In the domain of psychoanalysis and in numerous psychoanalytic theories, solitude, as a state of being alone, has been described as a fundamental and potentially beneficial human experience and has been ascribed a variety of meanings (Buchholz, 1997; Modell, 1993; Storr, 1988; see also Coplan, Bowker, & Nelson, Chapter 1). However, there have been few psychoanalytically informed empirical studies on beneficial (or potentially beneficial) solitude as a personality enhancing and constructive experience of aloneness. In contrast, from the psychoanalytic standpoint, loneliness, as the painful experience of being alone, has been the topic of a few well‐known studies, published some decades ago (e.g., Fromm‐Reichmann, 1959; Klein, 1975), and more recently (e.g., Quinodoz, 1991/1993), by clinicians. Empirical investigations into the origins of beneficial solitude from various psychoanalytic perspectives, however, are appropriate and potentially useful, for the following three reasons: (i) psychoanalysis has placed much emphasis on the decisive role of early life experiences, therefore the origins of solitude are also of great importance; (ii) most psychoanalytic models focus on what is the essence of solitude, that is, on the complex relation between the inner/private and the outer/social realm of human experience; and (iii) psychoanalysis, as a psychotherapeutic method based on a two‐person relationship and aiming at uncovering the unconscious layers of personality, is expected to alleviate loneliness and promote beneficial aloneness.
In the chapter, several psychoanalytic views on the origins of beneficial solitude, its developmental course during the first years of life and its implications for later development will be discussed and evaluated, organized around three dimensions: the solitary self, the ability to be alone and the necessity of being alone, as well as the companionable nature of solitude. Finally, conclusions will be drawn and future directions will be described, concerning the paradox of solitude, which I argue is evident from the beginning of life.
The Solitary Self
Autoerotism, Primary Narcissism, and Secondary Narcissism
The concepts of autoerotism, primary narcissism, and secondary narcissism are very important in the understanding of the origins, first manifestations, and development of the solitary self. According to Sigmund Freud (1905/1953), in the beginning of life the sexual drive is supported by the self‐preservative instinct (i.e., anaclitic relationship). This means that it is the vital function of nourishment, mainly from the mother (her breast or breast substitute), which satisfies the infant’s instinctual drive and provides pleasure, with the mouth being the first erotogenic zone. Thus, when the sexual drive detaches itself from the need for nourishment, it is directed toward the infant’s own body. This is the state of autoerotism, a typical manifestation of which is thumb sucking. By responding to the infant’s need and reducing his/her excitation, the mother provides a compensation for the infant’s typical sense of helplessness, thus creating an original experience of satisfaction (Freud, 1895/1966). This is the context within which the wish emerges, that is, the individual’s impulse to cathect (i.e., invest) an animate or inanimate object with libido (i.e., psychic energy associated with the drives) and connect with it and with the satisfaction it provides. During the mother’s absence, the infant seeks to repeat the remembered real experience. Relying on the memory image of the mother, the infant creates, with his/her own body and in a hallucinatory manner, a perceptually identical experience – a process called hallucinatory wish fulfillment. As a consequence, both the real and the hallucinatory satisfaction become the foundation and the prototype of the wish, which is what makes us human.
Gradually, the infant proceeds in unifying his/her body image and establishing the ego, cathected with libido. This means that the infant is in a state of primary narcissism, in which the self and the object are undifferentiated (Freud, 1914/1957b). Later, Freud (1916–1917/1963) regarded primary narcissism as the first stage of life, prior to the emergence of the ego and not different from autoerotism, which came to be regarded as the sexual activity typical of the narcissistic stage.
In Freudian theory, development is conceived as a gradual differentiation of the subject from the object, as the process of cathecting objects (initially the mother) and as the reduction of omnipotence. Although primary narcissism declines by the end of infancy, the ego is still cathected with libido, and an energy balance between ego libido and object libido occurs (i.e., an increase in the one entails a decrease in the other). Moreover, the residues of primary narcissism are manifest throughout the life span in the individual’s ego ideal (e.g., ideals, ambitions). However, a regression to primary narcissism is likely, even from the early years of life, and takes the form of the reinvestment of the ego, which means that libido is withdrawn from objects, and the narcissistic identification with objects, which means relating with objects on the basis of ego libido. This state is called secondary narcissism and is observed, albeit with varying degrees and qualities, in both normal and pathological psychic organizations (Freud, 1914/1957b).
Autoerotism and primary narcissism seem to represent a state of primary aloneness, in Freudian theory. The infant is immersed in omnipotent self‐sufficiency, in which satisfaction is achieved through an equally omnipotent other, who is not perceived as a separate being and is not yet internalized by the infant. This undifferentiated state may be regarded as an aloneness state because it is an objectless or pre‐objectal period of life, during which, paradoxically, being one with the caregiver reduces the typical infant helplessness and ensures survival. However, Freudian texts reflect an ambivalence toward the infant’s ability to perceive a separate other from the start. For example, in one of his earliest essays Freud (1895/1966) articulated the existence of another, a fellow human‐being, early in infancy. He argued that the relation with this being, the mother, who is the first object of love and hate, and the only source of help, is the context within which “a human‐being learns to cognize” (p. 331). If a mirror relation is what characterizes primary narcissism (in mythology Narcissus was in love with his own image or the image of his twin sister), then, as Laplanche and Pontalis (1967/1973) argued, it is not an objectless state. Put differently, it is an aloneness state in the sense that the infant experiences the mother as a “mirror” or “double” of his/her emerging ego. Furthermore, during moments when the infant is inevitably alone, he/she may not be overwhelmed by despair, but is able to sustain the investment on his/her own body and the outer world by resorting to fantasy as a means of wish fulfillment.
In addition, the notion of secondary narcissism may be regarded both as expressing defensive withdrawal in front of pressure and beneficial solitude enhancing creativity (see Paulus, Kenworthy, & Marusich, Chapter 19). Evidence supporting this argument comes from Freud’s own life experiences. When recollecting the early years of his career, Freud (1914/1957c) admitted that he suffered from loneliness, caused mainly by the difficulties he encountered in his psychoanalytic investigations and in the reception of his ideas by his contemporaries. Therefore, he seems to have experienced a mixture of involuntary and voluntary isolation, which was “not without its advantages and charms” (p. 22). He described this solitude as freedom from daily pressures and as a domain of discoveries, creativity and originality, which required effort and courage but yielded much narcissistic gratification – he felt as Robinson Crusoe in that “glorious heroic age” (p. 22). Splendid isolation (a term used to describe the British foreign policy) was the name Freud used for this beneficial solitude (in a letter to Jung; see Freud et al., 1976), which was a necessary prerequisite for scientific contribution. I argue that, when revealing his own experiences of aloneness, isolation, and solitude, Freud is referring to secondary narcissism, as described above.
Further evidence supporting that voluntary isolation when faced with adversity is likely to be a regression to primary narcissism (i.e., secondary narcissism) comes from Freud’s (1930/1961) famous essay on civilization. He argued that in order to avoid the suffering which stems from human relations, we withdraw ourselves, and in the resulting state of peacefulness, we search for solutions – on our own. We may build a private world through, for example, working, creating in art and science, and enjoying art and beauty, or by surrendering