a coherent grand narrative—in this case, the conspiracy myth of the NWO. The accounts of several members of this group highlighted these processes: ‘When we first came together it was just about Islam, but it is about so much more now’.
This process of “doing my own research” and sharing it within a group of likeminded others, as well as the outcome of these processes, i.e., the belief in an ideological meta-narrative that identifies a secrete global elite and their “puppets” in government as being responsible for all social ills, form an alternative system of knowledge. Similar to dogmatic interpretation of religious belief systems, it offers morally charged, simplistic answers to highly complex questions. This quasi-religious epistemology, whilst rooted in a combination of ultra-nationalistic and aggressively anti-egalitarian tropes, draws heavily on conspiratorial thinking. It is positioned in explicit opposition to the established “mainstream” epistemology, based on reason, science and provable facts, and controlled by the very same elites allegedly responsible for the demise of society. As such, this conspiracy theory-driven knowledge system reinforces boundaries between in-group and out-group, whereby strengthening internal solidarity and belonging and discrediting the others who are considered to be part of the establishment: local councils, governments, universities, and mainstream media. Any attempt by these “elite” agencies to challenge the in-group’s convictions, for instance through rational arguments or counternarratives, may backfire as it can be regarded as a deliberate manipulation attempt by the out-group and hence ‘perpetuate the original conspiracy theories’, as Holbrook recently argued.3
The alternative epistemologies within the radical right are powerful and difficult to refute from outside, also because they often serve a deeper psychological purpose for the individual. They offer something that people who feel disenfranchised may seek and feel they deserve but society has denied them: a sense of recognition, control and power in a social environment, both locally and globally, that is complexly interconnected, constantly changing and characterised by uncertainty and ambiguity.
Dr Mario Peucker is a Senior Fellow at CARR and senior research fellow at the Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities at Victoria University, Melbourne.
1 James M. Jasper, “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research,” Annual Review of Sociology 37, no. 1 (2011): 285-303.
2 Hedieh Mirahmadi, “Building Resilience against Violent Extremism: A Community-Based Approach,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, no. 1 (2016): 129-44; Matteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, Ekin Ilbahar and Greg Barton, “The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, no. 10 (2020): 854-85.
3 Donald Holbrook, “The Challenge of Conspiracy Theories for Strategic Communications,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 1 (2020): 26-36.
Radical Right Voters and Democratic Support
Nicolas Bichay
The rise of radical right parties is considered by many to be one of the largest modern threats to liberal democracy.1 There is a strong pattern of populist and radical leaders eroding constraints on the executive,2 diminishing press freedom,3 and harming the quality of elections to benefit themselves.4
But what about these parties’ voters? Do radical right voters exhibit overtly anti-democratic rhetoric? In other words, do voters of radical right parties knowingly hold and agree with anti-democratic attitudes? Or, rather, do they support these parties for other ideological reasons, while disagreeing with their anti-democratic tendencies?
On the one hand, it may simply be the case that voters support a radical right party for their policy proposals, for example their attention to immigration, the global economy, and promise of removing corrupt elites from government that, in their mind, other mainstream parties ignore. In such cases, cognitive dissidence may play a role in their determination that such parties are not really a threat to democracy and claims to the contrary are simply “fake news”. Or perhaps voters do believe these claims yet dub them a “necessary evil” worth the cost to restore the country to its “rightful place”.
On the other hand, there is a possibility that voters acknowledge the harms to democracy caused by the party they support and agree with these anti-democratic positions. The rhetoric of these parties is often categorized as anti-pluralist,5 with both voters and candidates believing that their party is the only one capable of solving the nation’s current problems. Thus, voters may be interpreting this situation as one which necessitates removing any limitations to the party’s rule. This scenario surely constitutes the more dangerous situation.
Public opinion data
For all the work done examining the relationship between the radical right and democracy, this important aspect of voter opinion still remains unclear. In fact, recent work has suggested that radical right voters are actually more supportive of democracy than their centrist counterparts,6 further complicating the issue. However, there is some anecdotal evidence that voters may indeed knowingly hold anti-democratic views. For example, the 2017 referendum that greatly consolidated executive power7 in Turkey held very high support from voters of the ruling populist right Justice and Development Party (90%), while maintaining overwhelming opposition from supporters of all other parties.8
To gain more insight on this important question, I analysed public opinion data from the European Value Survey (EVS). The EVS is a large-scale public opinion survey that has been conducted every nine years in Europe since 1981. It asks several questions with regard to democratic support on topics ranging from the importance of free and fair elections to the appropriateness of the military seizing power. I used these questions as a way to measure democratic support amongst respondents. Following Rooduijn et al.’s classification of what constitutes a radical right party,9 I outline the differences in opinion on democracy between EVS respondents who supported a radical right party, compared to supporters of all other parties below.
| Question | Non-Radical-Right Support | Radical-Right Support |
| Having a democratic political system is “very good” | 60% | 45% |
| Having a strong leader who doesn’t bother with elections or parliament is “very good” | 6% | 7% |
| Free and fair elections are an “essential characteristic of democracy” | 61% | 58% |
| Having the army rule the country is “very bad” | 65% | 46% |
|
The army takes over when government is incompetent is an “essential
|