the reason is that they must necessarily be permanent, and that they cannot calculate for the possible change of things. I know that the States must have their resources; but I contend that it would be improper to point them out, particularly in the Constitution. Sir, it has been said that a poll tax is a tyrannical tax; but the Legislature of this State can lay it whenever they please. Does, then, our Constitution authorize tyranny? I am as much opposed to capitation as any man. Yet who can deny that there may exist certain circumstances which will render this tax necessary? In the course of a war it may be necessary to lay hold of every resource; and for a certain period the people may submit to it. But on removal of the danger, or return of peace, the general sense of the community would abolish it. The United Netherlands were obliged, on an emergency, to give up one twentieth of their property to the government. It has been said that it will be impossible to exercise this power of taxation. If it cannot be exercised why be alarmed? But the gentlemen say that the difficulty of executing it with moderation will necessarily drive the government into despotic measures. Here, again, they are in the old track of jealousy and conjecture. Whenever the people feel the hand of despotism, they will not regard forms and parchments. But the gentlemen's premises are as false as their conclusion. No one reason can be offered why the exercise of the power should be impracticable. No one difficulty can be pointed out which will not apply to our State governments. Congress will have every means of knowledge that any Legislature can have. From general observations, and from the revenue systems of the several States, they will derive information as to the most eligible modes of taxation. If a land tax is the object, cannot Congress procure as perfect a valuation as any other assembly? Can they not have all the necessary officers for assessment and collections? Where is the difficulty? Where is the evil? They never can oppress a particular State by an unequal imposition, because the Constitution has provided a fixed ratio, a uniform rule, by which this must be regulated. The system will be founded upon the most easy and equal principles—to draw as much as possible from direct taxation, to lay the principal burdens on the wealthy, etc. Even ambitious and unscrupulous men will form their system so as to draw forth the resources of the country in the most favorable and gentle methods, because such will ever be the most productive. They never can hope for success by adopting those arbitrary modes which have been used in some of the States. A gentleman yesterday passed many encomiums on the character and operations of the State governments. The question has not been, whether their laws have produced happy or unhappy effects. The character of our Confederation is the subject of our controversy. But the gentleman concludes too hastily. In many of the States, government has not had a salutary operation. Not only Rhode Island, but several others, have been guilty of indiscretions and misconduct—of acts which have produced misfortunes and dishonor. I grant that the government of New York has operated well, and I ascribe it to the influence of those excellent principles in which the proposed Constitution and our own are so congenial.
We are sensible that private credit is much lower in some States than it is in ours. What is the cause of this? Why is it, at the present period, so low, even in this State? Why is the value of our land depreciated? It is said that there is a scarcity of money in the community. I do not believe this scarcity to be so great as represented. It may not appear; it may be retained by its holders; but nothing more than stability and confidence in the government is requisite to draw it into circulation. It is acknowledged that the General Government has not answered its purposes. Why? We attribute it to the defects of the revenue system. But the gentlemen say, the requisitions have not been obeyed, because the States were impoverished. This is a kind of reasoning that astonishes me. The records of this State—the records of Congress—prove that, during the war, New York had the best reason to complain of non-compliance of the other States. I appeal to the gentleman. Have the States who have suffered least contributed most? No, sir; the fact is directly the reverse. This consideration is sufficient entirely to refute the gentleman's reasoning. Requisitions will ever be attended with the same effects. This depends on principles of human nature that are as infallible as any mathematical calculations. States will contribute, or not, according to their circumstances or interests. They will all be inclined to throw off their burdens of government upon their neighbors. These positions have been so fully illustrated and proved in former stages of this debate, that nothing need be added. Unanswerable experience—stubborn facts—have supported and fixed them. Sir, to what situation is our Congress now reduced? It is notorious that with the most difficulty they maintain their ordinary officers, and support the mere form of a Federal government. How do we stand with respect to foreign nations? It is a fact that should strike us with shame, that we are obliged to borrow money in order to pay the interest of our debts. It is a fact that these debts are every day accumulating by compound interest. This, sir, will one day endanger the peace of our country, and expose us to vicissitudes the most alarming. Such is the character of requisitions—such the melancholy, dangerous, condition to which they have reduced us. Now, sir, after this full and fair experiment, with what countenance do gentlemen come forward to recommend the ruinous principle, and make it the basis of a new government? Why do they affect to cherish this political demon, and present it once more to our embraces? The gentleman observed, that we cannot, even in a single State, collect the whole of a tax; some counties will necessarily be deficient. In the same manner, says he, some States will be delinquent. If this reasoning were just, I should expect to see the States pay, like the counties, in proportion to their ability, which is not the fact. I shall proceed now more particularly to the proposition before the committee. This clearly admits that the unlimited power of taxation, which I have been contending for, is proper. It declares that, after the States have refused to comply with the requisitions, the General Government may enforce its demands. While the gentleman's proposition and principle admit this in its fullest latitude, the whole course of the States is against it. The mode they point out would involve many inconveniences against which they would wish to guard. Suppose the gentleman's scheme should be adopted; would not all the resources of the country be equally in the power of Congress? The States can have but one opportunity of refusal. After having passed through the empty ceremony of a requisition, the General Government can enforce all its demands without limitation or resistance. The States will either comply or they will not. If they comply, they are bound to collect the whole of the tax from the citizens. The people must pay it. What, then, will be the disadvantage of its being levied and collected by Congress, in the first instance? It has been proved, as far as probabilities can go, that the Federal Government will, in general, take the laws of the several States as its rule, and pursue those measures to which the people are most accustomed. But if the States do not comply, what is the consequence? If the power of a compulsion be a misfortune to the State, they must now suffer it without opposition or complaint. I shall show, too, that they must feel it in an aggravated degree. It may frequently happen that, though the States formally comply with the requisitions, the avails will not be fully realized by Congress; the States may be dilatory in the collection and payment, and may form excuses for not paying the whole. There may also be partial compliances, which will subject the Union to inconveniences. Congress, therefore, in laying the tax, will calculate for these losses and inconveniences. They will make allowances for the delays and delinquencies of the States, and apportion their burdens accordingly. They will be induced to demand more than their actual wants. In these circumstances the requisitions will be made upon calculations in some measure arbitrary. Upon the constitutional plan the only inquiry will be: How much is actually wanted? and how much can the object bear, or the people pay? On the gentleman's scheme it will be: What will be the probable deficiencies of the States? for we must increase our demands in proportion, whatever the public wants may be, or whatever may be the abilities of the people. Now, suppose the requisition is totally rejected; it must be levied upon the citizens without reserve. This will be like inflicting a penalty upon the States. It will place them in the light of criminals. Will they suffer this? Will Congress presume so far? If the States solemnly declare they will not comply, does not this imply a determination not to permit the exercise of the coercive power? The gentlemen cannot escape the dilemma into which their own reasoning leads them. If the States comply, the people must be taxed; if they do not comply, the people must equally be taxed. The burden in either case will be the same—the difficulty of collecting the same. Sir, if these operations are merely harmless and indifferent, why play the ridiculous farce? If they are inconvenient, why subject us to their evils? It is infinitely more eligible to lay a tax originally, which will have uniform effects throughout the Union, which will operate equally and silently.