientiane, and the Thai capital, Bangkok. A cooperation blueprint released earlier said that the railway linking China and Thailand was part of a Pan-Asia network that would also cover Singapore (Liu, 2016).
Third, the LMC mechanism has promoted bilateral relations between China and the mainland ASEAN countries in various fields. Economically, China became the largest trading partner of Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand, and the second largest for Laos. Bilateral trade between China and the five Mekong sub-region countries totaled US$220 billion in 2017, up 16% year on year. Some 80% of China’s rice imports are from the Mekong countries. Their fruit exports to China have increased by 21% annually over the past decade (Xinhua News Agency, 2018b). Politically, the close relations with the neighboring countries also improve China’s geopolitical conditions and the surrounding environment. Under the framework of the LMC, China can surely build a positive image by helping relatively underdeveloped countries of Mekong sub-region gain a better livelihood and achieve socio-economic development.
3.4.The Challenges and Risks of the LMC in the Mekong Sub-region
As a new platform for cooperation, the LMC mechanism has made great progress on the one hand, but it also faces many challenges on the other.
First, there are some differences and imbalances of power among the LMC member countries.
From within the mechanism, as mentioned above, the Mainland ASEAN countries have many common interests, and every country in the region has joined and cooperated in the LMC based on the same agreement, but each country has a different economic, social, and political background. This is the reason why the current views and demands, in addition to hopes for the future, are not the same. How to coordinate the interests of various member countries to promote the development of the LMC at the overall level so that the relevant countries can all benefit from it is a major issue. Another issue is regarding the Imbalance of Power within the LMC member countries. There is a fear between strong and weak nations: this is in part caused by the phenomenon of the miraculous economic growth of China, with GDP expansion exceeding 10% for more than 15 years, resulting in an asymmetry of power that makes the less robust economies cautious. Many ASEAN countries thus view China’s various projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB, with suspicion. China invested in numerous massive infrastructure projects in many countries of the Mekong sub-region countries, especially in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. China’s influence in many countries has also created a different kind of fear that an imbalance in power will be caused and be an obstacle to the smooth development of the LMC. This is coupled with the fear that the prospect of mutual benefits may not result in an equitable share of economic benefits between the parties.
Second, there is an overlap of mechanisms in the Mekong sub-region.
Since the 1950s, a series of cooperation mechanisms and platforms in the Mekong River basin has been established. Their background, objectives, leading forces, and operating modes are very different. More importantly, most of the member countries of the LMC are also members of many of the same cooperative organizations and they want to be able to benefit from the various mechanisms. In fact, these mechanisms overlap with the LMC mechanism in the cooperation objectives and some specific cooperation projects, and there may be a series of problems in the actual operation process. This will be a challenge to ensure the smooth development of the LMC with the relevant cooperation mechanism.
Third, there is a misperception between peoples in the region.
There is a misperception on the numerous issues that spark misunderstandings between — one of the most influential ones is Cold War Memories that have imprinted the image of evil and danger. Another issue has to do with the South China Sea conflict, where one party views the other as an offender while the other party views its own actions as building a foundation infrastructure for safe navigation. In some ways, China herself has an identity bias of people with Chinese ethnicity. There are many people of Chinese descent and lineage in the Mekong sub-region countries, as well as Chinese immigrants. As time has passed, these people of Chinese descent have been integrated into the countries they settled in, and many have achieved high social, economic, financial, and political status. Accordingly, on many occasions, these people are considered by the PRC as native Chinese citizens who can act as agents to safeguard the interests of the PRC.
Fourth, a plethora of complex and unexpected problems cause great obstacles to cooperation in the LMC.
Among these, the water distribution of the Mekong River and environmental protection are the most interesting. For example, China’s dam and hydroelectric project on the Lancang River in the Upper Mekong sparked complaints from downstream states. These countries ruminate that the use of water resources in the Mekong River is a common concern of countries in the basin, and upstream development projects have had a severe impact on the environment and livelihoods along the river. Many hydropower dams in the tributaries and mainstream of Southeast Asia’s longest river cause unnatural fluctuations of water flow (Ganjanakhundee, 2018). However, the relations between the six countries are historically without much harmony, and perhaps the Chinese strategy to build dams on the Mekong River while also funding similar projects downstream threatens to stir up tensions between neighboring countries. Even in Cambodia, environmentalists purport that the change of water in Lake Tonle Sap impaired the exceptional abundance of fish stocks and the remarkable biodiversity of the country. From Lake Tonle Sap, the water passes through the famous region of the Mekong Delta, where salinity and drought were prevalent in 2016. The environmentalists have also noted that China was responsible for these problems because of its dams, which caused an excessively high rate of evaporation of water upstream of the Mekong. China’s proposal to open sections of the Mekong between Thailand and Laos to allow the passage of larger cargo ships has generated opposition from residents and conservation groups