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The Political Economy of the BRICS Countries


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between December 2012 and October 2017. More than 150 top-ranking officials in the bureaucracy, military, and private-sector businesses have lost their jobs because of the campaign (Mitchell, 2017). In particular, the campaign is likely to help small entrepreneurs increase their investment since corruption is often one of the biggest hurdles to additional investment for them (Gianetti et al., 2017).

      South Africa inherited a deeply flawed economic system when it became a democratic country in 1994. Poverty was widespread, society was deeply divided, and the government bureaucracy and infrastructure that the new government inherited were designed to serve only a minority of the population (Pillay, 2004: 588). Policies enacted to address the problems of economic inequality afflicting the country further entrenched rather than reduced inequality. Government policy initiatives stressed a system of racial preferences in ownership and employment that easily lent itself to political capture. An increase in black ownership of firms was achieved through debt-funded purchases of equity by a small number of black entrepreneurs (Handley, 2005: 220). Many of these entrepreneurs were closely connected to the ruling African National Congress. In the absence of sufficient number of blacks with the requisite skills to take advantage of the opportunities provided by BEE legislation, the positive impact has been more in terms of number of blacks in senior board positions rather than in employment. The major benefits in terms of BEE legislation have accrued to a newly emerging ‘black middle class’, which has benefited from increased opportunities for employment, rather than to poorer blacks (Horwitz and Jain, 2011: 314; Iheduru, 2004).

      Conclusion

      It is not surprising that the BRICS economies would seek to play a much greater role in global politics, given the rapid growth of their economies, and their increasing share of global economic output. With international political and economic institutions still structured to reflect immediate post-World War II economic realities, it is also clear that international reform of these institutions is long overdue. The ability of the BRICS economies to influence the G7 to initiate these reforms is, however, constrained both by differences between them and also by their domestic vulnerabilities. While all the five BRICS economies have seen periods of rapid economic growth, continuing income inequalities and the non-inclusive nature of their growth make them susceptible to domestic instability. Rising economic inequality could undermine domestic stability, further reducing their ability to work together internationally. The effectiveness of BRICS as an emerging power bloc might be more apparent than real.

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