not the highest form of military spirit, this was at any rate one of which a good commander might make much use. Renault took advantage of this feeling, and from the young men of the colony, such as Company's servants, ships' officers, supercargoes, and European inhabitants,[29] he made a company of volunteers, to whom, at their own request, he gave his son, an officer of the garrison, as commander.
One of the volunteer officers writes:—
"I had the honour to be appointed lieutenant, and was
much pleased when I saw the spirit of emulation which
reigned in every heart. I cannot sufficiently praise the
spirit of exactitude with which every one was animated, and
the progress which all made in so short a time in the
management of their arms. I lay stress on the fact that it
was an occupation entirely novel to them, and one of which
the commencement always appears very hard, but they overcame
all difficulties, and found amusement in what to others
would appear merely laborious."
All this time Renault was watching the war between the English and the Moors. In January the English sailed up the Hugli, passed Chandernagore contemptuously without a salute, burned the Moorish towns of Hugli and Bandel, ravaged the banks of the river, and retired to Calcutta. Up to this the Nawab had not condescended to notice the English; now, in a moment of timidity, he asked the intervention of the French as mediators.[30] Renault eagerly complied, for had his mediation been accepted, he would have inserted in the treaty a clause enforcing peace amongst the Europeans in Bengal; but the English refused to treat through the French. This could have only one meaning. Renault felt that his course was now clear, and was on the point of offering the alliance which the Nawab had so long sought for, when he received orders from M. de Leyrit forbidding him to attack the English by land. As M. Law writes, if Renault had been free to join the Nawab with 500 Europeans, either Clive would not have ventured a night attack on the Nawab's camp, or, had he done so, the event would probably have been very different. Under the circumstances, all that Renault could do was to continue his fortifications. It was now that he first realized that Admiral Watson would take part in the attack.
"As the ships of war were what we had most to fear
from, we constructed on the river bank a battery of 6 guns,
four of which covered the approach to the Fort. From the foot
of the battery a bank twenty-two feet high stretching to
the Fort, was begun, so as to protect the curtain on this side
from the fire of the ships, but it was not finished. We had also to attend to the inhabited portion of the town; it was impossible to do more, but we determined to protect it from a surprise, and so ditches were dug across the streets and outposts established."[31]
It was this waste of valuable time upon the defence of the town that a capable engineer would have saved Renault from the mistake of committing. Had he limited his efforts to strengthening the walls of the Fort and cleared away the surrounding houses, he would have been not only stronger against the attack of the land force, but also in a much better position to resist the ships.
The issue of the Nawab's attack on Calcutta has already been told. He was so depressed by his failure that he now treated Renault with the greatest respect, and it was now that he gave him the sum of money—a lakh of rupees, then worth £12,500—which he spent on provisions and munitions of war. Renault says:—
"The Nawab's envoy further gave me to understand that
he was, in his heart, enraged with the English, and continued
to regard them as his enemies. In spite of this we saw
clearly from the treaty just made" (with the English)
"that we should be its victims, and knowing Siraj-ud-daula's
character, his promise to assist me strongly if the
English attacked us did not quiet my mind. I prepared for
whatever might happen by pressing on our preparations and
collecting all kinds of provisions in the Fort."
The Nawab and the English concluded a treaty of peace and alliance on the 9th of February, 1757. Renault mentions no actual treaty between the Nawab and the French, but the French doctor referred to in a note above asserts that the Nawab demanded that the Council should bind itself in writing,
"to oppose the passage of the English past Chandernagore. …
It was merely engaging to defend ourselves against
the maritime force of the English … because Chandernagore
was the only place on this coast against which they
could undertake any enterprise by water. This engagement was signed and sent to the Nawab three days after he had made peace with the English. The Council received in reply two privileges, the one to coin money with the King's stamp at Chandernagore, the other liberty of trade for individual Frenchmen on the same footing as the Company, and 100,000 rupees on account of the 300,000 which he had extorted the previous year."
It does not matter whether this engagement was signed or not.[32] As a Frenchman thus mentions it, the rumour of its signature must have been very strong. It is probable that the English heard of it, and believed it to be conclusive proof of the secret understanding between the Nawab and the French. The privilege of individual trade was particularly likely to excite their commercial jealousy, for it was to this very privilege in their own case that the wealth and strength of Calcutta were due. Such a rumour, therefore, was not likely to facilitate negotiations. Nevertheless, Renault sent MM. Fournier and Nicolas, the latter of whom had many friends amongst the English, to Calcutta, to re-open the negotiations for a neutrality. These negotiations seemed to be endless. The most striking feature was Admiral Watson's apparent vacillation. When the Council proposed war he wanted peace, when they urged neutrality he wanted war. Clive went so far as to present a memorial to the Council, saying it was unfair to continue the negotiations if the Admiral was determined not to agree to a treaty. It seems as if the Council wanted war, but wished to throw the responsibility upon the Admiral. On the other hand the Admiral was only too eager to fight, but hesitated to involve the Company in a war with the French and the Nawab combined, at a moment when the British land forces were so weakened by disease that success might be considered doubtful. He had also to remember the fact that the Council at Chandernagore was subordinate to the Council at Pondicherry, and the latter might, whenever convenient to the French, repudiate the treaty. However, in spite of all difficulties, the terms were agreed to, the draft was prepared, and only the signatures were wanting, when a large reinforcement of Europeans arrived from Bombay, and the Admiral received formal notification of the declaration of war, and orders from the Admiralty to attack the French.[33] This put an immediate end to negotiations, and the envoys were instructed to return to Chandernagore. At the same time the English determined to try and prevent the Nawab from joining the French.
Whilst the Admiral was making up his mind fortune had favoured the English. The Nawab, in fear of an invasion of Bengal by the Pathans, had called upon the British for assistance, and on the 3rd of March Clive's army left Calcutta en route for Murshidabad. The Admiral now pointed out to the Nawab that the British could not safely leave Chandernagore behind them in the hands of an enemy, and Clive wrote to the same effect, saying he would wait near Chandernagore for a reply. On the 10th of March the Nawab wrote a letter to the Admiral, which concluded with the following significant words:—
"You have understanding and generosity: if your enemy
with an upright heart claims your protection, you will give
him life, but then you must be well satisfied of the innocence of his intentions: if not, whatever you think right, that do."
Law says this letter was a forgery,[34] but as the Nawab did not write any letters