challenge, and accepted the concurrence of five voices only in cases of life and death—and those of persons subject to the influence of the governor and unaccustomed to weigh evidence, or to defer to the maxims of civil tribunals. But if the constitution of the court was a subject of just complaint, the creation of new offences by unauthorised legislation, was still less acceptable to English statists.
The court proceeded smoothly, so long as none but convicts or persons of trivial influence were in question; but the dispute with Governor Bligh disclosed the dangers with which it was fraught: the sympathy of the jurors with the accused frustrated his prosecution, and overthrew the executive.
The esprit du corps of the jurors occasionally appeared in their verdict: the decision of a cause in which an officer was the aggressor, or one which interested the passions, did not command the confidence of the people.
The jeopardy of justice was illustrated by a dispute, in which the Rev. Mr. Marsden was complainant, and the secretary of the governor the defendant. Mr. Campbell was the censor of the New South Wales press: he admitted an article, which imputed to Mr. Marsden (1817) the abuse of his office as agent for the missionary societies, and of using muskets and gunpowder as articles of traffic with the natives of the Pacific. The judge advocate in this instance was said to attempt to shelter the offender by the influence of his three-fold office—as the law adviser of the governor, the public prosecutor, and member of the court of criminal jurisdiction. His reluctance to admit the evidence, and to take the preliminary steps in the prosecution, and his direction to deliver an inoperative verdict, were held fatal evidences that impartiality could not be secured by uniting functions so inconsistent with each other.
The jurors were not unfrequently interested: in some instances the prosecutor sat as witness and judge, giving the principal evidence in the case in which he was both to decide the guilt and apportion the punishment.[80]
The establishment of a court of criminal jurisdiction was alone authorised by the parliament: the necessity for supplemental laws was not foreseen, but was soon perceived. The governors assumed the legislative authority, under the disguise of orders and regulations, often contrary to the principles of English law, and sustained by penalties unknown in Great Britain. These were not collated until a late period: their provisions were imperfectly promulgated. In enforcing them, the governors relied on the impotence of resistance, and justified their enactment on the ground of expediency.
Had the parliament conveyed a legislative power, the ordinary precautions and limitations would have been embodied for that purpose: thus the free subjects of the king would have known the extent of their liabilities, both to prohibitions and penalties. An unfettered despotism drew no distinction, but rejected all questions of legality as contumacious.
Among the subordinate officers, were some high in rank, natives of France, who had emigrated during the revolution, or had by incurring the hatred of its government deserved the patronage of our own. Profoundly indifferent to the rights of freedom, and ignorant of the forms or proper subjects of judicial investigation, an "order" was far more sacred in their eyes, than the volumes of Blackstone. English gentlemen might have recalled the solemn warnings of history which check aggressions on private liberty, but an exiled adherent of Bourbon princes was not likely to be embarrassed by educational prejudices. Not that British officers were really more scrupulous, or offered by their habits a better guarantee for the legality of their administration.[81]
The minor offences of prisoners passed under the summary adjudication of magistrates. They often indulged in the lowest humour or furious passion: they applied torture to extract confessions, and repeated flagellation until it became dangerous to life.
The long delay of legislative remedies, when omissions and defects were discovered, is a proof of ministerial indifference. The crown provided a court of criminal jurisdiction for Port Phillip: the jurisdiction was strictly local, and the judge advocate ceased to act when Van Diemen's Land was occupied; but twenty years elapsed before the deficiency was supplied. Again, the criminal court of New South Wales was limited to islands adjacent to the eastern coast.[82] The discovery of Bass's Strait proved that Van Diemen's Land was not included in this geographical definition, and the scrupulous or idle judges for a long time evaded the holding of courts in this island, which was thus surrendered to disorder. In the absence of a legal court, the magistrates set up a jurisdiction of their own. Criminal trials were dispatched by the simplest process, and the mixed penalties of a military and civil court inflicted on the assumed offender.[83] Thus, the negligent provision for the administration of justice secured impunity to crime, or seemed to require an arbitrary tribunal.
The proclamation of martial law, was to relieve the government from the restraints of forms. The facility with which justice could be administered by it, was illustrated at the Castle Hill insurrection: no life being lost on the government side, the victorious troops arranged that every third man convicted should be hanged. They drew the names of the sufferers by lot, and were proceeding with great vigour, when the appearance of the governor suspended the execution.[84] The dangerous usurpation in both Norfolk Island and Van Diemen's Land, led to the hasty sacrifice of life.
The scarcity of corn was once deemed a sufficient justification, when there was no appearance of sedition: at these times the government seized boats, or whatever was deemed useful for the public service, and imitated the most irregular actions of the Stuarts.
The subordinate authorities were supposed to partake the license of their superiors. One commandant, Colonel Geils, fixed a spiked collar on the neck of a free woman; another flogged a female through Hobart Town for abusive language; and another tied up a free man on the spot, for placarding a grievance, when as yet there was no press.[85] Davey, having ordered a person to the triangles, answered his remonstrances with a pleasant jest: the sufferer reminded him that he could not flog him; the governor answered that "he would try," and the flagellator soon determined the problem in favor of authority. Indignant exclamations of free men were deemed preposterous by a body of officials, who regarded the diffidence of civil government as absurd, and considered power as the standard of right.
The administration of justice is described by a work of the times:—"I have known," wrote a contemporary witness, "men, without trial, sentenced to transportation by a single magistrate at his own door: free men, after being acquitted by a court of criminal judicature, banished to another of the dependant settlements. I have heard a magistrate tell a prisoner (then being examined for a capital offence, and who had some goods, supposed to be stolen, for which he would not account), that were he not going to be hanged so soon, he (the magistrate) would make him say whence he got them. I have known depositions destroyed by the magistrate."[86]
The courts were limited by the laws in force within the realm, but the realm was not defined;[87] and thus what portion of the law was applicable, was left in thirty years' doubt, until the commissioner royal stated that the omission had prevented several executions.[88] The same number of years were required to ascertain whether laws passed in Great Britain subsequent to the era of colonisation were the laws of the colony.
Law officers of the crown were permitted to define authoritatively the import of acts of parliament, and on their official decisions the colonial judge convicted, and the governor executed a criminal.[89]
The persons commissioned as justices constituted a court in avowed conformity with such tribunals in England, but they adjudicated on the orders of the governor,