imperialistic but also into democratic sections of the people, it took on a very liberal complexion. It was not Protectionist nor Monopolist, but had Free-Trade affinities, according to the principle of the Open Door.
Thus England contrived during the whole of the nineteenth century that no other Power should cast a threatening glance upon her naval supremacy. Germany alone began this threatening policy, at the close of the nineteenth century, when England's supremacy was demanded, as a matter of life and death, far more imperatively than in the time of Napoleon I.
Anyone who knows England and the English must be aware that the German naval programme was alone sufficient to bring round ever increasing sections of the English population to the notion that Germany must at any cost be made to put a stop to her naval preparations, even through a war, if not otherwise—a war which, thanks to Germany's former policy, also threatened to array against her Russia and France.
Herr von Bülow, who inaugurated this fatal policy, himself confesses that it threatened Germany with war. In his book on “The Policy of Germany” which appeared in 1916, he writes:
“During the first ten years after the introduction of the Navy Bill of 1897 and the beginning of our ship-building, an English policy, pursued with relentless determination, would no doubt have been in a position forcibly to prevent the development of Germany as a Naval Power, and to make us incapable of doing harm before our claws, in naval matters, were grown.... And in the eighteenth month of the war the ‘Frankfurter Zeitung’ confirms the view that when it had come to a settlement by force of arms England had sorrowfully to perceive that, in spite of all her schemes of encirclement, she had missed the right moment when she could have reduced her dreaded competitor to insignificance.”—Page 40.
So the naval policy was undertaken at the peril of inciting England to war with Germany. If it did not at once come to that, it was no fault of German policy; it was the restraint of England, which, instead of violently striking down the threatening foe in war, preferred the so-called “encirclement” policy, that is to say, the promotion of that isolation of Germany which her own world-policy had brought about.
The lamentable effects of the equally senseless and provocative naval policy of Germany were intensified by her obstinate sabotage of all attempts at an international understanding as to a general limitation of armaments, and at the settling of international conflicts by peaceful methods through courts of arbitration.
This was clear even at the first Hague Conference of 1899, which was concerned with the above objects.
“It was just at the time when the Hague Conference was sitting that the German Kaiser made his speech at Wiesbaden, in which he declared that a ‘well-ground sword’ was the best guarantee of peace.” [1]
At this Conference the German delegate could not be got to vote for obligatory arbitration even in cases of demands for compensation or of juridical controversies. Even these insignificant limitations of the settlement of international conflicts by force were wrecked on the opposition of Germany, which, later on, rejected all attempts to arrive at a limitation of armaments.
What wonder that hatred of Germany spread throughout the world, not only among the rival Imperial Powers, but also among the champions of international peace and freedom!
The rôle which Tsarism had hitherto played as the worst enemy of the European democracy now fell more and more to the German military monarchy. A more senseless policy could hardly have been conceived. It stood condemned not only from the point of view of international Socialism, but also from that of any Imperialism which should try to take account of the existing position of forces. A reasonable imperialistic policy for Germany would never have been such as to call forth simultaneously the enmity both of Russia and of England, the two Powers which, with Germany, dominated Europe. It must, on the one hand, to gain its ends against Russia and her ally, France, have enlisted the support of England, which meant, above all, the abandonment of her naval competition. And this would have meant, in accordance with the character of English policy, the triumph of the principle of the Open Door throughout the whole world—a principle which offered the most brilliant prospects to German industry.
But this would not, indeed, have been a policy after the hearts of the ironmasters, monopolists and militarists. The grand object of these was extension at the cost of England. In that case, however, it was necessary to come to an understanding with Russia. Germany, in alliance with Russia and thus more fully ensured against danger from France, might with an easy mind have taken up the naval competition with England. In case of war the English could do Germany no great harm. They might occupy her colonies, suppress her ocean-trade, but could not starve her out. Germany, on the contrary, with the help of Russia on land, would have been able to wreck the foundations of England's world-position and to achieve what Napoleon I. had in other wars in vain endeavoured to effect, namely, the occupation of Egypt and an advance on India.
It was sheer insanity to attempt the overthrow of England, not in union with Russia, but in war with with Russia, France, and with the whole world.
1 ↑ Fried: “Handbook of the Peace Movement,” p. 171.
CHAPTER III
GERMAN PROVOCATIONS
For the moment, German policy did not mean war with the whole world. It did, however, involve the danger of such a war. The stronger the encirclement, the more complete the isolation of Germany, the more necessary it became, in her own interests, to avoid any provocative action that might entangle her in war.
The Marxist who contends that imperialism would have brought about a war in any case, whatever policy Germany had pursued, is like one who should defend a pack of silly boys for amusing themselves by throwing matches into a cask of gunpowder. The boys, he maintains, are not to blame for the devastating explosion which followed their practices, it is the circumstance that there was powder in the cask. Had there been water in it, nothing would have happened. No doubt. But in our case the boys knew there was powder in the cask—they had put a good deal of it in themselves.
One might indeed say that the greater Germany's isolation, and the more threatening the danger of a world-war, the more her provocations increased.
The growing danger itself had the effect of intensifying the bitterness on both sides; it formed a new impulse towards the increase of armaments and thereby towards the strengthening of warlike influences. It fatally increased the number of those who believed war to be unavoidable, and who therefore urged that it should be let loose, as a preventive war, at the moment when circumstances were favourable to Germany and embarrassing to the enemy.
In Germany, step by step with her military preparations, grew also the confidence in her strength. This displayed itself in many circles as a veritable megalomania, basing itself on the history of Prussia, which for a century and a half had, with the exception of Jena, nothing but victories on its record.
The pan-German section in particular exceeded all bounds in the provocations it uttered. These were of serious significance, for the pan-Germans were the leading element in those circles of society which formed the ruling class in Germany and from which its Government sprang.
The mischief was still more increased by the personality of the Kaiser, whose mind was militarist through and through, and at the same time superficial, excessively vain, and devoted to theatrical effect. He never shrank from demonstrations and speeches of the most challenging kind when he believed that they would impress those around him.
We have already noted that in the days of the first Hague Conference he declared that, as against courts of arbitration and disarmament, a well-ground sword was the best guarantee of peace.
One year later (July 27th, 1900), when troops were embarking for China at Bremerhaven,