truly substantial element, subjectivity opposes feeling, and to this substantial element and to the thinking knowledge of it it opposes immediate knowledge. Here, however, we do not stay to consider the nature of action, but simply remark that it is just this substantial element, represented by the laws of justice and morality and the commandments of God, which is by its very nature the true Universal, and has consequently its root and basis in the region of thought. If sometimes the laws of justice and morality are regarded merely as arbitrary commands of God—which would mean, in fact, that they were irrational—still it would take us too far to make that our starting-point. But the putting on a permanent basis and the investigation of the conviction, on the part of the conscious subject, of the truth of the principles which ought to constitute for him the basis of his action, is thinking knowledge. While the unsophisticated heart yields itself up to these principles, its insight is as yet so undeveloped, and any pretension on its part to independence is so foreign to it, that it reaches them rather by the road of authority, and thus this part of the heart in which they are implanted is alone the place of conscious thought, for they are themselves the thoughts of action, and are inherently universal principles. This heart cannot, therefore, offer any opposition to the development of what is its own objective basis, any more than it can to that of those truths which belong to it, and which at first appear in themselves rather as theoretical truths pertaining to its religious faith. As, however, this possession, and the intensity which characterises it, are already in the heart only through the mediation of education, which has asserted its influence upon its thought and knowledge just as it has upon its volition, so, in a still greater degree, the further developed content, and the alteration in the circle of its ideas which are implicitly native to the place where they are found, also represent mediating knowledge mediated into the conscious form of thought.
Lecture 5
FIFTH LECTURE
We may sum up what has gone before as follows. The heart ought not to have any dread of knowledge; the determinateness of feeling, the content of the heart, ought to have a substantial form. Feeling or the heart must be filled by the Thing or true object by what actually exists, and consequently be broad and true in character. But this Thing, this substantial element, is simply the truth of the Divine Spirit, the Universal in-and-for-itself, though just because of this it is not the abstract Universal, but the Universal in the development which belongs essentially to itself. The substantial element is thus essentially implicit thought, and exists in thought. But thought, what constitutes the really inner nature of faith itself, if it is to be known as essential and true—in so far as faith is no longer something implicit and merely natural, but is regarded as having entered into the sphere of knowledge with all its requirements and claims—must at the same time be known as something necessary, and must have gained a consciousness of itself and of the connected nature of its development. It thus extends and proves itself at the same time; for, speaking generally, to prove simply means to become conscious of the connection, and consequently of the necessity of things, and in relation to our present design it means the recognition of the particular content in the Universal in-and-for-itself, and of how this absolute truth itself is the result, and is consequently the final truth of all particular content. This connection, which is thus present to consciousness, must not be a subjective movement of thought outside of reality, but must follow this latter, and must simply unfold its meaning and necessity. Knowledge is just this unfolding of the objective movement of the content, of the inner necessity which essentially belongs to it, and it is true knowledge since it is in unity with the object. For us this object must be the elevation of our spirit to God, and is thus what we have referred to as the necessity of absolute truth in the form of that final result into which everything returns in the Spirit.
But because it contains the name of God, the mention of this end may easily have the effect of rendering worthless all that was urged against the false ideas of knowledge, cognition, and feeling, and all that was gained in the way of a conception of true knowledge.
It has already been remarked that the question as to whether our reason can know God, was made a formal one; that is to say, it was referred to the criticism of knowledge, of rational knowledge in general, and connected with the nature of faith and feeling in such a way that what is included under these special heads is to be understood apart altogether from any content. This is the position taken up by immediate knowledge, which itself speaks with the fruit of the tree of knowledge in its mouth, and transfers the problem to the formal sphere since it bases the justification of such knowledge, and of this exclusively, on the reflections which it makes regarding proof and philosophical knowledge, and as a consequence it has to put the true and infinite content outside of the range of its reflections, because it does not get beyond the idea of finite knowledge and cognition. With this presupposition of a knowledge and cognition which are merely finite, we contrasted the knowledge which does not remain outside of the Thing or true reality, but which, without introducing any of its own qualities, simply follows the course of true reality, and we have directed attention to the substantial element in feeling and the heart, and have shown that, speaking generally, it exists essentially for consciousness and for conscious thought, in so far as its truth has to be worked out in what constitutes its most inner nature. But owing to the mention of the name of God, this object defined as knowledge in general, as well as the study of it, have been forced into an inferior position, and connected with that subjective way of looking at things for which God is something above. Since, in what has gone before, this aspect of the matter has received sufficient elucidation, and can be here indicated merely, rather than examined in detail, the only other thing to do would be to explain the relation of God in and to knowledge as deduced from the nature of God. In connection with this it may be remarked, first of all, that our subject, namely, the elevation of the subjective spirit to God, directly implies that in this very act of elevation the one-sidedness of knowledge, that is, its subjectivity, is abolished, and that it is itself essentially this process of abolition and absorption. Consequently, the knowledge of the other side of the subject, namely, the nature of God, and, together with this, His relation in and to knowledge, comes in here of itself. But there is one drawback connected with what is of an introductory and incidental character, and is yet necessary here, and it is this, that any thorough treatment of the subject renders it superfluous. Still we may so far anticipate as to say that there can be no thought here of carrying our treatment of the subject to the point reached by the explanation so intimately connected with it, of the self-consciousness of God, and of the relation of His knowledge of Himself to the knowledge of Himself in and through the human spirit. Without referring you here to the more abstract and systematic discussions on this subject to be found in my other works, I may call attention to a very remarkable book which has recently appeared, entitled, “Aphorisms on Agnosticism and Absolute Knowledge in Relation to the Science of Christian Faith,” by C. Fr. G l (Berlin: C. Franklin). It makes reference to my statement of philosophical principles, and contains quite as much thoroughly grounded Christian belief as it does speculative and philosophical depth. It throws light on all the points of view from which the Understanding directs its attack on the Christianity of knowledge, and answers the objections and counter-arguments which the theory of agnosticism (Nichtwissen) has brought against philosophy. It shows in particular the misunderstanding and the want of understanding of which the pious consciousness is guilty when it ranges itself on the side of the explaining Understanding in connection with the principle of agnosticism, and thus makes common cause with it in its opposition to speculative philosophy. What is there advanced regarding the self-consciousness of God, His knowledge of Himself in men, and Man’s knowledge of himself in God, has direct reference to the point of view just indicated, and it is marked by speculative thoroughness while casting light on the false opinions which have been attributed alike to philosophy and to Christianity in connection with these subjects.
But even in connection with the purely general ideas to which we here confine ourselves, in order that, taking God as the starting-point, we may discuss the relation in which He stands to the human spirit, we are met more than anywhere else by an assumption which is in contradiction with any such design—namely, that we do not know God; that even