all vacancies.
One of the common justifications for enhancing entry qualification to 10+2 is that graduation at the NDA helps in second career after retirement. It is a strange logic. The priorities are totally misplaced. At the start of service career, interests of military service (may be of 30 years span) are being subordinated to post retirement resettlement. The services should focus on their needs, rather than be unduly concerned with other issues. In any case, suitable arrangements can always be put in place to help officers obtain graduation degree prior to their retirement.
Most importantly, entry age and educational qualification for admission to the NDA should be reduced to the earlier standards. All over the world the ruling mantra is to ‘catch them early and catch them young’. All corporate houses go to professional colleges to recruit people in campus interview. They pay exorbitant charges to the colleges to have the first pick. The services have irrationally surrendered the same advantage and now have to do with what they unfairly call ‘left-overs’. Reduction in entry age to the previous levels (15 to 17 years) will also increase trainability quotient, thereby making it much easier to cast the net wider to select suitable raw youth and train it according to the requirements of the services.
Impediments to the Modernisation of the IndianDefence Forces
As an emerging economic and military power, India must possess armed forces that can guarantee security of its interests in a dynamic international geo-political environment. However, slow and tardy modernisation of the Indian armed forces has been causing disquiet amongst all who are concerned with national security. Existing critical deficiencies are cited as a proof of India’s failure to keep abreast with newer technologies and weapon systems. The defence forces remain deprived of modern weaponry while the allocated funds lapse. Even the Prime Minister of India expressed his concern during the Combined Commanders Conference held in New Delhi in October 2004. Many attribute this state of affairs to poor planning, rigid mindsets and complex procedures.
Group of Ministers (GoM) on National Security had also taken a serious view of this inadequacy. It was of the opinion that the then prevailing procurement mechanism led to sluggish modernisation of the services due to lack of integrated planning and sluggish implementation. In its report of February 2001, it suggested creation of a separate and dedicated procurement structure to inject a higher degree of professionalism to reduce delays. The main focus of the GoM was on bringing about improvements in the structures and procedures through integration of civil and military components and by ensuring ‘jointness’ among the Armed Forces to the extent desirable.
Consequent to the acceptance of their report, a new set-up was established in MoD in October 2001 and an exhaustive procurement procedure has been put in place. However, there has been no discernible improvement and the services continue to wait indefinitely for new equipment to materialise.
Complex Facets of Modernisation of Defence Equipment
India has failed to appreciate that procurement of new defence equipment for modernisation is a multifaceted process requiring highly specialised management. It is not a routine governmental activity. Defence procurements are intrinsically linked to a nation’s foreign policy and diplomatic interests. Additionally, there are strong political and corporate lobbies at work to push their products.
Funds involved are very large and the quality of equipment selected has a profound influence on national defence potential. There is no open tendering. Invitations are sent to a few selected vendors. A fine balance has to be maintained between need for generating competition and security imperatives.
Most of the sophisticated equipment has to be imported as the indigenous defence industry is still in a nascent stage. There are a limited number of producers in the world market and very few are ready to part with their ‘top of the line’ products. The problem gets compounded where technology transfer is sought as an essential part of the package.
Major weapon producers in the world are primarily systems integrators, as various sub-assemblies are produced in different countries having different export policies. Many governments impose riders on the usage of their products. There are some countries whose domestic laws preclude assured subsequent sustenance of the equipment bought. This complicates negotiation of life cycle support for the equipment.
As there is an element of secrecy in the procurement process, all decisions come under scrutiny subsequently. Therefore, it becomes essential to follow the laid down procedures diligently. Deviations, if any, have to be accounted for and duly justified for posterity.
Negotiating contracts is an arduous and time-consuming process, as a large number of aspects need to be unambiguously spelt out to avoid subsequent misunderstandings.
All expert committees have so far concentrated only on reforms in structures and procedures. No dispassionate, objective and holistic exercise has ever been carried out to identify the underlying reasons for inordinate delays which continue to dog the system. Even the Kelkar Committee has overlooked intricate interplay of dynamics of domain interests and conflicting attitudes that defeat all attempts at reforming the system.
Some of the common and recurrent impediments are discussed below.
Sub-Optimal Quality of Acquisition Staff
Indifferent quality of acquisition staff is the single most important reason for delays in procurements. Officials who perform acquisition functions are drawn from the civil services, defence forces and the defence finance. No one is selected for any special flair for the job. For most of them it is just another routine assignment. Their approach continues to be entrenched in bureaucratic mediocrity and procedural quagmire.
No training in acquisition functions is ever provided to them. They are expected to identify, trial evaluate and negotiate import of defence equipment worth millions of dollars using their common sense and basic intelligence. It is a very unfair and tall order.
The services are the biggest defaulters. They pay no attention to the selection of acquisition staff, although all procurement proposals are initiated by them and they are the most affected party. They have qualitative requirements spelt out for a host of other lesser appointments but none whatsoever for functionaries dealing with acquisitions that affect their war potential. Any officer can be posted to these appointments. Such an apathetic approach results in faulty preparation of qualitative requirements, tardy field trials and flawed staff evaluation.
Civil officials of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) accord approval to procurement proposals, issue Requests for Proposals (RFP), accept technical evaluation to shortlist vendors to be called for field trials, approve staff evaluation, open commercial bids and negotiate contracts with the lowest bidder. As can be seen, their span encompasses almost all procurement activities. Their role is of utmost importance and has a direct bearing on the success of any procurement programme.
They need to handle functions which involve intimate knowledge of military’s functioning, defence equipment, technologies involved and commercial negotiations. However, their selection is done in a routine manner without consideration of any demonstrated flair or proficiency. No training is imparted to them. Additionally, their short tenures preclude acquisition of on-the-job expertise.
No procurement proposal can fructify unless Defence Finance functionaries concur with it at all stages from acceptance of necessity to closing the deal. Most importantly, they actively participate in all facets of commercial evaluation and negotiation of contract.
Despite the fact that they are mandated to ensure financial propriety, they are ill equipped for the