and medium-range weapons, as well as rivalry in the development of space weapons and cyber warfare.
Beginning in the mid-2020s, the United States plans to modernize its strategic triad: new systems to replace the current heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs.45 And Russia continues to modernize its triad, deploying and developing two new ICBM systems (Yars and Sarmat), one SLBM system (Borei-Bulava), and two heavy bomber systems (modernized Tu-160M and PAK DA).
In addition, the United States is developing the above-mentioned systems for limited nuclear strikes (Trident-2 SLBMs with low-yield warheads, LRSO, B61-12, and nuclear sea-based cruise missiles). And Russia is developing the strategic systems unveiled in Putin’s March 1, 2018, address (that is, Burevestnik nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missiles, Avangard hypersonic gliders, and Poseidon long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed super-torpedoes).46 The impact of these weapons on strategic stability requires special analysis, but is unlikely to be positive.
In addition, this arms race will be multilateral, involving states such as China, NATO members, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Japan, and others. The start of a nuclear arms race would undoubtedly undermine the norms and regimes for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2015 ended in failure. The next conference in 2020 was doomed to fail, but was postponed by about a year due to the Covid-19 pandemics. Still it may end in the same way, especially in light of the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal and a number of other deep controversies among the treaty member-states. This would likely be followed by the collapse of the CTBT, which for twenty-four years has not entered into force because of the refusal of the United States and a number of other states to ratify it. Nor is there much hope for progress in negotiating the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which has been stalled for more than a quarter-century. Iran and Saudi Arabia will likely join the nuclear club, as may Egypt, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Nigeria, South-African Republic, Brazil, and other countries. Through them, nuclear weapons will sooner or later inevitably fall into the hands of international terrorists, with all the ensuing consequences.
Renewing Strategic Stability and Arms Control
At the Valdai forum in Sochi in 2016, Putin said “nuclear weapons are for deterrence and a factor of ensuring peace and security worldwide,” and cannot be considered “a factor of any potential aggression.”47
As can be seen from the above analysis, nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security with one crucial reservation: namely, that it can only work in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Without such checks, nuclear deterrence goes berserk. It endlessly fuels the arms race, brings the great powers to the brink of nuclear war in any serious crisis, and sometimes the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence can instigate confrontation.
By the early 1960s, the world had gone through a series of increasingly dangerous crises, edging closer to the brink of nuclear war. The culmination was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when sheer luck saved humanity from disaster. Only after that, with the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, did the construction of a legal, treaty-based system of control over nuclear arms begin.
A few years ago, the world once again embarked on the pernicious path of confrontation and military competition, as all areas of arms control stalled for technical, strategic, and political reasons. Only through the strengthening of strategic stability, rehabilitation, and improvement of the nuclear arms control system can we turn away from the path to the nuclear brink.
The Soviet-U.S. concept of strategic stability agreed upon in 1990 was perhaps even more revolutionary than the authors themselves understood.48 It stipulated that the two sides recognized each other’s right to a nuclear strike capability as a guarantor of their own security, but undertook not to develop offensive and defensive weapons that would deprive the other party of such an insurance. Moreover, the limitation of damage from a hypothetical nuclear war should not be carried out by developing disarming strike capabilities, large-scale anti-missile defenses, and options for the selective use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it had to be achieved through minimizing the likelihood of such a war politically and reducing the destructive arsenals through treaties, transparency, and confidence-building measures, as well as improving mutual understanding of military doctrines and concepts.
Such a policy is not possible if the powers independently develop concepts, operational plans, and deterrence capabilities, since those are always aimed at defeating the alleged enemy “if deterrence fails.” As stated in the Russian military doctrine, in an analogy to U.S. strategic documents and those published by other states, the purpose of the armed forces is “defeating the aggressor’s troops (forces) and forcing the aggressor to cease hostilities on terms and conditions suiting the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies.”49
However, deterrence in a crisis may collapse simply under the weight of plans and capabilities intended to deter the enemy. Responsibility for the decision to launch a nuclear strike is laid by the military at the feet of politicians, but those politicians are hostage to the operational plans and technical characteristics of weapons developed by the military and engineers.
Only an understanding of strategic stability that is agreed upon by both sides and embodied in arms limitation and reduction agreements can put strict limits on destabilizing concepts, plans, and arms of nuclear deterrence. Elements of this philosophy were enshrined in the 1990 strategic stability document.
Now, as then, the conditions of strategic stability can only be imagined between Russia and the United States if this concept is to have clear meaning (elimination of incentives for a nuclear first strike) rather than stand as wishful thinking for international peace and harmony. However, after nearly thirty years, it would be crucial to update the agreed principles of strategic stability in light of the changes that have taken place.
Moreover, the very definition of stability in Russian-U.S. strategic relations should be expanded to include not only “eliminating incentives for a nuclear first strike” but also “incentives for any use of nuclear weapons.” With regard to deterring a conventional attack, it primarily should be based on sufficient general-purpose forces and capabilities and, better still, on agreements such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1990).
Further to that point, the meaning of the provision on “measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles” and “giving priority to highly survivable systems” should be expressed not indirectly but directly, and with mutual recognition that weapons systems threatening the survival of strategic forces and their command-and-control are destabilizing and should be limited and reduced as a matter of priority. If this condition is met, launch-on-warning concepts should be mutually cancelled in light of the possibility of initiating nuclear war due to false alarms, unauthorized use, or cyber sabotage.
In addition, weapons systems that blur the line between nuclear and conventional arms (that is, dual-purpose) should be recognized as destabilizing and should be subject to mutual restrictions and confidence-building measures.
Missile defense systems intended to protect against third countries and non-state actors should once again be the subject of a mutually agreed “relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms.”
Space weapons—above all, antisatellite systems—should be acknowledged as destabilizing and be subject to a verifiable ban. Cyber warfare against each other’s strategic command-and-control information systems is also destabilizing and should be subject to prohibitions and confidence-building measures.
Both sides should recognize that their nuclear doctrines and weapons could create the risk of unintended